GIFT   OF 
MICHAEL 


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<^s. 


AMERICAN  POLICY 


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AMERICAN    POLICY 

THE  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 
IN  ITS  RELATION  TO  THE   EASTERN 


BY 

JOHN    BIGELOW 

MAJOR  U.  S.  ARMY,  RETIRED 
AUTHOR    OF    "mars-la-tour    AND    GRAVELOTTE";     "THE    PRINCIPLES    OF 

strategy";  "reminiscences  of  the  SANTIAGO  campaign"? 
"the  campaign  of  chancellorsville." 


NEW  YORK 
CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 


o1 


Copyright,  1914,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  April,  1914 


^^ 


PREFACE 

The  subjects  of  Foreign  Policy  and  World 
Peace  have  never  been  so  much  in  the  minds 
and  mouths  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
as  at  the  present  day.  Pan  American  Con- 
gresses, the  Panama  Canal,  the  difference  with 
Japan,  the  revolution  in  Mexico,  the  question 
of  the  Philippine^,  tariff  reduction.  The  Hague 
Conferences,  the  Centennial  of  Peace  with  Great 
Britain,  and  other  incidents,  direct  our  thoughts 
to  foreign  countries  and  lead  us  to  reflect  on 
the  relations  which  we  hold  to  them.  The  pur- 
pose of  this  little  work  is  to  minister  with  fact 
and  reason  to  such  reflection. 

It  deals  with  American  policies  in  their 
broadest  aspects,  with  political  problems  of  the 
United  States  and  of  all  America.  It  seeks 
to  explain  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  distinguishing 
between  the  extension  and  the  perversion  of  it; 
to  show  its  bearing  and  that  of  Washington's 


285732 


^ 


VI  PREFACE 

Farewell  Address  upon  present  national  affairs; 
and  to  expound  the  theory  of  Pan  Americanism 
in  its  true  relation  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

As  used  in  its  pages,  the  word  America  means 
the  independent  countries  of  North,  South,  and 
Central  America.  Where  the  United  States 
alone  is  referred  to  it  is  done  in  express  terms. 

21  Gramercy  Park, 

New  York,  February  19,  1914. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 


I    Population  and  Government     ...  3 

II    The  Washington  Precept.    The  Mon- 
roe Doctrine 29 

III  Cases  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine  .  85 

IV  The  Bolivar  Idea.    Conclusion    .     .  137 

Appendices 161 

Bibliography 170 

Index 177 


AMERICAN  POLICY 


I 

POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT 

"In  America,  to  govern  Is  to  populate/'^  In 
the  last  analysis  the  stability  of  every  govern- 
ment results,  as  in  the  United  States,  in  Eng- 
land, in  France,  in  Germany,  from  the  solution 
of  this  problem  of  population;  and  the  insta- 
bility of  government  results,  as  in  certain  coun- 
tries of  Latin-America  and  in  China,  from  its 
non-solution.  The  most  serious  troubles  of  the 
British  Empire  to-day  are  questions  of  popula-  s/ 
tion.  The  happy  solution  of  the  problem  by 
the  United  States  is  due  principally  to  the  ra- 
pidity with  which  its  immigration  has  been  as- 
similated, which  is  traceable  to  its  form  of 
government. 

One  of  the  grievances  which  led  to  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution  was  the  royal  opposition  to  emi-  * 
gration  to  the  colonies.     Throughout  the  first 

^  Alberdi.    Quoted  from  Latin  America:  Its  Rise  and  ProgresSy 
by  F.  Garcia-Calderon,  p.  339. 

3 


/ 


4  AMERICAN  POLICY 

half  of  the  nineteenth  century  Great  Britain 
strove  by  a  variety  of  legislation  to  check  the 
tide  of  emigration  to  the  United  States.  Not 
until  1870  did  she  recognize  or  grant  the  right 
of  her  subjects  to  renounce  their  British  al- 
legiance.^ 

The  nations  of  America  were  originally  settled 
with  three  varieties  of  people:  the  Anglo-Saxon, 
the  Portuguese,  and  the  Spanish.  The  descend- 
ants of  the  latter  two  are  now  designated  as 
Latin-Americans.  This  designation  is  unneces- 
sarily broad;  to  be  precise,  it  should  be  Iberian- 
Americans.^  Out  of  respect  for  custom  and 
brevity,  I  retain  the  older,  simpler  term,  Latin- 
American.  The  Anglo-Saxon  and  the  Portu- 
guese elements  are  embodied  each  in  a  single 
nation,  the  former  in  the  United  States,  the 
latter  in  Brazil;  but  the  Spanish  element  is 
dispersed  among  nineteen  separate  common- 
wealths, distracted  internally  by  racial  as  well 
as  political  differences. 

These  two  groups,  Anglo-Saxon  and  Latin,  de- 
veloped separately — so  much  so  that  for  a  long 

^  Die  Neueste  Einwanderung  in  den  Vereinigten  Staaten,  by  R.  M. 
Jovanovich,  p.  27. 

2  Cuestiones  Americanas,  by  J.  S.  Carranza,  1907,  p.  92. 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT  5 

time  they  hardly  knew  each  other,  except 
through  European  Hterature.  It  was  princi- 
pally through  English  literature  that  the  United 
States  knew  the  Latin  states  and  through 
French  literature  that  the  latter  understood  the 
United  States.  Each  group  was  more  identified 
with  Europe  than  it  was  with  the  other,  for  it 
was  from  her  that  it  received  the  elements  of 
culture  and  of  life  that  were  necessary  to  it.^ 

The  Anglo-Saxon  element  became  diluted  by 
immigration,  with  a  variety  of  foreign  blood. 
In  the  United  States  the  white  population  that 
has  descended  from  non-United  States  peoples 
is  about  evenly  divided  between  a  British  strain 
and  other  non-United  States  strains.  The  fig- 
ures in  1900  were  about  as  follows: 

British 34,300,000 

Other  non-United  States 32,690,000 

Total 66,990,000 

A  contingent  of  9,313,390  colored  people 
brought  the  total  population  to  76,303,390.^ 
It  has,  however,  been  remarked  that  the  influ- 
ential class  formed  by  the  higher  officers  of  the 

^  Le  Droit  International  Americainy  by  Alejandro  Alvarez,  p.  42. 

2  These  figures  are  based  upon  the  results  of  exhaustive  study 
and  calculation  by  Professor  A.  B.  Faust,  of  Cornell  University, 
published  in  his  work,  The  German  Element  in  the  United  States,  II, 
27,  and  the  Census  of  the  United  States  for  1900. 


6  AMERICAN  POLICY 

government,  of  the  army  and  navy,  and  the 
leaders  in  education,  are  still  predominently  of 
British  descent. 

In  Spanish  America,  French  ideas,  in  Portu- 
guese America  (Brazil),  German  ideas,  prevail.^ 
The  present  population  of  these  two  regions,  or 
of  Latin-America,  is  formed,  for  the  greater  part, 
of  three  races,  the  Iberian,  the  Indian,  and  the 
African.  Certain  mixtures  of  these  have  their 
separate  designations.  Iberian  (or  other  white) 
and  African  is  called  mulatto;  Iberian  (or  other 
white)  and  Indian  is  called  mestizo;  Indian  and 
African  is  called  Sambo;  pure  descendants  from 
Iberians  (or  French)  are  called  Creoles.  The  In- 
dian element  is  purer  than  in  the  United  States 
and  numbers  about  five  and  a  half  million.^ 

.  .  .  though  several  tribes  of  the  coast  disagree 
with  those  of  the  Sierra,  they  stand  united 
against  the  foreign  invader  and  not  at  all 
friendly  but  in  the  bottom  of  their  hearts  still 
hostile  and  hoping  secretly  some  day  to  over- 
throw the  rule  of  the  foreigner. 

In  Peru,  in  BoUvia,  and  in  Ecuador,  the  pure- 
blooded  Indian  is  the  fundamental  stock.     In 

^  Garcia-Calderon,  opus  cit.y  p.  251. 

2  Siid-Amerika  und  die  deutschen  Interessen,  by  Wilhelm  Sievers, 
1903. 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT  7 

Peru  and  in  Ecuador  the  population  is  about 
fifty  per  cent  Indian.^  In  the  former  it  is  only 
about  twelve  and  in  the  latter  about  seven  per 
cent  white.^ 

Juarez,  who  was  President  of  Mexico  while 
Maximilian  pretended  to  be  Emperor,  was  a 
full-blooded  Indian. 

In  the  countries  in  which  the  pure-blooded  In- 
dians have  not  been  able  to  maintain  them- 
selves the  mestizos  abound.  They  form  the 
population  of  Colombia,  of  Chili,  of  Uruguay, 
and  of  Paraguay,  about  ninety  per  cent  of  the 
population  of  Venezuela,  and  about  fifty  per  cent 
of  that  of  all  South  America.^  It  is  this  stock 
that  produced  Porfirio  Diaz,  of  Mexico.  An 
Argentine  anthropologist  says  that  the  mestizo 
of  first  crossing  is  inferior  to  his  European  pro- 
genitor, but  is  often  superior  to  his  native  par- 
ent. He  assimilates  the  morality  of  a  superior 
civilization  and  predominates  at  the  bar  and  in 
politics.  He  is  not,  however,  a  factor  in  the 
political  and  economical  unification  of  America. 

1  Sievers,  opus  cit. 

2  According  to  Garcla-Calderon,  the  population  of  Peru  and  of 
Ecuador  is  seventy  per  cent  Indian  and  only  six  per  cent  white, 
and  that  of  Bolivia  fifty  per  cent  Indian,  opus  cit.,  p.  332. 

3  Sievers,  opus  cit..,  pp.  10,  15. 


8  AMERICAN  POLICY 

He  retains  too  many  of  the  faults  of  the  native; 
he  is  deceitful  and  servile  and  often  indolent. 
It  is  only  after  new  admixtures  of  European 
blood  that  he  shows  well-developed  character- 
istics acquired  from  the  white  race.  He  is  ex- 
tremely patriotic;  Americanism,  the  spirit  of  op- 
position to  foreigners,  is  his  creation.  He  wants 
to  rise  and  possess  himself  of  the  privileges  of  the 
Creole  oligarchy.^ 

Not  only  do  the  native  whites,  blacks,  and 
mestizos  form  separate  strata  or  castes  of  so- 
ciety, but  the  foreign  elements  of  various  na- 
tionalities stand  also  more  or  less  apart  from  the 
native  population,  not  entering  into  its  political 
and  social  life  and  being  absorbed  by  it,  as  it  is 
in  the  United  States.  This  is  due  partly  to  in- 
difference on  the  part  of  the  foreigner  and 
partly  to  exclusiveness  on  the  part  of  the  na- 
tive. There  are  settlements  of  Germans  which 
preserve  their  language  and  national  traits  and 
feelings  with  remarkable  persistency,  commu- 
nities that  have  kept  their  mother  tongue  a  hun- 
dred years,  their  sons  and  daughters  going  to 
Germany  for  education.^ 

*  Garcia-Calderon,  opus  cit.j  pp.  332,  333. 
2  WelcheAussichten  bieten  sich  den  Deutschen  in  Stld-Amerika, 
by  Doctor  Backhaus,  p.  4. 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT  9 

While  the  Indian  population  is  more  numer- 
ous, the  negro  population  is  less  so  than  in 
the  United  States.  If  any  countries  in  South 
America  may  be  considered  as  white,  they  are 
South  Brazil,  Uruguay,  and  Argentine.  Al- 
varez gives  the  white  population  of  Latin- 
America  as  about  10,000,000  out  of  a  total  of 
about  60,000,000.1 

The  population  of  America,  including  Canada, 
has  about  the  same  density  as  that  of  Africa;  it 
is  from  one-quarter  to  one-third  as  dense  as  that 
of  the  non-American  world;  about  one-tenth  as 
dense  as  that  of  Europe;  from  one-fifth  to  one- 
fourth  as  dense  as  that  of  Asia;  and  from  five 
to  six  times  as  dense  as  that  of  Australia  and 
Oceanica.  The  population  of  Latin-America  is 
about  seven-tenths  as  dense  as  that  of  the  rest 
of  America,  including  Canada;  nearly  five  times 
as  dense  as  that  of  Australia  and  Oceanica;  about 
one-half  as  dense  as  that  of  the  United  States; 

*  From  figures  given  in  A.  Hartleben's  Kleines  statistisches  Ta- 
schenbuch  tiber  alle  Lander  der  Erde  (191 3),  I  compute  the  popula- 
tion of  the  twenty  independent  republics  of  Latin-America  as 
79,863,336  and  the  white  population  as  over  12,000,000. 

But  to  quote  from  another  authority:  "The  population  of  these 
twenty  republics,  from  the  best  obtainable  sources  of  information, 
.  .  .  amounts  to  about  73,666,000." — {Bulletin  of  Pan-American 
Uniony  February,  191 3,  p.  225.) 


i-' 


lo  AMERICAN  POLICY 

about  four-fifths  as  dense  as  that  of  Africa; 
about  one-sixth  as  dense  as  that  of  Asia;  and 
about  one-twelfth  as  dense  as  that  of  Europe.^ 
This  brings  us  to  the  great  question  which  all 
Americans,  North  and  South,  should  join  in 
helping  one  another  to  answer,  the  mystery  of 
Pan  America:  Why  is  it  that  Latin-America, 
with  its  greater  extent  of  territory,  and  at  least 
equality  with  the  United  States  in  point  of  soil 
and  cHmate,  is  behind  the  United  States  in  pop- 
ulation and  resources?^  Difference  of  race,  it 
has  been  said;  difference  of  political  conditions, 
say  others,  under  which  the  two  regions  were 
settled  and  developed.  The  true  answer  is 
probably  a  combination  of  both  of  these;  for 
the  race  is  responsible  for  the  government,  and 
the  government,  by  its  influence  upon  immi- 
gration and  its  regulation  of  it,  is  more  or  less 
responsible  for  the  race.  The  two  must  work 
together  for  their  common  good,  if  either  is  to 
be  materially  improved. 

Mr.  Ugarte,  with  admirable  frankness,  gives 
his  readers  a  graphic  description  of  the  unat- 


1  Computed  from  A.  Hartleben,  opus  cit. 

2  Latin-America  is  so  sparsely  populated  that  it  may  be  called 
a  desert  (Garcia-Calderon,  opus  cit.,  p.  309). 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT         ii 

tractive  features  of  Latin-American  republican- 
ism.    To  quote  from  this  portion  of  his  work 

(1910): 

What  first  strikes  one  in  the  New  World  is  the 
contradiction  between  the  loftiness  of  the  con- 
stitutions and  the  baseness  of  the  political  life. 
The  right  to  vote,  which  is  the  foundation  of 
our  social  contract,  proves  almost  always  a  de- 
lusion, because  governments  or  parties  substi- 
tute their  wishes  for  the  will  of  the  people  by 
means  of  fraud  or  revolution.  ...  X  and  Z 
declaim  in  resounding  periods  terminating  in 
^'Uberty,"  **  progress,"  or  *' constitution,"  and 
we  take  sides  with  one  or  the  other,  for  no  appar- 
ent reason,  as  we  choose  head  or  tail  in  a  game 
of  chance.  ...  In  South  America  the  time  has 
not  yet  come  when  ambitions  are  supported  by 
doctrines.  The  contest  is  brutal  and  plain 
among  those  who  want  to  occupy  the  highest 
post.  And  as  in  a  proud  people,  among  whom 
the  greatest  insult  that  can  be  inflicted  on  a 
citizen  is  to  call  him  '^adulador,"^  those  who  as- 
pire to  rise  independently  are  many,  the  fact 
may  be  accounted  for  that  civil  war  has  been 
until  recently  a  national  function.^ 

^  Flatterer,  satellite,  henchman. 

2  El  Porvenir  de  la  America  Latina,  pp.  205,  220.  During  the 
seventy-three  years  between  1825  and  1898  Bolivia  had  more 
than  sixty  revolutions,  a  number  of  international  wars,  and  six 
presidents  assassinated,  without  counting  those  who  died  in  ex- 
ile.    Pueblo  enfermOf  by  Alcides  Arguedas. 


12  AMERICAN  POLICY 

The  Indians  and  the  mestizos,  dispossessed  by 
the  conquest  or  condemned  to  inferiority,  find 
themselves  in  the  new  population  as  in  a  for- 
eign country. 

Politicians  use  the  combativeness  of  these 
masses,  corrupting  them  with  a  life  of  adventure 
and  combat,  and  leading  them  to  find  happi- 
ness in  individual  license.  In  the  populous  cap- 
itals it  is  not  hard  to  put  the  suffrage  into  prac- 
tice. But  in  the  towns  of  the  interior  and  in  the 
little  villages,  where  huddle  the  common  people 
of  America,  it  appears  for  the  present  to  be  an 
impossibility.  .  .  .  Up  to  this  time  to  cheat  the 
Treasury  has  been  a  venial  offence.  .  .  .  '*I  at- 
tend only  to  what  concerns  me,"  says  the  ma- 
jority; "let  others  attend  to  the  general  wel- 
fare.'^ And,  as  every  one  says  the  same  thing, 
the  result  is  that  no  one  thinks  of  what  in  the 
last  analysis  should  be  every  one's  business.^ 

^To  the  same  effect  writes  Garcia-Calderon  (191 1): 
"Autocrat-presidents  take  the  place  of  viceroys.  .  .  .  The  dom- 
inant caste,  inheriting  the  prejudices  of  the  Spaniards,  despise  in- 
dustry and  commerce,  live  on  politics  and  its  futile  agitations. 
The  landed  noblemen  domineer  as  they  did  before  the  Revolution. 
There  are  still  the  old  latifundia,  extensive  domains,  which  ac- 
count for  the  power  of  the  oligarchies.  The  legislative  assem- 
blies act  a  minor  part.  .  .  .  Catholicism  is  still  the  pivot  of  social 
life.  These  *picaros'  of  the  Spanish  novel,  haughty  and  ingen- 
ious parasites,  thrive.  Bureaucracy  swallows  up  the  wealth  of 
the  Treasury;  it  was  formed  a  century  ago  of  rapacious  Castil- 
ians,  it  is  made  up  to-day  of  shiftless  Americans.  In  spite  of  the 
equality  proclaimed  by  the  constitutions,  the  Indian  is  subjected 
to  the  pitiless  tyranny  of  the  local  authorities,  the  priest,  the 
justice  of  the  peace,  the  *  cacique.'  Under  new  names,  the  petty 
despots  of  Spanish  times  are  still  in  power.'* 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT         13 

No  North  American  or  other  foreigner  has 
exposed  the  defects  of  Latin-American  char- 
acter and  institutions  more  faithfully  and  clearly 
than  has  Alcides  Arguedas  in  his  Pueblo  en- 
fermOy  Contribucion  a  la  Psicologia  de  los  Pueblos 
hispano-americanos  } 

Before  knowledge  cometh  humility;  the  first 
step  in  improvement  is  a  true  apprehension  of 
one's  faults.  The  remarkable  freedom  and 
severity  of  such  self-criticism  is  full  of  promise 
for  the  future  of  Latin-America.  The  foregoing 
quotations  refer  to  Latin-America  in  general. 
They  do  not  apply  to  every  Latin-American 
country;  notably  not  to  the  trio  called  the 
ABC:  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chili,  which 
may  be  made  a  quartet  by  the  addition  of 
Uruguay.  These  four  nations,  says  Garcia- 
Calderon,  will  within  a  century  be  perfectly  or- 
ganized republics.  But  a  century  seems  a  long 
time  to  wait  for  that  consummation. 

Both    of    the    forementioned    writers   favor 

^  With  respect  to  reform  he  says: 

"...  the  great  problem,  almost  the  only  one,  is  to  modify 
those  three  elements  which  fatally  co-operate  to  oppose  the  de- 
velopment of  the  country  for  a  long  time  to  come:  the  excessive 
immorality  and  lack  of  training  of  the  governing  classes,  the  thor- 
ough corruption  of  the  classes  governed,  and  the  nullity  of  the 
indigenous,  the  numerically  preponderant  race." — (P.  428.) 


14  AMERICAN  POLICY 

oligarchic,  absolute  government  for  Latin- 
America;  but  Mr.  Ugarte,  being  a  socialist, 
hopes  for  eventual  popular  government.  He 
makes  a  number  of  judicious  recommendations, 
but  fails  to  suggest  that  Latin-American  people 
go  to  the  land  of  the  dreaded  "Yanquis"  and 
learn  from  them  the  secrets  of  their  success  in 
government  and  in  business,  and  by  association 
with  them  acquire  some  of  that  energy  and 
aptitude  which  makes  them  formidable  com- 
petitors in  so  many  fields  of  human  endeavor. 
But  without  his  encouragement  or  approval 
Latin-Americans  are  adopting  that  sensible 
course  in  large  and  increasing  number.  Be- 
tween the  years  1900  and  1910  the  number  of 
people  in  the  United  States  born  in  Latin- 
America  increased  from  137,458  to  279,514,  or 
one  hundred  and  three  per  cent.  The  increase, 
in  the  same  period,  of  those  born  in  other  foreign 
countries  was  thirty-nine  per  cent^  and  of  the 
total  population  twenty-one  percent.^  The  num- 
ber of  Latin-Americans  in  Europe  in  1910  may  be 
safely  reckoned  as  less  than  30,000;  say  28,000, 
about  one-tenth  as  many  as  in  the  United  States.^ 

1  Census  (1910),  I,  789.  2  Jhid.^  I,  24. 

3  Such  statistics  as  I  have  been  able  to  gather  on  this  point  are 
given  in  Appendix  A. 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT         15 

The  number  of  Latin-American  students  in 
the  United  States  has  been  the  subject  of  some 
loose  talk.  The  Outlook^  is  responsible  for  the 
statement,  for  which  it  cites  no  authority,  that 
in  191 3  there  were  1,500  Latin-Americans 
studying  in  the  United  States.  The  Bulletin  of 
the  International  Bureau  of  the  American  Repub- 
lics^ came  out  several  years  ago  with  this  re- 
markable assertion: 

No  statistics  have  been  compiled  of  Latin- 
American  students  in  the  universities,  colleges, 
technical  schools,  and  industrial  establishments 
of  the  United  States,  but  it  is  known  that  there 
are  several  thousand  of  them. 

The  figures  in  both  cases  are  estimates. 
Those  yielded  by  statistical  compilation,  as  car- 
ried out  by  the  author,  are  1,042.^ 

It  would  be  interesting  in  this  connection  to 
note  the  number  of  Latin-American  students 
in  European  countries.  Unfortunately,  it  has 
never  been  compiled.  They  are,  for  certain  coun- 
tries, as  follows:  for  France  one  hundred  and 
forty-one;  for  Sweden  one;  for  Denmark  one; 

iAugust9,  1913,  p.  783. 
2  Vol.  25,  pp.  72,  73  (1909). 

2  Based  on  figures  for  years  1910-12,  furnished  by  the  Bureau 
of  Education.      The  number  includes  231  from  Porto  Rico. 


i6  AMERICAN  POLICY 

for  Greece  none;  for  Germany  about  twenty- 
six^;  for  Belgium  about  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
nine.^  With  regard  to  Spain,  I  am  informed  by 
our  ambassador  that  there  are  no  statistics  avail- 
able. "As  an  illustration,  however,  it  appears 
from  observation  of  the  students  in  the  Central 
University  of  Madrid,  who  number  more  than 
six  thousand  five  hundred,  that  only  a  few 
come  from  the  Americas."^  The  number  for 
Russia  is  reported  as  "practically  negligible."^ 
Allowing  ten  for  Spain  and  Russia,  the  total  for 
these  seven  countries  is  about  three  hundred 
and  eight.  It  is  not  likely  that  the  rest  of 
Europe  contains  more  than  three  times  this 
number.  It  may  be  concluded  that  there  are 
more  Latin-American  students  in  the  United 
States  than  there  are  in  Europe. 

Mr.  Ugarte  cautions  Latin-Americans  against 
allowing  American  capital  and  enterprise  to 
come  in  any  considerable  quantity  into  their 
country.     He  pleads   impressively   for   an   in- 

1  Computed  for  the  second  term  of  191 3  from  figures  furnished 
by  the  Amerika-Institut  of  Berlin. 

-  School  year  191 2-1 3.  At  universities  about  125  (letter  from 
Minister  of  Sciences  and  Arts  to  American  Minister);  at  technical 
schools  of  college  grade,  reported  2,  estimated  2. 

2  Letter  from  Ambassador  J.  W.  Willard. 
*  Letter  from  United  States  Embassy. 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT         17 

crease  in  influence,  prestige,  and  security,  by  a 
consolidation  of  the  smaller  Latin-American 
countries  into  larger  ones  or  all  of  them  into 
one.  It  has  also  been  advocated  that  the  Por- 
tuguese Republic  of  Brazil  be  matched  by  a 
Spanish  Republic  formed  by  a  union  of  all  the 
American  countries  of  Spanish  origin.^  There 
are  considerable  difficulties  in  the  way  of  these 
projects.  One  is  the  partiality  of  Latin-Ameri- 
cans for  centralization,  or  unification,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  decentralization,  or  confedera- 
tion; the  other  is  their  fondness  for  public  office. 
Both  are  inheritances  from  long  experience  of 
absolute  government,  lay  and  ecclesiastical. 
The  idea  of  reconciling  centralization  with  free 
representative  government  they  imbibed  with 
the  doctrines  of  the  French  Revolution.  It  has 
proved  impracticable.  Union  is  less  favorable 
than  disunion  to  professional  office-holding. 
The  larger  a  nation  the  fewer  the  offices,  es- 
pecially the  higher  ones,  in  proportion  to  the 
people,  and  it  is  the  higher  offices  that  the  poli- 
ticians want.  Since  the  emancipation  of  Latin- 
America  the  tendency  of  its  component  states 
has  been  to  subdivide  rather  than  to  combine. 

^  J.  S.  Carranza,  1907,  opus  cit.,  pp.  73,  74,  95. 


1 8  AMERICAN   POLICY 

This  pernicious  condition  has  perhaps  been  ag- 
gravated by  the  co-operation  of  the  United 
States  in  the  secession  of  Panama  from  Co- 
lombia. 

We  should  be  deluding  ourselves  if  we 
thought  that  the  nations  of  America  would 
deliberately  adopt  measures  to  remove  their 
diflFerences  of  race,  to  assimilate  themselves 
racially.  In  case  of  a  common  danger,  nations 
differing  in  race  may  agree  temporarily  to  sup- 
port one  another,  as  the  French  did  the  people 
of  the  United  States,  as  these  did  the  people  of 
Cuba;  as  the  French  and  Russian  and  British 
on  one  hand,  and  the  German  and  Austrian  and 
Italian  on  the  other,  are  now  co-operating  in 
maintaining  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe. 
But  they  do  not,  in  such  cases,  renounce  their 
separate  sovereignties  or  nationalities  to  adopt 
one  in  common.  Races,  like  individuals,  do 
not  take  kindly  to  the  idea  of  changing  their 
identity;  that  is  what  the  transformation  of  a 
race  amounts  to.  It  will  not  be,  therefore,  to 
become  like  other  people,  or  to  prevent  conflicts 
with  them,  so  much  as  to  improve  the  domestic, 
particularly  the  industrial,  conditions  under 
which  they  live,  that  Latin-Americans  will  at- 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT         19 

tend  seriously  to  fostering  immigration.  An 
eminent  authority  on  this  question  made  nearly 
sixty  years  ago  the  following  observations,  to 
which  events  have  recently  given  a  peculiar  in- 
terest and  justification: 

...  it  appears  that  the  only  hope  of  Central 
America  consists  in  averting  the  numerical  de-/ 
cline  of  its  white  population,  and  increasing  that 
element  in  the  composition  of  its  people.  If  not 
brought  about  by  a  judicious  encouragement  of 
emigration  or  an  intelligent  system  of  coloniza- 
tion, the  geographical  position  and  resources  of 
the  country  indicate  that  the  end  will  be  at- 
tained by  those  more  violent  means,  which 
among  men,  as  in  the  material  world,  often  an- 
ticipate the  slower  operations  of  natural  laws. 
To  avert  the  temporary  yet  often  severe  shocks 
which  they  occasion,  by  providing  for  the  ne- 
cessities of  the  future,  is  the  true  mission  and 
should  be  the  highest  aim,  of  the  patriot  and 
statesman.  Central  America  will  be  fortunate 
if  she  shall  be  found  to  number  among  her  sons 
men  adequate  to  the  comprehension  and  control 
of  the  circumstances  under  which  she  is  placed, 
and  which  are  every  day  becoming  more  com- 
plicated and  exigent.^ 

Probably  nowhere  is  the  mercurial  and  fickle 
variability  of  Latin-American  humor,  the  in- 

^  Notes  on  Central  America,  by  E.  G.  Squler,  p.  58. 


20  AMERICAN  POLICY 

stability  of  Latin-American  character,  more  ap- 
parent than  in  the  trials  and  tribulations  which 
brought  to  an  early  grave  the  peerless  hero  of 
the  War  of  Spanish-American  Liberation,  the 
great  "Libertador,"  Simon  Bolivar.^ 

The  anguish  of  his  disappointment  and  disillu- 
sionment wrung  from  him  on  his  deathbed  the 
following  gloomy  predictions,  which,  says  Ar- 
guedas,  have  been  literally  fulfilled. 

America  is  ungovernable;  those  who  served 
the  revolution  have  ploughed  the  sea.  The 
only  thing  that  can  be  done  in  America  is  to 
emigrate.     Those  countries  will  inevitably  fall 

^  "  From  beginning  to  end  his  career  was  one  long  struggle,  not 
only  against  the  Spaniards  but  also  against  the  disloyalty  and  the 
incompetence  of  the  men  who  professed  to  work  with  him.  .  .  . 

"  The  figure  of  the  worn-out  Liberator,  suffering  in  mind  and 
body,  deserted  by  all  but  a  few,  reviled  by  the  majority  of  those 
who  owed  everything  to  him,  is  one  of  the  most  pathetic  in  history. 

"His  life  is  the  history  of  a  great  success  and  a  great  failure.  He 
succeeded  in  throwing  off  forever  the  yoke  of  Spain,  which  had 
pressed  for  three  centuries  on  the  shoulders  of  South  America;  he 
failed  to  set  up,  in  place  of  Spanish  dominion,  anything  resembling 
a  stable,  free,  and  popular  government.  .  .  .  His  failure  hardly 
detracts  from  his  greatness,  for  the  task  of  making  a  great  nation 
out  of  the  materials  he  had  to  work  with  was  an  impossible  one. 
He  had  to  deal  with  peoples  depraved  by  centuries  of  bad  govern- 
ment. The  mass  of  the  population,  sunk  in  superstition,  ser- 
vility, and  ignorance,  was  without  Initiative  or  capacity.  The 
majority  of  its  leaders  were  either  as  ignorant  as  the  rest  or  else 
had  been  endowed  by  the  Spanish  system  with  a  narrow  literary 
and  legal  education,  which  turned  them  into  professional  in- 
triguers and  fostered  their  innate  vanity.     With  such  materials 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENf         21 

into  the  hands  of  the  unchecked  multitude  to 
pass  hence  into  diminutive  tyrannies,  devoured 
by  crime  and  consumed  with  ferocity.  If  it  were 
possible  that  a  portion  of  the  world  should  re- 
vert to  primitive  chaos,  that  would  be  the  last 
state  of  America.^ 

The  governments  of  Latin-America  have  long 
been  favoring  a  limited,  or  select,  immigration, 
but  do  not  seem  to  have  sought  a  crossing  of  the 
Latin  race  with  other  races.  That  process  is 
taking  place  in  spite  of  unfavorable  conditions, 
and  will  doubtless  continue  to  do  so,  but  with 
its  traditional  slowness.  Next  to  the  United 
States,  Argentina  is  the  American  republic  that 
attracts  the  largest  European  immigration.  Sta- 
tistics of  marriages  contracted  by  Argentinian 
residents  of  Buenos  Ayres,  the  capital  of  the 
Argentine  Republic,  show  about  eight  per  cent 
of  such  unions  to  be  Argentinian-English  or  Ar- 
gentinian-German, the  remaining  ninety-two  per 
cent  being  Argentinian-Latin,  Argentinian-mes- 
tizo, or  Argentinian-Indian.^ 

Washington  could  never  have  evolved  the  United  States,  and  Na- 
poleon could  never  have  conquered  the  greater  part  of  Europe." — 
(Simon  Bolivar ,  by  E.  L.  Petre,  pp.  443,  448,  449.) 

^  Alcides  Arguedas,  opus  cit.,  p.  202.  For  an  eloquent  eulogy  of 
Bolivar,  see  Congres  de  Panama^  by  de  Pradt,  p.  82  et  seq, 

2  Appendix  B. 


22  AMERICAN  POLICY 

Arguedas  looks  principally  to  educarion  for 
the  awakening  and  development  of  Latin- 
America.  But  if  his  description  of  present  con- 
ditions is  correct,  it  would  seem  that  immigra- 
tion is  indispensable  to  the  introduction  and 
administration  of  an  effective  system  of  public 
education.  It  may  be  that  poHtical  and  other 
reforms  can  be  brought  about  by  the  importa- 
tion and  adoption  of  ideas  without  the  absorp- 
tion of  new  blood.  But  so  far  as  the  latter  may 
be  called  for,  how  can  it  be  better  effected  than 
by  immigration  from  the  United  States?  What 
other  country  will  furnish  people  that  can  be 
so  safely  trusted  to  preserve  republican  insti- 
tutions and  make  them  work  successfully?  I 
know  the  obstacle  to  United  States  immigration 
formed  by  temperamental  difference,  amount- 
ing in  individual  cases  to  incompatibility.  I 
have  been  a  sorrowful  witness  of  it  on  more 
than  one  occasion.^  But  the  new  population 
might  well  come  in  large  measure  from  Great 

*  A  distinguished  statesman,  thoroughly  informed  as  to  condi- 
tions in  the  Antilles,  said  not  long  ago  that  in  Porto  Rico  and 
even  in  Cuba,  while  there  is  greater  order  and  more  honest  ad- 
ministration than  under  the  old  regime,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
rudeness  of  the  Anglo-American  officials  makes  them  odious  to 
the  people,  who  are  frequently  offended  by  it,  in  their  dignity  or 
self-respect.     So  far  as  such  conduct  is  typical  it  is  a  duty  of  all 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT         23 

Britain,  Germany,  and  other  non-Latin  coun- 
tries; and  these  contingents  might  mix  better 
with  the  Latin-Americans  than  those  of  the 
United  States.  Latin-Europeans  would  mix 
with  them  still  better,  but  the  wise  and  loyal 
Latin-American  will  prefer  in  this  new  element 
a  certain  incompatibiHty  of  temperament  with 
the  quality  of  civic  efficiency,  to  compatibility 
of  temperament  without  that  quality — North 
Americans,  EngHsh,  Scotch,  Irish,  Germans, 
Swedes,  and  Norwegians,  to  Spanish,  French, 
and  Italians, — leaving  the  latter  to  go  to  non- 
Latin  countries,  such  as  the  United  States,  and 
improve  them  by  imparting  some  of  their 
warmth,  vivacity,  and  grace  to  a  comparatively 
cold,  phlegmatic,  ungainly  people. 

America  to  clamor  for  its  correction.  (J.  S.  Carranza,  opus  cit., 
1907,  p.  19.) 

Mr.  Ugarte  says:  ".  .  .  it  is  evident  that  nothing  attracts  us 
toward  our  neighbors  of  the  North.  By  her  origin,  her  educa- 
tion, and  her  spirit.  South  America  is  essentially  European.  We 
feel  ourselves  akin  to  Spain,  to  whom  we  owe  our  civilization,  and 
whose  fire  we  carry  in  our  blood;  to  France,  source  and  origin  of 
the  thought  that  animates  us;  to  England,  who  sends  us  her  gold 
freely;  to  Germany,  who  supplies  us  with  her  manufactures;  and 
to  Italy,  who  gives  us  the  arms  of  her  sons  to  wrest  from  the  soil 
the  wealth  which  is  to  distribute  itself  over  the  world.  But  to 
the  United  States  we  are  united  by  no  ties  but  those  of  distrust 
and  fear." — (El  Porvenir  de  la  America  Latina,  by  Manuel  Ugarte, 
PP-  93,  94-) 


24  AMERICAN  POLICY 

The  Latin  race  is  theoretical,  abstract,  ideal- 
istic, the  cosmopolitan  United  States  race  is 
practical,  concrete,  materialistic.  A  certain 
admixture  of  the  latter  characteristics  seems 
necessary  to  the  perfection  of  Latin-American 
character.  According  to  Garcia-Calderon,  a 
limited  supply  of  United  States  capital  and  emi- 
gration may  be  judiciously  admitted  to  Latin- 
America,  but  no  considerable  immigration  of 
Yankees  or  intermarriage  with  them  is  desirable 
or  possible  It  is  not  desirable,  because  the 
good  qualities  to  be  thus  engrafted  upon  Latin- 
Americans  must  be  accompanied  by  many 
that  are  objectionable,  and  they  can  be  ob- 
tained without  such  accompaniment,  from 
other  people. 

We  find  practical  mind,  industrialism,  polit- 
ical liberty  in  England;  organization  and  instruc- 
tion in  Germany;  in  France  inventive  genius, 
culture,  wealth,  great  universities,  democracy. 
From  these  dominating  people  the  New  World 
should  receive  the  legacy  of  Western  civilization 
directly.  .  .  .  Europe  offers  to  the  Latin-American 
democracies  what  they  ask  of  Saxon  America, 
which  was  itself  formed  in  the  schools  of  Europe.^ 

1  Garcia-Calderon,  opus  cit.j  "Le  Peril  nord-americain,"  Livre 
V,  Chap.  Ill,  p.  288. 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT         25 

To  say  that  Saxon  America  was  formed  in  the 
schools  of  Europe  Is  to  shut  one's  eyes  to  the 
fact  that  Its  early  settlement  was  a  protest  and 
revolt  against  those  schools,  and  to  ignore  its 
features  of  indigenous  growth,  the  products  of 
American  environment  and  experience,  such  as 
climate,  topography,  aboriginal  population,  the 
co-operation  of  separate  commonwealths  in  the 
defence  of  their  peculiar  civic  principles;  the 
new,  original  form  of  government  which  this  led 
them  to  establish;  the  transformation  in  mod- 
ern times  of  a  wilderness  into  a  thriving,  popu- 
lous commonwealth;  the  successful  combination 
of  republican  government  with  vast  territo- 
rial possessions.  These  and  other  develop- 
ments of  the  United  States,  in  the  secrets  of 
which  Latin-America  is  peculiarly  interested, 
cannot  be  studied  at  first  hand,  except  in  the 
United  States. 

That  no  considerable  intermarriage  of  people 
from  the  United  States  with  people  of  Latin- 
America  is  possible  is  inferred  by  Garcia-Cal- 
deron  from  the  prejudice  of  **Les  Yankees" 
against  half-breeds,  such  as  mestizos  and  mulat- 
toes.  Without  such  blending  of  the  races  there 
would  be  the  same  feeling  on  the  part  of  the 


26 


AMERICAN  POLICY 


white  toward  the  colored  that  there  Is  in  the 
United  States.^  On  both  of  these  points  his 
reasoning  appears  to  be  a  priori  and  may  be 
controverted  by  facts  and  figures.  Racial  prej- 
udice in  the  United  States  has  not  prevented 
miscegenation.  Intermarriage  was  in  1910  pro- 
hibited in  twenty-six  but  allowed  in  twenty-four, 
of  the  States  and  Territories.^  Between  the 
years  1850  and  1910  the  ratio  of  mulatto  to 
total  negro  population  has  increased  as  indicated 
in  the  following  table  :^ 


Year 


1850 

i860 

1870 

1880  (no  figures) 

1890 

1900  (no  figures) 
1910 


Negro  Population 


Black 

% 


88 
86 
88 


84 
79 


Mulatto 

% 


II. 2 

13.2 
12.0 

15.2 

20.9 


^    Opus    Ctt.y     p.      289. 

2  Race  Distinctions  in  American  Law,  by  G.  T.  Stephenson,  pp. 
81,  98. 

3  Thirteenth  Census  of  United  States  (Abstract,  p.  79).  The 
definition  of  the  term  "mulatto"  adopted  at  different  censuses  has 
not  been  entirely  uniform.     In  1870  and  in  1910  the  term  was  ap- 


POPULATION  AND  GOVERNMENT         27 

Between  1790  and  1910  the  percentage  of 
colored  to  total  population  has  decreased  from 
19.3  to  ii.i.^  This  is  largely  due  to  immigra- 
tion of  white  people  in  excess  of  colored.^ 

As  the  preponderance  of  the  white  popula- 
tion over  the  colored  increases,  race  feeling 
diminishes  or  becomes  less  manifest.  As  immi- 
gration contributes  in  the  United  States,  it  may 
contribute  in  Latin-America,  to  the  solution  of 
the  race  problem.  Statistics  indicate  that  it  is 
doing  so,  at  least  in  Central  America.  The  im- 
migration into  that  region  has  contributed  al- 
most twice  as  large  an  element  of  Germanic  as 
it  has  of  Latin  population.  Following  are  the 
contingents  of  foreign  people  "that  have  al- 
ready established  themselves  in  Central  Amer- 
ica": 

German 2,400  French 2,050 

English SjOOO  Spanish 2,850 

United  States 5>7oo  Italian 2,300 

13,100  7,2003 

plied  to  all  persons  having  any  perceptible  trace  of  negro  blood, 
excepting,  of  course,  negroes  of  pure  blood. 

^  Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United  States ^  191 2,  p.  39. 

2  The  term  "colored,"  as  here  used,  includes  Chinese,  Japanese, 
other  Asiatics,  and  American  Indians. 

3  These  figures  are  compiled  from  a  table  in  Immigration — A 
Central  American  Problem,  by  E.  B.  Fllsinger.  (The  Annals, 
May,  191 1.) 


28  AMERICAN  POLICY 

In  conclusion,  be  it  said  that  the  two  great 
wants  of  Latin-America  are  immigration  and 
education.  Statistics  on  these  subjects  are 
called  for  as  indexes  of  its  political  condition 
and  rate  of  growth  and  development. 


II 

THE  WASHINGTON  PRECEPT.    THE 
MONROE  DOCTRINE 

The  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  is 
based  upon  three  cardinal  principles,  which 
may  be  briefly  stated  as  follows : 

1.  Abstention  from  permanent  alliances  with 
non-American  powers,  which  was  recommended 
by  President  Washington  in  his  Farewell  Ad- 
dress. This  may  be  called  the  Washington 
Precept. 

2.  Non-intervention  by  non-American  pow- 
ers in  the  affairs  of  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
which  was  enunciated  by  President  Monroe  in  a 
message  to  Congress  and  is  known  as  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine. 

3.  Pan  Americanism,  or  the  co-operation  of 
all  American  nations,  for  the  maintenance  of 
American  control  of  the  Western  Hemisphere, 

which  was  originally  suggested  by  the  Colom- 

29 


30  AMERICAN  POLICY 

bian  patriot  Bolivar.     It  may  be  called  the  Bol- 
ivar Idea. 

Taking  its  general  direction  from  the  fore- 
going cardinal  or  fundamental  principles,  the 
policy  of  the  United  States,  like  that  of  other 
countries,  is  determined  largely  by  minor  prin- 
ciples dictated  by  exigencies  of  the  day  or  hour. 
The  fundamental  principles  are,  generally  speak- 
ing, a  guide  to  every  administration,  irrespect- 
ively of  political  party.  The  minor  principles 
change  more  or  less  with  the  administration. 
Among  those  which  have  had  their  day  with  our 
government  or  now  have  it,  are  the  following: 

1.  Protective  tariff. 

2.  Tariff  for  revenue. 

3 .  Hegemony  of  the  United  States  in  America, 
significantly  called  the  '*Big  Stick."^ 

4.  Diplomatic  support  of  particular  commer- 
cial enterprises  of  American  citizens  in  foreign 
countries,  known  as  '*  Dollar  Diplomacy." 

^  This  principle  may  be  read  in  the  following  declaration  of 
President  Roosevelt's:  "If  a  nation  shows  that  it  knows  how  to 
act  with  decency  in  industrial  and  political  matters,  if  it  keeps 
order  and  pays  its  obligations,  then  it  need  fear  no  interference 
from  the  United  States.  Brutal  wrong-doing  or  impotence  which 
results  in  the  general  loosening  of  the  tidies  of  civilized  society  may 
finally  require  intervention  by  some  civilized  nation,  and  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  the  United  States  cannot  ignore  its  duty." 
— (Moore,  American  Diplomacy^  p.  197.) 


THE  WASHINGTON  PRECEPT  31 

5.  The  financial  regeneration  of  insolvent 
Latin-American  republics,  called  by  ex-Presi- 
dent Taft  "International  Philanthropy." 

6.  Responsibility  of  the  United  States  to 
European  nations  for  offences  of  Latin-Ameri- 
can nations. 

7.  The  "open  door"  in  China. 

8.  Independence  for  the  Philippines. 

9.  United  States  command  of  the  Pacific. 

10.  Exclusion  of  Mongolians  from  the  United 
States. 

11.  Non-recognition  of  governments  based  on 
violence. 

From  this  notice  of  minor  principles  let  us 
return  to  the  consideration  of  the  major  or 
fundamental  principles  of  American  policy. 

The  Washington  Precept 

Washington's  words,  spoken  on  the  17th  of 
September,  1796,  are  these: 

[^Against  the  insidious  wiles  of  foreign  influ- 
ence, I  conjure  you  to  believe  me,  fellow  citizens, 
the  jealousy  of  a  free  people  ought  to  be  con- 
stantly awake,  since  history  and  experience 
prove  that  foreign  influence  is  one  of  the  most 
baneful  foes  of  republican  governmenttj.  .  . 


32  AMERICAN  POLICY 

(^  The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us,  in  regard  to 
foreign  nations,  isjn  extending  our  commercial 
relations,  to  have  with  them  as  little  political 
connection  as  possible.  So  far  as  we  have  al- 
ready formed  engagements,  let  them  be  fulfilled 
with  perfect  good  faith.     Here  let  us  stogjj 

Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests,  which 
to  us  have  none  or  a  very  remote  relation. 
Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent  contro- 
versies, the  causes  of  which  are  essentially  for- 
eign to  our  concerns.  Hence,  therefore,  it  must 
be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate  ourselves  by  artifi- 
cial ties  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her  poli- 
tics or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions 
of  her  friendships  or  enmities.  Our  detached 
and  distant  situation  invites  and  enables  us  to 
pursue  a  different  course.  .  .  .  Why  forego  the 
advantages  of  so  peculiar  a  situation?  Why 
quit  our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign  ground? 
Why,  by  interweaving  our  destiny  with  that  of 
any  part  of  Europe,  entangle  our  peace  and  pros- 
perity in  the  toils  of  European  ambition,  rival- 
ship,  interest,  humor,  or  caprice  ? 
iLjTis  our  true  policy  to  steer  clear  of  perma- 
nent alliances  with  any  portion  of  the  foreign 
world;  so  far,  I  mean,  as  we  are  now  at  liberty 
to  do  it — for  let  me  not  be  misunderstood  as 
capable  of  patronizing  infidelity  to  existing  en- 
gagements. .  .  .  But  in  my  opinion  it  is  un- 
necessary and  would  be  unwise,  to  extend 
themJJ 

^  Washington's  Farewell  Address.     {Writings  of  Washington,  by 
Ford,  XIII,  315-318.) 


/ 


4. 

THE  WASHINGTON  PRECEPT  33 

The  term  "entangling  alliance,"  not  used  in 
the  Precept,  aptly  describes  the  particular  sort 
of  association  which  it  proscribes.  To  come 
under  that  proscription  an  alliance  must  fulfil 
the  tallowing  conditions : 

It  must  be  younger  than  the  Precept;  that  is, 
it  must  have  followed  the  latter. 

It  must  be  permanent;  that  is,  of  indefinite 
duration. 

It  must  be  partial;  that  is,  it  must  associate 
the  United  States  with  some  power  in  opposi- 
tion to  a  third  power. 

It  must  be  non-American;  that  is,  the  other 
power,  or  one  of  the  other  powers,  must  be  of  the 
Eastern  Hemisphere. 

There  is  no  violation  of  the  Washington  Pre- 
cept in  an  aUiance  which  is  older  than  the  Pre- 
cept, or  temporary,  or  impartial,  or  formed 
with  only  American  powers.  Before  the  Wash- 
ington Precept  was  enunciated  the  United 
States  had  more  than  once  departed  from  the 
impartiaHty  prescribed  in  it.  On  the  4th  of 
May,  1778,  two  treaties,  One  of  amity  and  com- 
merce, and  one  of  alliance,  were  ratified  be- 
tween France  and  the  United  States.  By  these 
compacts  each  party  secured  to  itself  the  right 


34  AMERICAN  POLICY 

of  fitting  out  vessels,  condemning  and  disposing 
of  prizes,  enlisting  soldiers  or  seamen,  in  the 
ports  of  the  other.  It  was  stipulated  that  the 
enemies  of  either  power  should  be  denied  these 
privileges.  The  treaty  of  aUiance  guaranteed  to 
"His  Most  Christian  Majesty"  the  possessions 
then  held  by  ''the  Crown  of  France  in  America" 
and  "to  the  United  States  their  liberty,  sov- 
ereignty, and  independence,  absolute  and  un- 
limited." It  expressly  provided  that,  in  case  of 
a  rupture  between  France  and  England,  these 
reciprocal  guarantees  should  have  "their  full 
force  and  effect  the  moment  such  war  should 
break  out."  War  between  France  and  Eng- 
land broke  out  in  1792.  In  1795 — this  war  was 
then  going  on — a  treaty  of  amity,  commerce, 
and  navigation  was  ratified  by  the  United 
States  with  Great  Britain  in  which  it  was  agreed 
that  there  should  be  "a  firm,  inviolable  and  uni- 
versal peace,  and  a  true  and  sincere  friendship," 
between  those  countries.  This  treaty  obliged 
the  United  States  to  grant  to  Great  Britain  and 
deny  to  France  the  privileges  formerly  granted 
to  France  and  denied  to  her  enemies.  How 
this  treaty  was  denounced  by  France  and  de- 
fended by  the  United  States  is  immaterial  in 


THE  WASHINGTON  PRECEPT  35 

this  connection.  Each  of  the  three  treaties 
committed  us  to  "foregoing  the  advantages  of 
our  peculiar  situation."  It  was  the  recognition 
of  this  fact  that  prompted  Washington  to  qual- 
ify his  Precept  with  the  words,  "So  far  as  we 
have  already  formed  engagements,"  etc.,  and 
"so  far,  I  mean,  as  we  are  now  at  liberty,"  etc. 
There  would  be  no  violation  of  the  Washing- 
ton Precept  in  a  permanent  alliance  for  the  sup- 
pression of  piracy  or  of  the  slave  trade,  for  the 
protection  of  American  citizens  or  property  in  a 
country  with  the  government  of  which  the  alli- 
ance was  made,  or  in  an  alliance  of  whatever 
sort,  contracted  with  all  the  nations  of  the  world. 
In  1849  a  treaty  was  negotiated,  but  not  ratified, 
by  which  the  United  States  assumed  the  duty 
of  protecting  the  independence  and  territory 
of  Nicaragua  against  encroachment  by  Great 
Britain.  This  engagement  was  injudiciously 
criticised  in  the  United  States  Senate  as  a  vio- 
lation of  the  Washington  Precept.  The  speaker 
was  Senator  J.  M.  Clayton.  "This,"  he  said, 
"is  one  of  the  first  instances  since  the  ancient 
entangling  alliance  made  with  France  by  the 
treaties  of  1778,  in  which  any  minister  of  this 
government  has  attempted  to  disobey  the  sol- 


V 


36  AMERICAN  POLICY 

emn  injunction  of  the  Father  of  his  country 
to  avoid  all  such  political  connections.  For  this 
is  a  political,  not  a  mere  commercial  alliance."^ 
Secretary  Seward  erred  in  writing,  as  he  did, 
to  our  minister  at  Madrid : 

...  it  is  a  fixed  principle  of  this  government 
not  to  enter  into  entangling  alliances  of  any 
kind  with  foreign  nations  ...  we  once  de- 
clined to  enter  into  treaty  stipulations  for  non- 
intervention [in  Spain],  with  France  and  Great 
Britain  .  .  .  because  we  cannot  enter  into  polit- 
ical contests  [contracts]  for  any  general  purpose 
with  foreign  powers. 

For  the  same  reason  we  have  often  declined  to 
enter  into  the  Congress  of  the  American  Republics.'^ 

Our  declining  to  join  France  and  Great 
Britain  in  the  forementioned  treaty  stipulations 
was  prompted  by  the  "fixed  principle"  of  the 
Washington  Precept,  but  our  declining,  so  far  as 
we  did  decline,  to  enter  the  congress  of  the 
American  Republics,^  was  dictated  by  no  set- 
tled principle  but  by  temporary  expediency. 

^  Speech,  March  8,  1853. 

2  Seward  to  Perry,  April  4,  1865.     The  italics  are  mine. — J.  B. 

^  Congress  of  Latin-American  Republics,  which  met  four  times: 
at  Panama  in  1826,  at  Lima  in  1847,  at  Santiago  in  1856,  and  at 
Lima  in  1864.  The  United  States  was  asked  to  send  delegates  to 
each  of  the  first  two  meetings.  It  sent  two  delegates  to  the  first 
meeting,  but  one  of  them  died  on  the  way  and  before  the  other 


THE  WASHINGTON  PRECEPT  37 

In  1826  a  congress  of  Latin-American  re- 
publics was  held  in  Panama.  In  the  discussion 
which  took  place  in  the  United  States  Congress, 
as  to  the  advisabiUty  of  sending  delegates  to 
this  assembly,  there  was  much  opposition  to  the 
mission  as  tending _tCL  the  formation  of  "en- 
tangling alliances"  and  thus  to  the  violation 
of  the  Washington  Precept.  Its  final  approval  f 
was  due  not  so  much  to  reconciliation  to  such 
alliances  as  to  the  conclusion  that  no  such  alli- 
ance would  result.^  But  no  effective  answer  was 
made  to  the  reasoning  by  which  President  John 
Quincy  Adams,  in  a  special  message,  had  antic- 
ipated and  refuted  the  contention  that  an  alli-\ 
ance  of  the  United  States  with  an  American  re- 
public would  be  a  violation  of  the  Washington 
Precept. 

I  cannot  [he  said]  overlook  the  reflection  that 
the  counsel  .  .  .  was  founded  upon  the  circum- 
stances in  which  our  country  and  the  world 
around  us  were  situated  at  the  time  when  it  was 

one  arrived  the  meeting  had  adjourned.  It  was  prevented  from 
sending  delegates  to  the  second  meeting  by  its  being  engaged  in 
the  Mexican  War  {Pan-Amerika,  by  S.  H.  Fried,  p.  15).  It  was 
not  invited  to  send  delegates  to  the  third  or  to  the  fourth  meeting. 
1  House  Reports,  Resolutions  Nos.  38,  40,  41,  Nineteenth  Con- 
gress, First  Session,  Vol.  II;  Rep.  of  Sen.  Com.  on  Foreign  Affairs, 
Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  232,  Part  4  (1890). 


38  AMERICAN  POLICY 

given;  that  the  reasons  assigned  by  him  for  his 
advice  were  that  Europe  had  a  set  of  primary 
interests  which  to  us  had  none  or  a  very  remote 
relation;  that  hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  fre- 
quent controversies,  the  causes  of  which  were 
essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns;  that  our  de- 
tached and  distant  situation  invited  and  ena- 
bled us  to  pursue  a  different  course.  .  .  .  Eu- 
rope has  still  her  set  of  primary  interests  with 
which  we  have  little  or  a  remote  relation.  Our 
-distant  and  detached  situation  with  reference 
to  Europe  remains  the  same.  But  we  were  then 
the  only  independent  nation  of  this  hemisphere, 
and  we  were  surrounded  by  European  colonies 
with  the  greater  part  of  which  we  had  no  more 
intercourse  than  with  the  inhabitants  of  another 
planet.  Those  colonies  have  been  transformed 
into  eight  independent  nations,  extending  to  our 
very  borders,  seven  of  them  repubHcs  like  our- 
selves, with  whom  we  have  immensely  growing 
commercial,  and  must  have,  and  have  already, 
important  political,  connections,  with  reference 
to  whom  our  situation  is  neither  distant  nor  de- 
tached, whose  political  principles  and  systems 
of  government,  congenial  with  our  own,  must 
and  will  have  an  action  and  counteraction  upon 
us  and  ours  to  which  we  cannot  be  indifferent 
if  we  would.^ 

Subsequently  to  these  meetings,  and  at  the 
instance  of  the  United  States,  the  American  re- 

1  Message  to  House  of  Representatives,  March  15,  1826. 


THE  WASHINGTON  PRECEPT  39 

publics  have  united  in  forming  what  is  now 
called  the  Pan  American  Union.  Under  the 
auspices  of  this  association  four  Pan  American 
conferences  have  been  held;  at  every  one  of 
these  the  United  States  has  been  represented. 

As  thus  far  considered  the  Washington  Pre- 
cept refers  principally,  almost  exclusively,  to 
alliances.  But  it  is  interpreted  also  as  depre- 
cating intervention,  either  between  nations  or 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  a  particular  nation. 
This  interpretation  is  perhaps  due  to  a  con- 
fusion of  Monroe's  message  with  Washington's 
Farewell  Address.  For  Monroe,  as  we  shall 
see,  dwells  more  on  intervention  and  less  on 
alliances  than  Washington.  But  even  if  bor- 
rowed from  Monroe,  the  principle  of  non-inter- 
vention may  properly  be  associated  for  con- 
venience with  the  principle  of  abstention  from 
entangling  alliances,  under  the  designation  of 
the  Washington  Precept. 

The  participation  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Peace  Conferences  at  The  Hague  has  been  mis- 
represented as  indicating  a  desire  to  be  in  **the 
diplomatic  game,"  to  intervene  in  the  interna- 
tional affairs  of  Europe.  It  is  rather  an  ad- 
vance on  the  part  of  the  United  States  toward 


40  AMERICAN  POLICY 

the  world  as  a  whole,  with  a  view  to  common 
action  in  the  service  of  their  common  interests. 
The  United  States  contemplates  no  interven- 
tion unless  it  be  for  the  protection  of  American 
citizens  or  their  property;  this  may  be  a  duty 
superior  to  every  policy.  The  participation  of 
the  United  States  in  the  allied  expedition  to 
Pekin  was  dictated  by  this  duty  and  military 
expediency.  If  this  was  a  violation  of  the 
Washington  Precept,  it  was  one  that  Washing- 
ton himself  would  have  approved.  There  is 
nothing  in  the  Precept  against  expansion.  It 
may  be  construed  as  permitting  of  expansion 
within  the  sphere  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
or  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  Philippines, 
being  in  the  Eastern  Hemisphere,  are  without 
the  sphere  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  or  beyond 
the  limits  of  our  expansion  as  determined  by  the 
Washington  Precept  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
By  our  annexation  of  them  we  acquired  "pri- 
mary interests"  closely  related  to  those  of  Old- 
World  nations;  we  thus  forfeited,  to  an  appre- 
ciable extent,  the  advantages  of  "our  detached 
and  distant  situation."  It  is  hard  to  see  how 
we  can  ever  retrace  this  step.  Giving  the  Phil- 
ippines independence  means  entering  into  agree- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  41 

ments  either  with  foreign  powers  for  their  neu- 
tralization or  with  the  Philippines  themselves 
for  our  exercising  a  protectorate  over  them. 
Neither  of  these  measures  could  be  reconciled 
with  the  Washington  Precept  unless  it  were  con- 
curred in  by  the  nations  of  the  Old  World  gen- 
erally. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine 

History  tells  us  that,  after  the  downfall  of 
Napoleon,  the  rulers  of  Prussia,  Russia,  and 
Austria  formed  a  combination  known  as  the 
Holy  Alliance,  which  in  1822  emitted  this 
declaration : 

The  high  contracting  parties,  well  convinced 
that  the  system  of  representative  government 
is  as  incompatible  with  the  monarchical  princi- 
ple as  the  maxim  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  peo- 
ple is  opposed  to  the  principle  of  divine  right, 
engage  in  the  most  solemn  manner  to  employ 
all  their  means  and  unite  all  their  efforts  to  put 
an  end  to  the  system  of  representative  govern- 
ment wherever  it  is  known  to  exist  in  the  states 
of  Europe  and  to  prevent  it  from  being  intro- 
duced into  those  states  where  it  is  not  known. 

This  declaration  refers  only  to  the  states  of 
Europe.     But  it  was  natural  to  look  forward  to 


42  AMERICAN  POLICY 

its  extension  so  as  to  apply  to  the  Western 
Hemisphere.^  It  was  as  unfavorably  received 
by  Great  Britain  as  it  was  by  the  United 
States.2  On  the  20th  of  August,  1823,  Mr.  Can- 
ning, the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  wrote  to 
Mr.  Rush,  the  United  States  Minister  in 
London : 

...  Is  not  the  moment  come  when  our  goverrw 
ments  might  understand  each  other  as  to  the 
Spanish-American  'colonies?  And  if  we  can 
arrive  at  such  an  understanding  would  it  not 
be  expedient  for  ourselves,  and  beneficial  for  all 
the  world,  that  the  principles  of  it  should  be 
clearly  settled  and  plainly  avowed  ? 

For  ourselves  we  have  no  disguise. 

I.  We  conceive  the  recovery  of  the  colonies 
by  Spain  to  be  hopeless. 

1  Metternich  wrote  to  the  Austrian  representative  at  Madrid 
(December  14,  1822):  "...  His  Majesty  will  not  cease  to  regard 
disorder  and  insurrection  [bouleversements],  whatever  part  of 
Europe  may  be  the  victim  of  them,  as  an  object  of  lively  solicitude 
for  all  governments."  He  thus  menaced  insurrectionary  move- 
ments of  which  any  "  part  of  Europe  might  be  the  victim,"  in 
whatever  parts  of  the  world  the  movements  might  take  place. 
(Politique  exterieure  des  Etats^Unis,  Doctrine  Monroe^  by  Ernest 
Caylus,  p.  II.) 

The  Congress  of  Verona  (Holy  Alliance)  wanted  to  treat  the 
Mexicans  and  Peruvians  as  it  did  Spanish  or  Italian  liberals. 
{U Imperialisme  Americain,  by  Henri  Hauser,  p.  70.) 

2  People  asked  themselves  in  England  whether  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance might  not  some  day  think  of  re-establishing  the  reign  of  the 
Stuarts.     {Ibid.,  p.  12.) 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  43 

2.  We  conceive  the  question  of  the  recogni- 
tion of  them  as  independent  states  to  be  one  of 
time  and  circumstances. 

3.  We  are,  however,  by  no  means  disposed  to 
throw  any  impediment  in  the  way  of  an  arrange- 
ment between  them  and  the  mother  country,  by 
amicable  negotiations. 

4.  We  aim  not  at  the  possession  of  any  por- 
tion of  them  ourselves. 

5.  We  could  not  see  any  portion  of  them 
transferred  to  any  other  power  [than  Spain]  with 
indifference. 

If  these  opinions  and  feeUngs  are,  as  I  firmly 
believe  them  to  be,  common  to  your  govern- 
ment with  ours,  why  should  we  hesitate  mutu- 
ally to  confide  them  to  each  other,  and  to  de- 
clare them  in  the  face  of  the  world  ? 

If  there  be  any  European  power  which  cher- 
ishes other  projects,  which  looks  to  a  forcible 
enterprise  for  reducing  the  colonies  to  subjuga- 
tion, on  the  behalf  or  in  the  name  of  Spain, 
or  which  meditates  the  acquisition  of  any  part 
of  them  to  itself,  by  cession  or  by  conquest,  such 
a  declaration  on  the  part  of  your  government 
and  ours  would  be  at  once  the  most  eflFectual 
and  the  least  oflFensive  mode  of  intimating  our 
joint  disapprobation  of  such  projects.^  .  .  . 

The  "European  power"  referred  to  in  the  last 
paragraph  was  France.  In  that  day  a  colony 
was  a  dependency,  condemned  to  exploitation 

•^  Massachusetts  Historical  Society^  Proceed.,  2  S.,  XV,  415,  416. 


44  AMERICAN  POLICY 

by  the  mother  country  and  excluded  from  the 
privilege  of  trading  with  any  other  country. 
Canning,  therefore,  could  not  approve  of  col- 
onies unless  they  were  British.  He  saw  an  op- 
portunity to  thwart  the  hope  which  France 
entertained,  that,  on  the  reconquest  of  Spanish- 
America,  there  would  be  a  large  division  of  the 
conquered  territory  reclaimed,  subdued,  and 
turned  over  to  her.  He  knew  of  the  immense 
commerce  which  had  been  diverted  from  Spain 
to  Great  Britain  in  consequence  of  the  revolt 
of  the  Spanish-American  colonies,  and  desired 
that  this  vast  trade  be  retained  by  his  country. 
It  was  to  secure  these  ends,  unmoved  by  love 
or  regard  for  the  republic  of  the  United  States 
or  the  Spanish-American  republics,  or  repub- 
lican institutions  anywhere,  that  he  approached 
the  minister  of  the  United  States  at  London  with 
his  suggestion  of  an  entente  between  the  two 
governments.^  He  was  farseeing  enough  to  ap- 
prehend an  expansion  of  the  United  States  over 
Spanish-American  territory  that  might  prove  as 
detrimental  to  British  commerce  as  the  pos- 
session of  such  territory  by  powers  of  the  Holy 
Alliance.     His  clause  5  is  accordingly  worded 

^  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  by  T.  B.  Edglngton,  p.  7. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  45 

so  as  to  debar  the  United  States  from  such  ex- 
pansion, so  far  as  diplomatic  equivocation  could 
do  so.  The  United  States  declined  the  British 
overture  because  its  acceptance  might: 

1.  Implicate  the  United  States  in  the  "fed- 
erative system"  of  Europe. 

2.  Give  offence  to  France. 

3.  Obstruct  the  poHcy  of  the  United  States  in 
America. 

Our  secretary  of  state  wrote  to  our  minister 
in  London,  replying  to  Canning's  five  propo- 
sitions, as  follows: 

1.  We  conceive  the  recovery  of  the  colonies  by 
Spain  to  he  hopeless. 

In  this  we  concur. 

2.  We  conceive  the  question  of  the  recognition 
of  them  as  independent  states  to  be  one  of  time  and 
circumstances. 

We  did  so  conceive  it  until  ...  we  had  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  recovery  of  them  by 
Spain  was  hopeless.  Having  arrived  at  that 
conclusion,  we  considered  that  the  people  of 
those  emancipated  colonies  were  of  rights  inde- 
pendent of  all  other  nations,  and  that  it  was  our 
duty  so  to  acknowledge  them.  We  did  so  ac- 
knowledge them  in  March,  1822,  from  which 
time  the  recognition  has  no  longer  been  a  ques- 
tion to  us.   .   .   . 

3.  We  arey  however ^  by  no  means  disposed  to 


46  AMERICAN  POLICY 

throw  any  impediment  in  the  way  of  an  arrange- 
ment between  them  and  the  mother  country^  by 
amicable  negotiations. 

Nor  are  we  ...  an  arrangement  between 
them  and  Spain,  by  amicable  negotiation  is  one 
which,  far  from  being  disposed  to  impede,  we 
would  earnestly  desire,  and  by  every  proper 
means  in  our  power  endeavor  to  promote,  pro- 
vided it  should  be  founded  on  the  basis  of 
independence.  .  .  . 

4.  We  aim  not  at  the  possession  of  any  of  them 
ourselves, 

5.  We  could  not  see  any  portion  of  them  trans- 
ferred to  any  other  power  [than  Spain]  with 
indifference. 

In  both  these  positions  we  concur.  And  we 
add: 

That  we  cannot  see  with  indifference  any  at- 
tempt by  one  or  more  powers  of  Europe  to 
restore  those  new  states  to  the  crown  of  Spain, 
or  to  deprive  them,  in  any  manner  whatever,  of 
the  freedom  and  independence  which  they  have 
acquired.^ 

President  Monroe  replied  to  the  Declaration 
of  the  Holy  Alliance  by  his  memorable  message 
to  Congress  of  December  2,   1823.     There  is 

*J.  Q.  Adams  to  Rush,  November  29,  1823  {Am.  Hist.  Rev., 
VIII,  36).  The  italics  in  the  propositions  are  mine,  those  in  the 
answers  are  Adams's.  The  last  paragraph  leaves  no  doubt  as  to 
the  difference,  in  Adams's  mind,  between  the  position  of  the  United 
States  and  that  of  Great  Britain,  with  respect  to  expansion  in 
Spanish-America. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  47 

much  in  it  that  refers  to  non-intervention,  and 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  consequently 
understood  to  include  the  Washington  Pre- 
cept. But  it  does  not.  For  the  Washington 
Precept,  Washington's  Address  should  be  con- 
sulted primarily  and  Monroe's  message  second- 
arily.    Monroe  expressed  himself  as  follows: 

.  .  .jUhe  occasion  [of  determining  the  Paisgian 
northwest  boundary]  has  been  judged  proper 
for  asserting  as  a  principle,  in  which  the  rights 
and  interests  of  the  United  States  are  involved, 
that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free  and 
independent  condition  which  they  have  as- 
sumed and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be 
considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by 

any  European  powe^O •  .".' 

It  was  stated  at  the  commencement  of  the 
last  session  [of  Congress]  that  a  great  effort  was 
then  making  in  Spain  and  Portugal  to  improve 
the  condition  of  the  people  of  those  countries 
and  that  it  appeared  to  be  conducted  with  ex- 
traordinary moderation.  It  need  scarcely  be 
remarked  that  the  result  has  been,  so  far,  very 
different  from  what  was  then  anticipated.  Of 
events  in  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  with  which 
we  have  so  much  intercourse,  and  from  which 
we  derive  our  origin,  we  have  always  been  anx- 
ious and  interested  spectators.  The  citizens  of 
the  United  States  cherish  sentiments  the  most 
friendly  in  favor  of  the  liberty  and  happiness  of 


48  AMERICAN  POLICY 

.eir  fellow  men  on  that  side  of  the  Atlantic. 

Jn  xhe.  wans  of  xh^  Enropean  powers,  jp  matters 
relating  to  themselves  [and  not  to  the  United 
f^i-Qt^cjYwp^h^^  npvpr  tak^n  any  part^  nor  does 
it  compor^"'^Tth  our  goljcy-so  to  ^^■"'  It  is  only 
when  oTir  rightySfFHivaded  or  seriously  men- 
aced, that  we  resent  injuries  or  make  prepara- 
tion for  our  defence.  With  the  movements  in 
this  hemisphere  we  are,  of  necessity,  more  im- 
mediately connected,  and  by  causes  which  must 
be  obvious  to  all  enlightened  and  impartial 
observers.  The  political  system  of  the  allied 
powers  is  essentially  different  in  this  respect 
from  that  of  America.  This  difference  pro- 
ceeds from  that  which  exists  in  their  respective 
governments^  And  to  the  defence  of  our  own, 
which  has  Been  achieved  by  the  loss  of  so  much 
blood  and  treasure,  and  matured  by  the  wisdom 
of  their  most  enlightened  citizens,  and  under 
which   we   have   enjoyed  unexampled  felicity, 

whole  nation  is  devoted. 

e  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the 
amicable  relations  existing  between  the  United 
States   and   those   powers   to   declare   that  we 
should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to 
extend    their    system   to    any    portion    of   this 
hemisphere    as    dangerous    to    our    peace    and 
safety.     With  the  existing  colonies  or  depend-^  ^^v      ^ 
enciesj)f  any  European  power  we  have  not  in-     \a\ 
terfered,  and  shall  not  interfere.     But  with  the     ^ 
governments    who    have    declared    their    inde- 
pendence and  maintained  it,  and  whose  inde- 
pendence we  have,  on  great  consideration  and 


S'^: 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  49 

on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not 
view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  op-     C^* 
pressing  them,  or  controlling  in  any  other  man-        u  ■, 
ner  their  destiny,  by  any  European  power,  in  -^ 

any  other  light  than  as  a  manifestation  of  an  un^  j 
fri^Ildly.jdispjosition  towards  the  United  StatesJ  4 
In  the  war  between  these  new  governments  [of 
Latin-America]  and  Spain  we  declared  our  neu- 
trality at  the  time  of  their  recognition  [by  us], 
and  to  this  we  have  adhered  and  shall  continue 
to  adhere,  provided  no  change  shall  occur  which, 
in  the  judgment  of  the  competent  authorities  of 
this  government,  shall  make  a  corresponding 
change  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  indis- 
pensable to  their  security. 

The  late  events  in  Spain  and  Portugal  show 
that  Europe  is  still  unsettled.^  Of  this  impor- 
tant fact  no  stronger  proof  can  be  adduced  than 
that  the  aUied  powers  should  have  thought  it 
proper,  on  any  principle  satisfactory  to  them- 
selves, to  have  interposed  by  force  in  the  in- 
ternal concerns  of  Spain.  To  what  extent  such 
interposition  may  be  carried,  on  the  same  prin- 
ciple, is  a  question  in  which  all  independent 
powers,  whose  governments  differ  from  theirs, 
are  interested;  even  those  most  remote,  and 
surely  none  more  so  than  the  United  States. 
Our  policy  in   regard   to   Europe,   which  was 

1  At  the  instigation  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  a  French  army  of   . 
100,000  men,  under  the  Duke  of  Angouleme,  marched  into  Spain 
in  April,  1823,  and  replaced  Ferdinand  VII  upon  the  throne,  in 
opposition  to  the  wishes  of  the  great  majority  of  the  Spanish 

people. 


so 


AMERICAN   POLICY 


adopted  at  anearlystage-of  thewars  which  have 
so  long  agitated  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  never- \ 
theless  remains  the  same,  which  is,  not  to  inter-  \ 
fere  in  the  internal  concerns  of  any  of  its  pow- 
ers; to  consider  the_^o:irerniTient  de  facto  as  the 
legitimate  government  for  us;  to  cultivate 
^     friendly  relations  with  it,  and  to  preserve  those 

^-X^  relations  by  a  frank,  firm,  and  manly  policy, 
meeting  in  all  instances  the  just  cTaims  of  every 
power,  submitting  to  injuries  from  none.  But 
in  regard  to  these  continents,  circumstances 
are  eminently  and  conspicuously  different.  J  It  is 
impossible  that  the  alUed  powers  should  extend 
their  political  system  to  any  portion  of  either 
continent  without  endangering  our  peace  and 
happiness,  nor  can  any  one  believe  that  our 
J  southern  brethren,  if  left  to  themselves,  would 

^  J  adopt  it  of  their  own  accord.  It  is  equally  im- 
possible, therefore,  that  we  should  behold  such 
interposition  in  any  form  with  indifFerenceTJ 


\ 


About  as  this  paper  was  being  read  in  Con- 
gress a  circular  emanated  from  the  King  of 
Spain,  calling  for  support  from  the  sovereigns  of 
the  Holy  Alliance,  to  maintain  in  America  the 
principle  of  order  and  of  legitimacy ^  the  subversion 
of  which  would  soon  he  communicated  to  Europe, 
This  appeal  remained  unanswered,  not — it 
would  seem — on  account  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 


^  Sen.  Doc.  i,  i8  Cong.,  i  Sess. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  51 

trine,  but  because  of  a  declaration  made  by 
Great  Britain  that  European  intervention  in 
Spanish-America  would  impel  her  to  recognize 
the  independence  of  the  revolted  colonies. 
Rupture  with  Great  Britain  would  have  re- 
animated the  liberal  parties  and  again  shaken 
the  thrones  of  Europe.  This  consideration  was - 
enough  to  prevent  it.^  ^ 

Canning  has  been  credited  with  suggesting 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  United  States.^ 
He  suggested  what  may  be  called  the  Canning 
Doctrine,  according  to  which  the  United  States, 
as  well  as  Great  Britain  and  other  European 
countries,  was  to  be  prevented  from  expanding 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  a  very  different 
thing  from  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  allowed 
of  such  expansion  by  the  United  States,  but  not 
by  Great  Britain  or  any  other  non-American 
country. 

The  object  of  Canning  appears  to  have  been 
to  obtain  some  public  pledge  from  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  ostensibly  against  the 
forcible  interference  of  the  Holy  AUiance  be- 
tween Spain  and  South  America,  but  really  or 
especially  against  the   acquisition  to  \sic\  the 

^  Ernest  Caylus,  opus  cit.^  pp.  21,  22. 
2  Frelinghuysen  to  Lowell,  May  8,  1882. 


52  AMERICAN  POLICY 

United  States  themselves  of  any  part  of  the 
Spanish-American  possessions.  .  .  .  By  joining 
with  her,  therefore,  in  her  proposed  declaration, 
we  give  her  a  substantial  and  perhaps  incon- 
venient, pledge  against  ourselves,  and  really 
obtain  nothing  in  return.^ 

Besides  the  United  States,  France  was,  as 
already  indicated,  to  be  excluded  from  Latin- 
America.  In  defence  of  his  not  having  arrested 
the  French  invasion  of  Spain,  Canning  said:  "I 
sought  for  compensation  in  another  hemisphere. 
...  I  resolved  that  if  France  had  Spain,  it 
should  not  be  Spain  with  the  Indies  [Spanish- 
American  colonies].  I  called  the  New  World 
into  existence  to  redress  the  balance  of  the 
Old."^  Pretension.  Fanjaronnade,  The  Span- 
ish-American colonies  had  won  their  independ- 
ence by  their  own  valor  and  had  been  recognized 
as  independent  governments  two  years  before 
Great  Britain  took  action  in  the  matter.^  Can- 
ning was  so  irritated  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
that  he  retaliated  by  excluding  the  United  States 
from  participation  with  Great  Britain  and  Rus- 

^  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  VI,  177. 
2  Speech,  December  22,  1826. 

^  The  Diplomatic  Relations  of  the   United  States  and  Spanish- 
America^  by  J.  H.  Latane,  pp.  86,  87. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  53 

sia  in  the  settlement  of  the  Alaska  boundary 
question.^ 

Great  Britain,  he  maintained,  could  not  "ac- 
knowledge the  right  of  any  power  to  proclaim 
such  a  principle,  much  less  to  bind  other  coun- 
tries to  the  observance  of  it.  If  we  are  to  be 
repelled  from  the  shores  of  America,  it  would 
not  matter  to  us  whether  that  repulsion  were 
effected  by  the  ukase  of  Russia  excluding  us 
from  the  sea,  or  by  the  new  doctrine  of  the 
President,  prohibiting  us  from  the  land.  But 
we  cannot  yield  obedience  to  either.  .  .  ." 
Describing  the  declaration  of  the  President  as 
"very  extraordinary,"  he  announced  that  the 
principle  was  one  which  his  Majesty's  ministers 
were  prepared  to  combat  in  the  most  un- 
equivocal manner,  maintaining  that  "whatever 
right  of  colonizing  the  unappropriated  portions 
of  America  has  been  hitherto  enjoyed  by  Great 
Britain  in  common  with  the  other  powers  of 
Europe,  may  still  be  exercised  in  perfect  free- 

1  On  the  4th  of  January,  1824,  Rush  wrote  to  Secretary  Mid- 
dleton  that  it  was  the  intention  of  Great  Britain  to  proceed  sep- 
arately, saying:  "The  resumption  of  its  original  course  by  this 
[British]  government  has  arisen  chiefly  from  the  principle  which 
our  government  has  adopted,  of  not  considering  the  American 
continents  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  European 
powers,  a  principle  to  which  Great  Britain  does  not  accede." 


54  AMERICAN  POLICY 

dom,  without  affording  the  sHghtest  cause  of 
umbrage  to  the  United  States."^  To  the  end 
of  his  career,  it  was  Canning's  purpose  to  thwart 
and  oppose  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  On  every  oc- 
casion he  impressed  upon  Latin-American  gov- 
ernments the  advantage  for  them  of  an  alHance 
with  Great  Britain  over  an  alliance  with  the 
United  States.^ 

His  successors  in  office  have  in  general  taken 
this  attitude.  No  other  nation  has  criticised 
and  contravened  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  any- 
thing like  the  extent  that  Great  Britain  has. 
Incidentally  to  the  Venezuelan  controversy 
Lord  Salisbury  wrote  to  Secretary  Olney  that 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  not  entitled  to  any 
one's  respect. 

^  The  Monroe  Doctrine^  by  W.  F.  Reddaway,  p.  97. 

2  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning  {Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  ii, 
704).  See  also  Monroe  Doctrine  {Ibid.,  7,  6y6',  8,  28),  English 
Policy  towards  America,  1 790-1  {Ibid.,  7,  706),  Mexican  Diplomacy 
on  the  Eve  of  War  with  the  United  States  {Ibid.,  18,  No.  2). 

Under  date  of  May  2,  1854,  Canning  wrote  to  the  United 
States  minister  at  London:  "...  With  regard  to  the  doctrine 
laid  down  by  Mr.  President  Monroe  in  1823,  concerning  the  fu- 
ture colonization  of  the  American  continents  by  European  states, 
as  an  international  axiom  which  ought  to  regulate  the  conduct  of 
European  states,  it  can  only  be  viewed  as  the  dictum  of  the  dis- 
tinguished personage  who  delivered  it,  but  her  Majesty's  govern- 
ment cannot  admit  that  doctrine  as  an  international  axiom  which 
ought  to  regulate  the  conduct  of  European  states." 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  55 

The  prohibition  of  colonization  in  America 
and  of  intervention  in  its  affairs,  expressed  or 
implied  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  applied  to  all 
European  powers,  including  those  which  have 
possessions  in  the  American  hemisphere,  and 
may  be  considered  as  extertded  to  apply  to 
every  non-American  country .  On  the  other 
hand,  it  does  not  apply  to  any  American  coun- 
try. Articles  and  books  have  been  written  to 
prove  that  the  United  States  has  been  untrue 
to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  giving  it  such  appli- 
cation as  serves  only  the  interests  of  the  United 
States — one  that  is  not  altruistic,  looking  to  the 
interests  of  all  American  nations,  but  solely  or 
mainly  selfish,  looking  to  the  interests  of  the 
United  States.^  This  sort  of  criticism  and  re- 
sentment is  due  to  misconception  of  the  pur- 
pose and  meaning  of  the  Doctrine,  which  might 
be  corrected  by  a  careful  reading  of  the  pas- 
sages which  I  have  quoted.  The  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, while  it  here  and  there  reveals  an  element 
of  Pan  American  altruism,  is  in  its  general  form 
and   tenor   frankly   egoistical  or  national.     It 

^See  La  Doctrine  Monroe  et  V Amerique  Latine,  by  D.  Anto- 
kletz;  Le  Droit  International  Public,  by  Calvo;  El  Porvenir  de  la 
America  Latina,  by  Manuel  Ugarte;  Les  Democraties  Latines  de 
r Amerique,  by  F.  Garcia-Calderon. 


56  AMERICAN  POLICY 

speaks  for  the  United  States  and  its  interests 
and  not  for  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  its 
interests.  " 

To  appreciate  it  in  spirit  as  well  as  in  letter, 
it  is  necessary  to  recognize,  as  its  primary  pur- 
pose, the  safeguarding  of  the  territory  and  po- 
litical institutions  of  the  United  States.  The 
doctrine  is  commonly  confounded  with  the 
Bolivar  Idea,  which  is  expressed  by  the  phrase, 
"America  for  Americans."  Such  error  is  illus- 
trated in  the  following  quotation  from  a  work 
which,  apart  from  this  point,  is  most  instruct- 
ive and  cannot  be  too  highly  recommended  to 
students  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Pan 
American  movement.  El  Derecho  internacional 
americanOy  by  Alejandro  Alvarez: 

The  declarations,  in  fact,  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, have  no  value,  except  so  far  as  they  re- 
flect the  desire  of  all  America  and  not  the  per- 
sonal opinion  of  the  President.  It  is  this  idea 
that  one  must  grasp  in  order  to  know  its  real 
nature  and  its  scope. ^  .  .  .  The  Monroe  Doc- 
trine represents  the  interests  of  the  whole  con- 
tinent [both  continents],  and  all  the  states  of 
America  are  of  accord  for  its  maintenance.  So 
that,  while  the  United  States  has  remained  thus 

^  P.  139  (French  translation). 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  57 

far  its  only  defender,  Latin-American  states 
would  now  be  found  strong  enough  to  maintain 
it,  if  the  United  States  should  refuse  to  do  so.^ 

Every  nation  in  America  is  welcome  to  co- 
operate with  the  United  States  in  keeping  non- 
American  powers  at  a  safe  distance  from  the 
United  States.  That  is  what  the  enforcement 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  means,  but  that  is 
not  what  Mr.  Alvarez  means.  He  contemplates 
a  safeguarding  by  each  Latin-American  coun- 
try either  of  its  own  interests  or  of  those  of 
the  Western  Heniisphere  as  a  whole.  In  the 
former  case  the  policy  is  similar  to  that  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine;  it  may  be  considered  as  a 
Monroe  Doctrine,  but  not  properly  as  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine;  in  the  latter  case,  that  is,  in 
its  continental  application,  it  is  a  form  of  the 
Bolivar  Idea.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been 
construed  as  applying  to  the  continents  of 
North  and  South  America  and  as  applying 
to  these  continents  and  the  adjacent  islands. 
Monroe  does,  in  his  message,  refer  to  the 
"American  continents,"  but  he  refers  also  to 
**this  hemisphere"   as  the  sphere  of  his  Doc- 

^  P.  173.     See  also  Le  Vol  de  VAigle  de  Monroe  a  Roosevelt,  by 
Joseph  Ribet,  p.  38. 


S8  AMERICAN  POLICY 

trine.  He  may  have  used  the  term  "this 
hemisphere"  as  synonymous  with  "the  Ameri- 
can continents."  But  the  probabiUty  is  that 
his  language  on  this  point  was  purposely  vague. 
It  would  have  seemed  pedantic  had  it  been 
perfectly  definite.  It  leaves  the  sphere  of  his 
Doctrine  to  be  determined  by  events,  with  the 
American  continents  as  a  minimum.  He  ap- 
parently intended  that  it  should  comprise  if 
circumstances  seemed  to  warrant  it,  what  is 
commonly  called  the  Western  Hemisphere,  in- 
cluded between  the  twentieth  and  two  hun- 
dredth meridians  of  longitude  west  of  Greenwich. 
Daniel  Webster  would  have  restricted  its  appli- 
cation, so  far  at  least  as  it  involved  the  use  of 
force,  to  the  limits  of  North  and  perhaps  Cen- 
tral America.^ 

Mr.  Polk  in  his  messages  to  Congress  always 

*  Referring  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  he  said: 

".  .  .  This  declaration  must  be  considered  as  founded  on  our 
rights,  and  to  spring  mainly  from  a  regard  to  their  preservation. 
It  did  not  commit  us,  at  ^11  events,  to  take  up  arms  on  any  indi- 
cation of  hostile  feeling  by  the  powers  of  Europe  towards  South 
America.  If,  for  example,  all  the  states  of  Europe  had  refused  to 
trade  with  South  America  until  her  states  should  return  to  their 
former  allegiance,  that  would  have  furnished  no  cause  of  interfer- 
ence to  us.  Or  if  an  armament  had  been  furnished  by  the  allies 
to  act  against  provinces  the  most  remote  from  us,  as  Chili  or 
Buenos  Ayres,  the  distance  of  the  scene  of  action  diminishing  our 
apprehension  of  danger,  and  diminishing  also  our  means  of  ef- 


a] 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  59 

referred  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  applying 
to  the  North  American  continent,  and  never 
as  extending  to  the  entire  hemisphere.^  A  num- 
ber of  United  States  writers  on  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  have  expressed  the  belief  that  it  was 
unnecessarily  extensive  in  its  application  and 
suggested  that  it  be  narrowed  down.  Such 
views  have  not  gained  any  considerable  accept- 
ance. The  sphere  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
more  likely  to  be  enlarged  than  it  is  to  be  di- 
minished. Exemptions  from  its  application  will 
be  rarer  in  the  future  than  they  have  been  in 
the  past. 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine does  not  commit  the  United  States  to  any 
belligerent  action.  The  most  that  it  threat- 
ens is  the  unfriendliness  of  the  United  States 
toward  an  oflFending  nation.     This  threat  may 

fectual  interposition,  might  still  have  left  us  to  content  ourselves 
with  remonstrance.  But  a  very  different  case  would  have  arisen, 
if  an  army,  equipped  and  maintained  by  these  powers,  had  been 
landed  on  the  shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  commenced 
the  war  in  our  own  immediate  neighborhood.  Such  an  event 
might  justly  be  regarded  as  dangerous  to  ourselves,  and  on  that 
ground  call  for  decided  and  immediate  interference  by  us. 
The  sentiments  and  the  policy  announced  by  the  declaration, 
thus  understood,  were,  therefore,  in  strict  conformity  to  our 
duties  and  our  interest." — {Speech  on  the  Panama  Mission, 
April  14,  1826.) 
^  J.  D.  Richardson,  opus  ciu — T.  B.  Edgington,  opus  cit. 


6o  AMERICAN  POLICY 

gain  or  lose  in  force  with  the  armament  at 
our  command,  but  it  is  far  from  being  abso- 
lutely dependent  on  it  for  effect.  The  lowness 
of  our  present  tariff  on  imports  is  a  factor  to 
be  reckoned  with  in  the  execution  of  our  foreign 
policy.  Nations  will  not  lightly  expose  them- 
selves to  losing  the  market  which  it  allows  them. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  contemplated  that  any 
expansion  which  the  United  States  might  enter 
upon  should  not  meet  with  opposition  from  any 
colony  established  in  America  subsequently  to 
the  announcement  of  the  Doctrine.     It  was  to 

\  protect  the  government  and  institutions  of  the 
United  States,  not  only  where  they  existed  in 
1823  but  wherever  they  might  extend  them- 
selves to  on  American  soil.  The  construction 
of  the  Panama  Canal  has  brought  South  Amer- 
ica more  than  one  thousand  miles  nearer  the 
United  States  and  an  intensely  sensitive  part 
of  the  United  States.  The  Panama  Canal  is. 
spoken  of  as  a  part  of  the  coast-line  of  the 
United  States;   in  whatever  sense  that  may  be 

y  true,  in  that  same  sense  all  of  Central  America 
and  Mexico  are  a  part  of  the  United  States. 
Who  will  now  say  that  any  point  in  South 
America  is  far  enough  from  the  United  States 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  6i 

to  admit  of  its  colonization  hy  a  non-American 
power  without  offending  against  the  spirit  as 
well  as  the  letter  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine? 

It  has  been  said  in  substance  that  because 
we  have  taken  the  Philippines,  thus  invading 
non-American  territory,  we  have  no  right  to 
claim  immunity  for  our  hemisphere  from  inva- 
sion by  non-American  powers;  that  our  hold- 
ing the  PhiUppines  is  inconsistent  with  our 
holding  the  Monroe  Doctrine.^  Independently 
of  the  Washington  Precept,  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine does  not  preclude  the  acquisition  and 
control  by  the  United  States  of  territory  outside 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  United  States 
could  not  complain  if  the  Old  World  should 
promulgate  a  Monroe  Doctrine  directed  against 
the  New,  but  it  is  not  called  upon  to  Anticipate 
that  contingency,  so  long  as  its  possessions 
in  the  Eastern  Hemisphere  are  insignificant  in 
comparison  to  the  territories  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  possessed  by  powers  of  the  Eastern. 
About  half  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  is  Eu- 
ropean.^     The  American  territory  in  the  East- 

^  Democratic  national  platform  for  1900. 

2  The  territory  of  Canada  is  represented  on  British  maps  as 
extending  northward  to  the  Pole.  The  claim  thus  made  is  prob- 
ably contestable,  but,  so  far  as  can  be  learned,  has  not  been  either 


'^ 


62  AMERICAN  POLICY 

ern  Hemisphere  consists  of  the  Island  of  Guam 
and  the  Philippine  Islands,  which  form  to- 
gether about  -^  of  the  area  of  the  hemisphere. 
The  possessions  of  Great  Britain  alone  in 
America  aggregate  more  than  thirty  times  the 
area  of  all  the  colonies  of  the  United  States. 
But  for  our  misreading  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
we  should  probably  be  in  possession  of  a  num- 
ber of  islands  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  now  owned 
by  European  powers  and  of  all  the  Samoan 
Islands,  instead  of  sharing  them  with  Germany. 
Our  portion  of  the  latter  comprises  but  seven  per 
cent  of  their  area  and  about  thirteen  per  cent  of 
their  population. 

Under  the  conditions  attending  the  promul- 
gation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  no  non-Ameri- 
can power  could  be  thought  of  as  occupying 
any  part  of  a  Latin-American  country  without 
estabUshing  there  some  government  less  in  sym- 
pathy, or  more  out  of  sympathy,  with  our  own, 

contested  or  conceded  by  the  United  States  or  by  the  other  nations 
of  the  world. 

Palmyra  Island,  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  is  commonly  represented 
as  a  British  possession.  It  appears  on  our  Land  Office  map  as 
belonging  to  the  United  States.  Cllpperton  Island,  off  the  west 
coast  of  Central  America,  has  been  represented  as  British,  also  as 
French,  and  as  Mexican.  It  appears  to  belong  to  Mexico  and  to 
be  leased  to  the  Pacific  Islands  Company,  a  British  corporation. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  63 

and  more  dangerous  to  it,  than  the  one  which  it 
replaced. 

The  republican  character  of  the  United  States 
gave  no  concern  to  the  courts  of  Europe,  for  at 
that  time  politicians  and  publicists  believed 
that  that  form  of  government  was  reserved  for 
feeble  states. 

The  monarchic  form  of  government  was  a 
matter  of  concern  to  the  United  States  and  the 
other  states  of  America;  they  knew  by  experi- 
ence, and  the  pact  of  the  Holy  AUiance  justi- 
fied them  only  too  well  on  this  point,  that  that 
form  of  government  was  expansive  and  tended 
to  enlarge  its  colonial  domain.^ 

The  time  may  come  when  forms  of  govern- 
ment will  be  substantially  the  same  the  world 
over.  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  if  directed  only 
against  obnoxious  forms  of  government,  would 
then  lose  its  raison  d^etre.  But  it  has  another- 
objective.  It  is  directed  not  only  against  certain ' 
forms  of  government,  but  also,  and  perhaps 
more,  against  an  association  of  governments  and 
its  collective  policy.  The  two  ideas,  form  of  gov- 
ernment and  collective  policy,  Monroe  com- 
prehended in  the  term  "political  system."     The 

^  Le  Droit  international  americain,  by  Alejandro  Alvarez,  p. 
38  n. 


64  AMERICAN  POLICY 

difference  between  the  political  system  of  the 
Holy  Alliance  and  that  of  America  '^proceeds/' 
he  says,  "from  that  which  exists  in  their  respect- 
ive governments."  The  source  to  which  he  par- 
ticularly refers  is  the  principle  of  divine  right, 
which  is  not  yet  wholly  abandoned.  But  if  it 
were,  the  difference  might  proceed  from  other 
principles  or  interests,  common  to  Old-World 
governments  and  not  to  ours,  such  as  hereditary 
privileges,  European  hegemony  or  solidarity,  and 
groupings  or  combinations  of  powers  with  their 
respective  policies.  If  every  nation  of  Europe 
were  a  republic  modelled  after  our  own,  a  Euro- 
pean system  might  still  exist,  with  its  triple 
entente  and  triple  alliance^  its  equilibrium,  or 
balance  of  power,  and  its  concert,  with  its 
congresses,  for  intervening  in  the  affairs  of  par- 
ticular nations.  Let  us  suppose  two  or  three 
nations  of  Europe,  whatever  their  forms  of  gov- 
ernment, competing  actively  for  the  possession 
or  acquisition  of  territory,  in  America.  Can  we 
not  see  all  Europe  concerning  itself  in  the  con- 
test, and  the  concert  or  the  opposing  combina- 
tions of  powers  agitating  or  influencing  all  the 
nations  of  America?  Let  us  go  a  Httle  farther 
and  suppose  a  European  power  to  acquire  posses- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  65 

sion  and  control  of  any  important  strategic  or 
commercial  position  in  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
can  we  not  imagine  its  raising  in  the  course 
of  time  a  Near  Eastern  question  for  the  powers 
of  our  hemisphere  even  more  troublesome  than 
the  Near  Eastern  puzzle  of  Europe;  can  we  not 
conceive  of  European  control  and  influence  in 
America  so  enlarged  as  to  make  the  Western 
Hemisphere  but  an  annex  to  the  Eastern,  elim- 
inating the  New  World  as  such  by  incorporating 
it  in  the  Old,  nullifying  the  Washington  Pre- 
cept by  making  the  affairs  of  European  nations 
the  affairs  of  American,  and  necessarily  extend- 
ing the  concert  and  the  alliances  and  ententes 
of  Europe  to  include  all  America  ?^  It  is  against 
the  complication  and  distortion  of  our  policy  by 
such  conditions  as  these,  quite  as  much  as 
against  any  transformation  of  our  polity  by 
monarchic,  dynastic,  or  other  specific  forms  or. 
features  of  government,  that  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine is  directed.  If  we  are  to  have  a  'Apolitical 
system"   for  America,   it  is  to  be  essentially 

^In  former  centuries  the  practice  of  the  balance  of  power  was 
confined  to  Europe.  .  .  .  The  acquisition  of  territory  by  any  great 
power  anywhere  in  the  whole  world  is  now  held  to  disturb  the 
balance,  and  to  entitle  other  powers  to  a  compensating  acquisition. 
{The  Future  Peace  of  the  Anglo-Saxons,  by  S.  L.  Murray,  p.  18.) 


66  AMERICAN  POLICY 

American  and  not  an  importation  or  an  imposi- 
tion from  Europe. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  interdicts  the  Euro- 
peanizing  of  any  portion  of  the  Western  Hem- 
isphere, not  only  without  but  even  with  the  ex- 
press consent  of  the  American  government  or 
governments  immediately  concerned.  It  not 
only  protests  against  any  ^^interposition  for  the 
purpose  of  oppressing"  an  American  nation,  but 
goes  on  to  say  ^^or  controlling  in  any  other  way 
their  destiny."  It  finally  asserts  in  substance 
that,  if  an  American  government  should  ex- 
press itself  as  consenting  to  European  domina- 
tion, the  United  States  would  assume  that  it 
was  disregarding  or  misrepresenting  the  will  of 
the  people.^ 

It  is  hard  to  believe  that  such  language  was 
meant  to  be  taken  literally.  But  it  was,  and 
derived  certainly  some  justification  from  the 
arbitrary  quality  of  the  nominally  republican 
regime  prevailing  in  the  Latin-America  of  that 
day.    Presidential  dictators  who  would  assassin- 

^  ".  .  .  nor  can  any  one  believe  that  our  Southern  brethren,  if 
left  to  themselves,  would  adopt  it  of  their  own  accord.  ...  It  is 
equally  impossible,  therefore,  that  we  should  behold  such  interpo- 
sition in  any  form  with  indifference." — (Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  50 
ante.) 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  67 

ate  their  opponents  and  sack  their  country's 
treasury  might  not  scruple  to  barter  away  its 
Hberty  and  sovereignty.  President  Melgarejo 
of  Bolivia,  an  admirer  of  Napoleon  and  an  imi- 
tator of  his  absolutism,  ceded  to  Chili  and  to 
Brazil  considerable  portions  of  territory,  be- 
cause those  countries  had  turned  his  head  with 
honors  and  decorations.^  What  the  United 
States  would  do  to-day  if  a  Latin-American 
country  should  invite  a  European  one  to  annex 
it,  in  whole  or  in  part,  is  happily  an  idle  ques- 
tion. There  is  no  indication  that  any  nation  of 
Latin-America  would  willingly  part  with  its 
sovereignty  or  any  of  its  territory,  and  there  is 
much  to  indicate  that  Latin-Americans  are,  if 
possible,  more  opposed  to  foreign  dominion, 
more  attached  to  their  native  land  and  deter- 
mined to  preserve  it  inviolate,  than  the  people  of 
the  United  States  themselves.  But  they  are  not 
all  capable  of  resisting  the  temptation  to  raise 
money  by  granting  concessions  or  leasing  islands 
or  harbors,  which  is  the  next  thing  to  surrender- 
ing territory  and  sovereignty.  It  is  not  for  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  whose  government 
has  from  another  American  government  a  per- 

*  Alcides  Arguedas,  opus  cit.,  p.  209. 


68  AMERICAN  POLICY 

petual  lease  of  four  hundred  and  seventy-four 
square  miles  of  territory,  to  indulge  in  severe  or 
sweeping  condemnation  of  such  transaction. 
But  he  may  consistently  deprecate  the  habitual 
resort  to  it  by  an  American  toward  a  non- 
American  government,  and  in  so  doing  should 
have  the  approval  and  support  of  every  Pan 
American. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  opposes,  not  only  the 
substitution  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  of  non- 
American  for  American  sovereignty,  whether 
with  or  without  the  consent  of  the  American 
nations  affected — but  also  the  establishment 
in  America  of  foreign  sovereignty  where  no 
American  sovereignty  exists.  When  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  was  promulgated  there  were  vast 
territories  in  regions  now  embraced  within  the 
limits  of  Ecuador,  Bolivia,  Paraguay,  and  Ar- 
gentina, that  were  not  parts  of  any  recognized 
nation,  that  were  res  nullius  in  the  light  of 
so-called  international  law.  The  Monroe  Doc- 
trine has  been  pronounced  internationally  illegal 
because  it  undertakes  or  undertook  to  prevent 
the  appropriation  of  such  unappropriated  terri- 
tories by  European  governments.  Nations,  it  is 
said,  cannot  be  prohibited  from  taking  res  nuU 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  69 

lius  territories  on  the  ground  that  such  nations 
belong  to  a  different  hemisphere  or  another  con- 
tinent. That  is  why  President  Monroe  did  not 
base  his  action  on  so-called  international  law. 
He  put  it  on  the  ground  of  necessity,  necessity  of 
self-preservation,  the  first  law  of  nature.  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  enunciates  not  a  legal  right, 
but  a  national  policy  based  upon  a  natural  right 
as  inalienable  from  nationality  as  life,  liberty, 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness  are  inalienable  from 
humanity.  With  a  view  to  the  safety  of  the 
United  States  the  Monroe  Doctrine  meant  that 
the  unclaimed  territories  of  the  Western  Hem- 
isphere should  come  under  control  only  of 
American  powers.  It  has,  in  fact,  been  consid- 
ered by  more  than  one  authority  as  proclaiming 
that  all  such  territories  were  actually  under 
American  sovereignty. 

With  the  exception  [said  John  Quincy  Adams] 
of  the  existing  European  colonies,  which  it  was 
in  no  wise  intended  to  disturb,  the  two  con- 
tinents consisted  of  several  sovereign  and  in- 
dependent nations  whose  territories  covered 
theilr  whole  surface.^ 

^  Message  to  House  of  Representatives,  March  15,  1826. 
"According  to  the  message  [of  President  Monroe]  there  were 
not  In  America  as  there  were  In  Europe  territories  unappropriated 


70  AMERICAN  POLICY 

While  recognizing  the  existence  of  European 
possessions  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  and 
promising  not  to  interfere  with  such  ^'existing 
colonies  or  dependencies,"  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
does  not  commit  the  United  States  to  permitting 
their  transfer  by  one  European  power  to  an- 
other. On  the  contrary  it  warrants  the  preven- 
tion of  such  transfer  as  a  fresh  extension  of  the 
''political  system"  of  Europe  to  the  Western 
Hemisphere. 

In  1825,  Henry  Clay,  as  secretary  of  state, 
declared  to  the  governments  of  France  and 
England  that  the  United  States  would  not  per- 
mit Spain  to  transfer  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  to 
other  European  states.     With  respect  to  Cuba, 

in  law,  although  in  fact  the  greater  part  of  the  American  hemi- 
sphere was  in  that  situation.  That  declaration  was  not  new. 
Spain  had  made  it  at  the  beginning  of  her  colonial  period,  with 
regard  to  her  colonies.  The  origin  of  her  pretensions  is  found  in 
a  bull  of  Pope  Alexander  VI,  who  separated  by  a  geographical 
line  the  possessions  of  Spain  from  those  of  Portugal.  Spain  found 
herself,  then,  sovereign  in  law  of  all  lands  situated  west  of  that 
line.  Although  the  bull  has  not  been  respected  by  the  other 
powers,  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  Spain  put  forth  this  claim  on 
a  number  of  occasions  .  .  .  the  Spanish  government,  by  edict  of 
June  30,  1865,  relative  to  the  litigation  between  Venezuela  and 
Holland  over  the  Island  of  Aves,  declared  that  it  belonged  to 
Venezuela,  basing  its  decision  on  Spain's  having  formerly  con- 
sidered that  island  as  a  part  of  its  domain,  although  recognizing 
that  Spain  had  never  occupied  it  effectively." — (Alvarez.)  See 
also  F.  Garcia-Calderon,  opus  cit. 


/ 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  71 

similar  declarations  were  made  by  Secretary 
Van  Buren  In  1830  and  by  Secretary  Webster  in 
1852.  In  1845  President  Polk  said  that  the 
United  States  would  never  acknowledge  any 
transfer  of  territory,  whether  made  by  the  de- 
sire of  the  inhabitants,  by  purchase,  or  by  force, 
from  any  nation  of  North  America  to  any  nation 
of  Europe.^ 

President  Grant  said : 

These  dependencies  are  no  longer  regarded  as 
subject  to  transfer  from  one  European  power  to 
another.  When  the  present  relation  of  colonies 
ceases,  they  are  to  become  independent  powers 
exercising  the  right  of  choice  and  of  self-control 
in  the  determination  of  their  future  condition 
and  relations  with  other  powers.^ 

and : 

The  Doctrine  promulgated  by  President  Mon- 
roe has  been  adhered  to  by  all  poHtical  parties, 
and  I  now  deem  it  proper  to  assert  the  equally 
important  principle  that  hereafter  no  territory 
on  this  continent  shall  be  regarded  as  subject  of 
transfer  to  a  European  power.^ 

We  may  consider  as  a  corollary  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  that  no  non-American  possession  in 
America  shall  be  transferred  to  any  non-Ameri- 

*  W.  F.  Reddaway,  opus  cit.  ^  First  annual  message,  1869. 

'  Message  to  Senate,  May  31,  1870,  relative  to  Santo  Domingo. 


72  AMERICAN  POLICY 

can  power.  In  1877  Sweden  returned  the  is- 
land^of  St.  Barthelemy  to  France  without  oppo- 
sition from  the  United  States. 

In  spite  of  this  isolated  case,  a  declaration^ 
similar  to  Clay's  would  certainly  be  made  by  the 
United  States,  if  a  feeble  European  state  should 
cede  a  colony  in  the  Caribbean  Sea  to  a  power- 
ful one;  such  cession  would  be  considered  by  the 
United  States  as  a  danger.  This  policy,  which 
at  first  sight  seems  high-handed,  is  not  unprece- 
dented; in  Europe  the  great  powers  would  cer- 
tainly oppose  such  cessions  of  territory,  in  they 
name  of  the  equilibrium.^ 

President  Grant  in  his  annual  message  of 
1870  said:  ^^The  time  is  not  probably  far  distant 
when,  in  the  natural  course  of  events,  the  Euro- 
pean political  connection  with  this  continent 
will  cease,"  and  his  secretary  of  state,  in  an  ac- 
companying report,  remarked  that  the  policy 
announced  by  Monroe  "looks  hopefully  to  the 
time  when,  by  the  voluntary  departure  of  Euro- 
pean governments  from  this  continent  and  the 
adjacent  islands,  America  shall  be  wholly 
American."^ 

That  the  United  States  means  to  be  supreme 

*  Alvarez,  opus  ciu 

^Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1870-71,  p.  257. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  73 

among  the  nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
with  a  view  to  the  gradual  absorption  of  the  lat- 
ter, seems  to  be  a  postulate  of  all  foreign  critics 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

It  seems  unnecessary  to  repeat  [says  Manuel 
Ugarte]  that  the  United  States  have  not  enter- 
tained the  idea  of  assuring  our  independence  as 
something  permanent,  but  have  meant  to  pre- 
vent any  other  power  from  establishing  itself  in 
what  they  consider  as  destined  sooner  or  later 
to  be  theirs.^ 

Whether  the  North  American  peril  here  re- 
ferred to  be  exaggerated  or  not,  exception  may 
be  taken  to  the  author's  linking  it  as  he  does 
with  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  jingos  of  the 
United  States  can  find  no  justification  for  an 
aggressive  policy  toward  Latin-America  in  the 
Monroe  Doctrine;  and  the  patriots  of  Latin- 
America  can  find  none  in  it  for  attributing  such 

1  Opus  cit.,  p.  136.  See  also  La  Doctrina  de  Monroe,  by  J.  M. 
Cespedes,  Havana,  1893;  Les  Democraties  latines  de  rAmerique, 
by  Y.  G.  Calderon,  p.  274  et  seq. 

"  America  for  the  United  States.  American  statesmen,  whether 
Democratic  or  Republican,  have  never  understood  the  declara- 
tion of  President  Monroe  but  in  this  sense." — {Autour  de  VIsthme 
de  Panama,  by  Joseph  Justin,  President  of  the  National  School  of 
Law  of  Port  au  Prince,  p.  28.)  To  the  same  effect  Das  Volker- 
recht  systematisch  dargestellt,  by  Doctor  Franz  v.  Liszt,  p.  37,  and 
Ulmperialisme  americain,  by  Henri  Hauser,  p.  76. 


74  AMERICAN  POLICY 

a  policy  to  the  United  States.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  claims  nothing  for  the  United  States 
to  the  exclusion  of  other  American  nations;  it 
pretends  to  nothing  for  the  United  States  that 
it  does  not  concede  to  every  other  American 
nation.  If  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  the  United 
States  arrogates  to  itself  supremacy  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  it  is  only  with  respect  to 
non-American  powers,  and  with  respect  to  them 
it  wishes  every  American  nation  to  be  supreme. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  that 
makes  its  provisions  a  monopoly  of  the  United 
States.  Nothing  would  suit  the  United  States 
better  than  to  have  every  American  nation 
promulgate  a  similar  doctrine  for  itself. 

Our  absorption  of  a  portion  of  Mexico  and  our 
intervention  in  Colombia  are  pointed  to  as  evi- 
dence of  land  cupidity  on  the  part  of  the  **  Yan- 
quis."  I  shall  not  undertake  to  justify  in  every 
respect  the  courses  taken  by  the  United  States 
in  the  acquisition  of  these  two  additions  to  its 
territory;  on  the  contrary,  I  admit  that  there  is 
much  in  them  to  condemn.  I  wish  only  to  point 
out  that  they  were  not  prompted  by  lust  of  con- 
quest, but  were  both  actuated  by  specific  mo- 
tives of  a  different  character. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  75 

Let  us  unhesitatingly  assert  [says  a  Latin- 
American]  that  the  United  States,  as  a  nation, 
has  never  confirmed  any  of  these  theories  of 
questionable  tendencies,  either  by  explicit  en- 
actments of  the  Congress  or  by  their  inclusion  in 
treaties  or  other  documents  of  official  character. 
The  great  republic  is,  therefore,  absolutely  with- 
out reproach  as  regards  the  projects  of  hegem- 
ony which  have  been  attributed  to  it  with  more 
malice  than  justice.^ 

Mr.  Maurice  de  Waleff'e,  in  his  work  Les  Pa- 
radis  de  VAmerique  Centrales  asks  the  question : 
"Will  the  United  States  gobble  up  Spanish- 
America?"  and  answers  it  in  the  affirmative. 
"The  Yankee  tide,"  he  says,  "after  having  ab- 
sorbed Mexico,  will  overflow  Venezuela,  Colom- 
bia, Ecuador,  and  Peru,  to  stop  only  before  the 
three  substantial  states  of  South  America:  Bra- 
zil, Argentina,  and  Chili.  But  the  wave  that 
will  come  to  beat  at  their  feet  will  have  acquired 
colossal  proportions,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether 
they  will  be  able  to  do  more  than  give  it  a  tem- 
porary check.     By  that  time — and  those  of  us 

1  Monro'isme,  by  F.  Capella  y  Pons,  Honorary  Secretary  of  the 
Uruguayan  Legation  at  Berlin. 

As  I  write  these  lines,  both  of  the  political  parties  in  Mexico,  the 
Ins  and  the  outs,  are  trying  with  more  or  less  success  to  make 
political  capital  out  of  the  supposed  longing  of  the  United  States 
for  more  Mexican  territory. — ^J.  B. 


76  AMERICAN  POLICY 

twenty  years  of  age  will  live  to  see  it — the 
United  States  will  be  more  powerful  than  all 
'Europe  united." 

If  the  United  States  had  the  sinister  designs 
attributed  to  it  respecting  the  other  nations  of 
America,  it  would  want  those  nations  to  remain 
weak.  It  would  assume  the  role  of  their  de- 
fender, and  deprecate  every  attempt  on  their 
part  to  develop  their  power  of  self-defence.  But 
what  does  the  history  of  America  show?  That 
the  United  States  has  repudiated  the  role  of 
champion  for  Latin-American  countries,  that  it 
welcomes  the  growth  of  those  countries,  their 
advance  in  the  arts  of  peace  and  of  war,  their 
confederation,  their  contriving  in  any  way  to 
strengthen  themselves  separately  and  collect- 
ively. 

The  United  States  is  not  seeking  territory. 
It  is  true  that  its  people  go  into  foreign  coun- 
tries, notably  Canada,  Mexico,  and  others  of 
Latin-America,  and  they  will  probably  do  so  In 
ever-increasing  numbers.  This  prospect  has 
created  among  the  smaller  and  weaker  countries 
an  apprehension  that  the  Yankees  may  get  con- 
trol of  them,  either  by  force  or  by  the  ballot,  and 
bring   about   their   annexation   to   the   United 


THE  MONROE   DOCTRINE  77 

States.  The  feeling  is  natural  and  perhaps  not 
wholly  groundless,  but  it  may  be  said  that  there 
is  little  likelihood  of  any  uprising  or  revolt 
on  the  part  of  settlers  from  the  United  States 
against  a  government  that  gives  them  the  essen- 
tials of  what  they  get  from  their  own;  that  af- 
fords them,  by  whatever  forms  and  methods, 
protection  in  their  persons  and  property.  There 
has  never  been  a  case  of  settlers  from  the  United 
States  revolting  against  a  fairly  good  govern- 
ment. In  the  case  of  Texas  their  revolt  was 
against  an  intolerable  military  oligarchy.^  To 
attempt  to  make  United  States  adventurers,  sol- 
diers of  fortune,  filibusterers,  etc.,  responsible  for 
revolutions  in  Latin-American  countries  is  un- 
reasonable. That  class  of  people  only  supply  a 
demand,  as  do  the  machinery  and  other  products 
of  the  United  States  and  of  other  countries  im- 
ported into  Latin-America.  They  do  not  cre- 
ate the  demand  which  they  meet.  That  is  the 
work  of  the  countries  to  which  they  go.  Mili- 
tary adventurers  would  not  go  to  a  country  any 
more  than  sewing-machines  would,  if  there  were 
no  use  for  them  there. 

1  Las  grandes  Mentiras  de  nuestra  Historia,  by  Francisco  Bulnes, 
p.  261. 


78  AMERICAN  POLICY 

Why  should  not  settlers  from  the  United 
States  do  in  other  countries  as  settlers  from  for- 
eign countries  do  in  the  United  States,  cast  their 
lots  irrevocably  with  the  country  which  they 
adopt  and  become  as  loyal  citizens  of  it  as  any  ? 
During  our  Civil  War  the  foreign-born  element 
of  our  population  rendered  more  military  service 
in  proportion  to  its  numbers  than  the  native- 
born.^  Should  Canada  ever  be  afflicted  with  the 
scourge  of  war,  she  may  count  upon  similar  sup- 
port from  her  United  States  subjects.  Should 
the  war,  by  any  possibility,  be  with  the  United 
States,  it  would  be  for  those  subjects  a  civil  war. 
Some  of  them  would  probably  desert  her  and 
some  even  fight  against  her,  but  the  majority, 
assuming  that  her  government  continues  as  ex- 
cellent as  it  is  to-day,  would  stand  loyally  by 
her. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  does  not  protect  any 
American  country,  not  even  the  United  States, 
against  encroachments  by  another  American 
country.  Should  any  Latin-American  country, 
or  combination  of  such  countries,  undertake  to 
impose  its  form  of  government  upon  another  or 

^  Das  Deutschtum  in  den  Vereinigten  Staaten  in  seiner  geschicht- 
lichen  Entzvickelung,  by  A.  B.  Faust. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  79 

seek  otherwise  to  oppress  it,  or  seem  by  expan- 
sion to  be  endangering  the  integrity  of  the 
United  States,  any  prevention  that  we  might 
undertake  would  depend  for  its  justification  not 
upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  upon  the  natu- 
ral right  by  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  in- 
spired and  according  to  which  it  is  interpreted — 
the  right  of  self-preservation.  This  right  has 
been  recently  invoked  as  the  basis  of  the  follow- 
ing Senate  resolution,  introduced  by  Senator 
Lodge,  and  passed  on  the  2d  of  August,  1912: 

Resolved,  that  when  any  harbor  pr  other 
place  in  the  American  continents  is  so  situated 
that  the  occupation  thereof  for  na.val  or  mili- 
tary purposes  might  threaten  the  communica- 
tions or  the  safety  of  the  United  States,  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  could  not  see, 
without  grave  concern,  the  possession  of  such 
harbor  or  other  place  by  any  corporation  or 
association  which  has  such  a  relation  to  another 
government  not  American  as  to  give  that  gov- 
ernment practical  power  of  control  for  naval  ob 
military  purposes. 

Commenting  upon  this  enactment  the  sena- 
tor says:  "It  rests  on  a  much  broader  and  older 
ground  than  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  This  reso- 
lution rests  on  the  generally  accepted  principle 


8o  AMERICAN  POLICY 

that  every  nation  has  a  right  to  protect  its  own 
safety;  and  if  it  feels  that  the  possession  of  any 
given  harbor  or  place  is  prejudicial  to  its  safety, 
it  is  its  duty  and  right  to  intervene." 

The  Lodge  resolution  was  not  approved  by 
President  Taft.  It  may  seem  on  this  account 
to  have  less  authority  than  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. But  the  authority  that  comes  of  formal 
approval  of  such  a  declaration  is  of  little  im- 
portance. Its  real  authority  can  come  only  as 
the  authority  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  come 
— from  its  observance. 

As  there  is  nothing  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
that  protects  the  United  States  from  the  rest  of 
Latin-America,  there  is  nothing  in  that  doc- 
trine that  protects  Latin-America  or  any  part 
of  it  from  the  United  States.  If  the  United 
States  should  annex  Canada,  Cuba,  Mexico, 
and  all  Central  America,  with  or  without  the 
consent  of  those  countries,  any  opposition  that 
might  be  made  by  other  American  countries 
could  be  based  only  on  the  same  natural  right  of 
self-protection. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  does  not  make  us  the 
protector  of  any  American  country,  except  so 
far  as  an  attempt  upon  that  country  may  be 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  8i 

a  danger  or  a  menace  to  the  United  States. 
Whether  or  not  it  is  such  is  to  be  decided  by  the 
United  States  and  to  govern  its  action  in  each 
case  as  it  may  arise.  It  was  with  this  idea  that, 
in  1826,  during  the  debate  on  the  Panama  Con- 
gress, James  Buchanan  introduced  and  passed 
in  the  House  of  Representatives  the  following 
resolution : 

In  the  opinion  of  the  House  the  United  States 
ought  not  to  form  any  alliance  with  all  or  any 
of  the  South  American  republics,  nor  ought  they 
to  become  parties  with  them  to  any  joint  dec- 
laration for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  colo- 
nization upon  the  continent  of  America,  but  that 
the  people  of  the  United  States  should  be  left 
free  to  act  in  any  crisis  in  such  manner  as  their 
feelings  of  friendship  toward  these  republics  or 
as  their  own  honor  and  policy  may  at  the  time 
dictate. 

Manuel  Ugarte  exhorts  his  fellow  Latin- 
Americans  to  guard  against  the  "Yanqui" 
peril.  If  this  was  to  be  done  by  developing  the 
resource  of  Latin-America,  the  United  States 
could  only  wish  them  success;  for  in  securing 
themselves  against  the  United  States  they  would 
be  making  themselves  impregnable  to  Europe. 
But  Mr.  Ugarte's  idea  of  security  for  Latin- 


82  AMERICAN  POLICY 

America  is  protection  by  European  countries. 
From  these,  he  says,  Latin-America  has  nothing 
to  fear  and  everything  to  hope.  Think  of  it! 
Great  Britain,  France,  Germany,  Russia,  Aus- 
tria, Italy,  those  hardened,  bristUng,  organ- 
ized embodiments  of  intervention  and  conquest, 
of  ruined  nationahties,  of  blasted  hopes  and 
blighted  aspirations  toward  liberty  and  inde- 
pendence, to  be  looked  to  by  the  feeble,  dis- 
united young  republics  of  Latin-America  for 
protection,  and  from  what?  From  aggression 
by  their  considerate,  pacific  elder  brother.  Here 
is  a  Latin-American  answer  to  Mr.  Ugarte's 
proposition: 

In  July,  1850,  Russia,  England,  and  France 
signed  at  London  a  protocol  establishing  ''the 
integrity  of  the  Danish  monarchy."  Not  only 
that;  when,  in  1864,  the  question  of  the  duchies 
entered  into  the  acute  stage,  the  Prince  of  Wales 
had  already  married  one  of  the  daughters  of 
Christian  IX  [of  Denmark].  Besides  the  politi- 
cal reasons  and  the  treaties,  strong  family  ties 
weighed  in  favor  of  Denmark.  So,  notwith- 
standing the  evidence  and  the  imminent  danger 
which  threatened  him.  Christian  IX  appeared 
unconcerned  and  was  firmly  convinced  that 
France  would  not  abandon  him  and  that  Eng- 
land would  not  let  Prussia  take  possession  of 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  83 

the  ports  of  Schleswig.  Austria  and  Prussia, 
however,  threw  themselves,  for  different  reasons, 
upon  feeble  Denmark.  England  and  France 
pretended  not  to  know  what  was  going  on,  and 
Denmark  was  despoiled.  Schleswig-Holstein 
was  taken  from  her,  and  the  signers  of  the  Lon- 
don protocol  made  no  sign  of  protest. 

Haytians,  my  brothers,  ponder,  ponder  well 
this  lesson.  And  remember,  above  everything, 
that  the  great  powers  of  Europe  profess  the 
policy  of  "You  scratch  me;  I  scratch  you."  On 
many  occasions  the  United  States  have  shown 
themselves  disposed  to  accord  to  us  at  least  a 
strong  moral  support;  and  they  have  always 
treated  us  with  the  greatest  courtesy. 

It  will  be  replied,  perhaps,  that  their  sympa- 
thies cover  a  thousand  selfish  considerations. 
Be  it  so;  it  is  preferable  to  deal  with  interested 
parties  who  do  not  lack  consideration  for  us 
than  with  friends  who  constantly  maltreat  us, 
while  entertaining,  no  doubt,  the  same  egotistic 
sentiments  which  they  only  know  better  how  to 
dissimulate.  ...  In  my  judgment,  if  it  were 
imperatively  necessary  that  Hayti  should  con- 
clude an  alliance,  it  is,  at  any  rate  for  the  pres- 
ent,^ not  in  Europe  that  it  should  be  sought.^ 

If  Europe  Is  debarred  from  colonization  in 
America,  what  interest  can  it  have  in  the  pro- 

1  In  1886. 

2  La  Politique  exterieure  (T Haiti,  by  J.  N.  Leger,  formerly  charge 
d'affaires  of  Hayti  in  Paris. 


84  AMERICAN  POLICY 

tection  of  Latin-America,  except  as  a  foreign 
market?  But  considering  it  as  a  market,  is 
Europe  likely  to  prefer  for  it  Latin-American 
control  to  United  States  control?  If  Latin- 
America  does  not  develop  the  population  and 
resources  necessary  to  self-protection,  the  ques- 
tion will  be,  not  whether  the  United  States  or 
Europe  shall  protect  it,  but  whether  the  United 
States  or  Europe  shall  absorb  it.  To^liis  ques- 
tion the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Bolivar  Idea 
answer:  Let  it,  then,  be  the  United  States. 
It  is  a  Latin-American  who  says: 

Nations  must  trust  their  destinies  to  the  ef- 
forts of  their  own  people  and  strengthen  them- 
selves in  the  wisdom  and  probity  of  the  latter. 
The  danger  for  the  states  of  the  South  American 
continent  does  not  come  from  the  North;  the 
real  peril  will  always  be  the  incapacity  and  dis- 
order within  themselves.^ 

1  Monrotsme^  by  F.  Capella  y  Pons,  honorary  secretary  of  the 
Uruguayan  Legation  at  Berlin,  pp.  158,  159. 


Ill 

CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE 
DOCTRINE 

The  cardinal  policies  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States — British  command  of  the  sea  and 
the  Monroe  Doctrine — would  seem  at  first  blush 
not  likely  to  conflict,  the  province  of  one  being 
the  oceans  of  the  world  and  that  of  the  other 
the  land  of  one  hemisphere.  One  would  think 
that  each  of  these  policies  could  work  itself  out 
on  its  own  element  without  coming  in  the  way 
of  the  other.  This  might  have  been  the  case 
had  man  contented  himself  with  the  distribu- 
tion of  land  and  water  which  nature  provided, 
and  this  he  would  perforce  have  done — so  far 
as  we  can  judge — had  there  been  no  such  thing 
as  intercontinental  isthmuses  offering  the  op- 
portunity of  changing  the  distribution  of  land 
and  water  in  a  way  to  affect  the  value  of  each. 
Great  Britain  could  not  without  concern  see  the 

85 


/--/ 


86  AMERICAN  POLICY 

United  States  secure  for  itself  a  shorter  route 
from  the  middle  Atlantic  Ocean  to  British  India 
than  she  had  herself,  nor  could  the  United 
States  countenance  the  occupation  and  fortifi- 
cation of  American  territory  by  Great  Britain 
to  the  extent  necessary  to  the  construction  and 
protection  of  an  interoceanic  railroad  or  canal. 
It  was  destined  that  these  two  considerations 
should  contend  for  mastery  wherever  the  ques- 
tion of  interoceanic  communication  should  come 
up  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

Since  the  first  third  of  the  seventeenth  century 
Great  Britain  entertained  a  project  of  taking 
possession  of  Nicaragua  with  the  object  of  pro- 
viding rapid  communication  between  the  At- 
lantic and  Pacific  Oceans.  The  early  surveys 
made  with  this  object  in  view  represented  the 
route  as  impracticable,  and  it  was  not  until 
some  two  hundred  years  later  that  the  acquisi- 
tion of  California  led  the  United  States  to  take 
steps  toward  the  connection  of  the  two  oceans, 
and  raised  the  question  whether  British  or 
American  interests  were  to  be  supreme  in  the 
American  hemisphere.  The  first  two  articles 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  answered  this 
question  in  favor  of  Great  Britain.     Article  I 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    87 

declared  that  neither  nation  would  "ever  obtain 
or  maintain  for  itself  any  exclusive  control  over 
the  said  ship-canal:  agreeing  that  neither  will 
ever  erect  or  maintain  any  fortifications  com- 
manding the  same  or  in  the  vicinity  thereof,  or 
occupy,  or  fortify,  or  colonize,  or  assume  or 
exercise  any  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa 
Rica,  the  Mosquito  Coast,  or  any  part  of  Cen- 
tral America.  .  .  ."  Article  II  said:  "Vessels 
of  the  United  States  or  Great  Britain  traversing 
the  said  Canal  shall,  in  case  of  war  between  the 
contracting  parties,  be  exempted  from  block- 
ade, detention,  or  capture  by  either  of  the  bel- 
ligerents, and  this  provision  shall  extend  to 
such  a  distance  from  the  two  ends  of  the  said 
canal  as  may  hereafter  be  found  expedient  to 
establish."  While  the  treaty  was  under  con- 
sideration an  American  statesman  wrote  :^ 

If  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  can  succeed  in  having 
the  first  two  provisions  of  this  treaty  ratified  by 
the  Senate,  he  will  deserve  a  British  peerage. 
.  .  .  The  treaty  altogether  reverses  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  and  establishes  it  against  ourselves 
rather  than  European  governments.  .  .  .  To 
get  clear  of  this  treaty  will  some  day  cost  us  a 

^  Buchanan  to  McClernand,  April  2,  May  30,  1850.  {American 
Historical  Review,  V,  99-101.) 


88  AMERICAN  POLICY 

bloody  war  with  Great  Britain,  should  she  re- 
main as  powerful  as  she  is  at  present. 

Sir  Henry  got  his  peerage.  There  has  been 
no  bloody  war  over  the  treaty,  but  the  time 
has  not  yet  come  for  saying  that  it  has  been 
averted.  A  bloodless  one,  with  occasional 
truces,  has  been  going  on  ever  since  the  treaty 
was  enacted.  One  of  our  secretaries  of  state 
wrote  to  our  minister  in  London : 

As  an  original  proposition,  this  government 
would  not  admit  that  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  should  be  put  on  the  same  basis, 
even  negatively,  with  respect  to  territorial  ac- 
quisitions on  the  American  continent,  and  would 
be  unwilling  to  establish  such  a  precedent  with- 
out full  explanation.^ 

Each  party  to  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty 
engaged  "to  invite  every  state  with  which  both 
or  either  have  friendly  intercourse  to  enter  into 
stipulations  similar  to  those  which  they  have 
entered  into  with  each  other."^ 

^  Blaine  to  Lowell,  November  19,  188 1. 

2  "The  attitude  assumed  on  this  occasion  by  the  American  sec- 
retary of  state,"  says  a  Senate  committee  on  foreign  relations, 
"was  so  strangely  inconsistent  alike  with  the  Interests  and  with 
the  dignity  of  the  United  States  that  it  is  Impossible  for  the  com- 
mittee to  advert  to  it  without  pain. 

"Mr.    Clayton    weakly    sought    to  induce  Great   Britain   to 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    89 

It  was  in  the  condemnation  of  this  transac- 
tion that  Senator  Stephen  A.  Douglas  made  his 
reputation  as  an  orator.  In  the  following  pas- 
sages from  his  speeches  one  may  catch  some  of 
the  eloquence  with  which  he  moved  his  grave 
colleagues  of  the  Senate  and  won  the  heart  of 
Young  America.  The  reference  in  his  first  few 
words  is  to  the  opportunity,  renounced  by  Sec- 
retary Clayton,  of  having  an  exclusively  Ameri- 
can canal. 

When  Nicaragua  desired  to  confer  the  priv- 
ilege, and  when  we  were  willing  to  accept  it,  it 
was  purely  an  American  question,  with  which 
England  had  no  right  to  interfere.  It  was  an 
American  question  about  which  Europe  had  no 
right  to  be  consulted.  Are  we  under  any  more 
obligation  to  consult  European  powers  about  an 
American  question  than  the  allied  powers  were, 
in  their  Congress,  to  consult  us,  when  establish- 
ing the  equilibrium  of  Europe  by  the  agency  of 
the  Holy  AUiance.  .  .  .  England  not  consent! 
She  will  acquiesce  in  your  doing  what  you  may 
deem  right  so  long  as  you  consent  to  allow  her  to 
hold  Canada,  the  Bermudas,  Jamaica,  and  her 
other  American  possessions.  .  .  . 

abandon  her  own  unfounded  claims  on  the  territory  of  an  inde- 
pendent Spanish-American  state  by  inviting  her  to  share  with  us 
the  duty  and  privilege,  peculiarly  our  own,  of  protecting  an  inter- 
oceanic  communication  of  infinite  interest  and  concern  to  this 
country." 


90  AMERICAN   POLICY 

I  was  unwilling  to  enter  into  a  treaty  stipula- 
tion with  any  European  power  in  respect  to  this 
continent,  that  we  would  not  do  in  the  future 
whatever  our  duty,  interest,  honor,  and  safety 
might  require  in  the  course  of  events.  I  am 
not  prepared  to  prescribe  limits  to  the  area 
over  which  democratic  principles  may  safely 
spread.  ... 

You  may  make  as  many  treaties  as  you  please 
to  fetter  the  limits  of  this  giant  republic,  and 
she  will  burst  them  all  from  her,  and  her  course 
will  be  onward  to  a  limit  which  I  will  not  venture 
to  prescribe.  Why  the  necessity  of  pledging 
your  faith  that  you  will  never  annex  any  more  of 
Mexico?  Do  you  not  know  that  you  will  be 
compelled  to  do  it,  that  you  cannot  help  it; 
that  your  treaty  will  not  prevent  it,  and  that 
the  only  effect  it  will  have  will  be  to  enable 
European  powers  to  accuse  us  of  bad  faith  when 
the  act  is  done,  and  associate  American  faith 
and  Punic  faith  as  synonymous  terms?  What 
is  the  use  of  your  guarantee  that  you  will  never 
erect  any  fortifications  in  Central  America, 
never  annex,  occupy,  or  colonize  any  portion  of 
that  country?  How  do  you  know  that  you  can 
avoid  doing  it?  If  you  make  the  canal,  I  ask 
you  if  American  citizens  will  not  settle  along  its 
line;  whether  they  will  not  build  up  towns  at 
each  terminus;  whether  they  will  not  spread 
over  that  country  and  convert  it  into  an  Ameri- 
can state;  whether  American  principles  and 
American  institutions  will  not  be  firmly  planted 
there?     And  I  ask  you  how  many  years  you 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    91 

think  will  pass  away  before  you  will  find  thesame 
necessity  to  extend  your  laws  over  your  own 
kindred  that  you  found  in  the  case  of  Texas? 
.  .  .  Jamaica  at  present  commands  the  en- 
trance of  the  [projected]  canal;  and  all  that 
Great  Britain  desired  was,  inasmuch  as  she  had 
possession  of  the  only  place  commanding  the 
canal,  to  procure  a  stipulation  that  no  other 
power  would  erect  a  fortification  near  its  ter- 
minus. That  stipulation  is  equivalent  to  an 
agreement  that  England  may  fortify,  but  that 
we  never  shall.  .  .  . 

Douglas  related  the  following  conversation 
between  himself  and  Sir  Henry  Bulwer: 

He  [Sir  Henry]  took  occasion  to  remonstrate 
with  me  that  my  position  with  regard  to  the 
treaty  was  unjust  and  untenable,  that  the  treaty 
was  fair  because  it  was  reciprocal — because  it 
pledged  that  neither  Great  Britain  nor  the 
United  States  should  ever  purchase,  colonize,  or 
acquire  any  territory  in  Central  America. 

I  told  him  it  would  be  fair  if  they  would  add 
one  word  to  the  treaty  so  that  it  would  read 
that  neither  Great  Britain  nor  the  United 
States  should  ever  occupy  or  hold  dominion  over 
Central  America  or  Asia,  ^^But,"  answered  he, 
"you  have  no  interest  in  Asia."  "No,"  an- 
swered I,  "and  you  have  none  in  Central 
America." 

"But,"  said  he,  "you  can  never  establish  any 
rights  in  Asia."     "]N[o,"  said  I,  "and  we  don't 


92  AMERICAN  POLICY 

mean    that    you    shall    ever   establish    any    in 
America."^ 

An  agreement  to  which  there  is  but  one  party 
can  be  violated  only  by  that  party.  The  United 
States  being  the  only  party  to  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, the  only  nation  that  can  violate  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  the  United  States.  It  com- 
mitted such  violation  in  ratifying  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty: 

This  treaty  is  the  only  instance  in  which  the 
United  States  has  consented  to  join  with  any 
European  power  in  the  management  of  political 
interests  in  the  Western  Hemisphere;  and  the 
treaty  is  remarkable  not  only  because  it  is  a 
departure  from  the  settled  policy  of  the  United 
States  not  to  sanction  any  European  interfer- 
ence in  the  affairs  of  America,  but  because  de- 
viating in  this  way  from  our  settled  system,  it 
undertakes,  in  concert  with  a  foreign  power,  to 
determine  a  question  the  most  important  to  the 
United  States  that  can  arise  outside  of  our  own 
territory.^ 

When  after  our  Civil  War  the  United  States 
sought  to  establish  coaling  stations  for  its  navy, 
it  found  itself  debarred  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer 

1  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  by  C.  E.  Carr,  p.  36. 

2  Wharton's  Int.  Dig.,  p.  168. 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    93 

Treaty  from  acquiring  such  positions  in  Central 
America.  Our  secretary  of  state  wrote  to  our 
minister  in  London  suggesting  a  waiver  by  Great 
Britain  of  her  rights  in  this  respect: 

It  is  becoming  more  and  more  certain  every 
day  that  not  only  naval  warfare  in  the  future 
but  also  all  navigation  of  war  vessels  in  time  of 
peace  must  be  by  steam.  This  necessity  will 
occasion  little  or  no  inconvenience  to  the  prin- 
cipal maritime  powers  of  Europe,  and  especially 
to  Great  Britain,  as  these  powers  have  posses- 
sions in  various  parts  of  the  globe  where  they 
can  have  stores  of  coal  and  provisions  for  the 
use  of  their  vessels.  We  are  differently  situ- 
ated. We  have  no  possession  beyond  the  lim- 
its of  the  United  States.  Foreign  colonization 
has  never  been  favored  by  statesmen  in  this 
country,  either  on  general  grounds  or  as  in  har- 
mony with  our  peculiar  condition.  There  is  no 
change  or  likely  to  be  any  in  this  respect.  It  is 
indispensable  for  us,  however,  to  have  coaling 
stations  under  our  own  flag  for  naval  observa- 
tion and  police  and  for  defensive  war,  as  well  as 
for  the  protection  of  our  widely  spread  commerce 
when  we  are  at  peace  ourselves.  .  .  .  Under 
these  circumstances  you  will  sound  Lord  Claren- 
don as  to  the  disposition  of  his  government  to 
favor  us  in  acquiring  coaling  stations  in  Central 
America,  notwithstanding  the  stipulation  con- 
tained in  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty.^ 

^  Seward  to  Adams,  April  25,  1866. 


94  AMERICAN  POLICY 

Whatever  propositions  were  made  to  Lord 
Clarendon,  they  met  with  no  response.  Out- 
side of  the   Panama  Canal  zone,  the  United 

^«  States  has  not  to  this  day  a  coaling  station  in 
Central  America.  It  made  repeated  attempts 
to  secure  one  in  the  Island  of  Hayti,  but  was 
thwarted  principally  by  Great  Britain.  That 
it  succeeded,  by  the  Spanish-American  War,  in 
securing  one  in  Cuba  and  others  in  the  Philip- 
pines is  due  to  Germany,  whose  naval  develop- 
ment determined  Great  Britain  to  cultivate 
friendly  relations  with  the  United  States. 

When  it  developed  that  the  expedition  sent 
by  Napoleon  III  to  Mexico  had  for  its  object 

^  the  forcible  substitution  of  a  monarchical  for  a 
republican  form  of  government,  the  United 
States  expressed  to  France  the  belief  that  the 
undertaking  would  be  defeated  by  the  Mexicans 
themselves,  but  let  it  be  undierstood  that  if  it 
were  not,  Mexico  would;  be  assisted  in  defeating 
it  by  the  United  States,  Our  government  re- 
fused to  recognize  the  imperial  usurper  Maximil- 
ian; recognized  the  republican  executive  Juarez, 
and  gave  his  patriot^^ollowers  financial  as  well 
as  moral  support. ^^'^Piis  proved  sufficient  to 
cause   the  withdrawal   of  the    French   troops. 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    95 

Maximilian  refused  to  abdicate  and  depart  with 
the  latter.  As  a  consequence,  his  illegitimate 
Franco-Austro-Papal  government  was  over- 
thrown and  he  and  two  of  his  generals  were  cap- 
tured and  executed. 

Upon  the  outbreak  of  our  Civil  War,  the  sym- 
pathy developed  abroad  for  the  insurgents  had 
made  it  politic  for  the  United  States  to  respect 
the  general  dislike  of  European  governments  for 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  So,  in  our  negotiations 
with  France  looking  to  the  withdrawal  of  the 
French  forces,  care  was  taken  not  to  mention  it. 

In  1862  Colombia  (then  New  Granada),  by 
virtue  of  a  treaty  ratified  in  1848,  solicited  the 
intervention  of  the  United  States  to  establish 
order  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  Secretary 
Seward's  action  thereupon  was  remarkably  at 
variance  with  the  spirit  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  the  ideas  of  Jefferson,  Adams,  Webster, 
Douglas,  and  other  expounders  and  supporters 
of  it.     He  wrote  to  our  minister  in  London: 

This  government  has  no  interest  in  the  matter 
different  from  that  of  other  maritime  powers. 
It  is  willing  to  interpose  its  aid  in  execution  of 
its  treaty  with  New  Granada  and  for  the  benefit 
of  all  nations.  But  if  it  should  do  so  it  would 
incur  .  .  .  danger  of  misapprehension  of  its  ob- 


96  AMERICAN  POLICY 

jects  by  other  maritime  powers  if  it  should  act 
without  previous  consultation  with  them.  .  .  . 

The  points  to  be  remembered  are: 

First, — Whether  any  proceeding  in  the  mat- 
ter shall  be  adopted  by  the  United  States  with 
the  assent  and  acquiescence  of  the  British  and 
French  governments. 

Secondly, — Whether  these  governments  will 
unite  with  the  United  States  in  guaranteeing  the 
safety  of  the  transit  and  the  authority  of  the 
Granadian  Confederation  or  either  of  these  ob- 
jects, and  the  form  and  manner  in  which  the 
parties  shall  carry  out  such  agreement. 

I  need  hardly  say  that  this  government  is  not 
less  anxious  to  avoid  any  such  independent  or 
hasty  action  in  that  matter  as  would  seem  to 
indicate  a  desire  for  exclusive  or  especial  ad- 
vantages in  New  Granada  than  the  British  Gov- 
ernment can  be  that  we  shall  abstain  from  such 


The  proposals  thus  made  were  a  double  viola- 
tion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine: 

1.  In  subjecting  the  course  of  the  United 
States  in  this  purely  American  matter  to  the 
censorship  of  European  powers. 

2.  In  inviting  the  intervention  of  European 
powers  in  the  internal  affairs  of  an  American 
nation. 

Mexico,  being  herself  at  this  time  a  victim  of 

^  Seward  to  Adams,  July  ii,  1862. 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINp    97 

European  interference,  was  particularly  con- 
cerned about  the  latter  and  protested  against 
it.^  In  a  brief,  not  to  say  curt,  reply  Secretary 
Seward  stated  that  his  proposals  to  France  and 
Great  Britain  had  been  misunderstood.^  He 
did  not  and  could  not  suggest  any  understand- 
ing of  them  that  did  not  include  an  invitation  for 
France  and  Great  Britain  to  unite  with  the 
United  States  in  guaranteeing  "the  authority  of 
the  Granadian  Confederation."  His  reply  was 
an  indirect,  evasive  acknowledgment  of  the  pro- 
priety of  the  Mexican  protest. 

Adams  replied  for  Great  Britain  that  the  con- 
tingency for  intervention  had  not  yet  arisen, 
the  free  transit  across  the  isthmus  not  being 
threatened;  but  that  if  it  were,  "the  British 
Government  would  readily  co-operate  with  the 
United  States  in  the  measures  that  might  be 
thought  necessary  to  make  good  the  privileges 
secured  by  the  guarantee."  Dayton  replied  that 
De  Thouvenel  "would  not  think  it  improper  for 
the  United  States  to  interfere." 

Seward  made  no  protest  when,  in  1862,  the 
settlement  of  Belize  was  erected  into  the  Crown 

'  Romero  to  Seward,  March  19,  1863. 
2  Seward  to  Romero,  March  20,  1863. 


98  AMERICAN  POLICY 

Colony  of  British  Honduras  in  violarion  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  as  well  as  in  contra- 
vention of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  em- 
barrassments of  the  United  States  at  home  and 
abroad  incidental  to  the  Civil  War  may  justify 
or  excuse  these  instances  of  apparent  indiffer- 
ence to  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
/  In  1871  the  independent  republic  of  Santo  Do- 
mingo  negotiated  with  Spain  to  return  of  its  own 
/^  (^ccord  under  that  country's  dominion;  the  United 
States  protested  and  Spain  renounced  the  plan. 
^  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  contravened  by 
Great  Britain  and  violated  by  the  United  States 
when  these  two  nations  concluded  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  Treaty  inhibiting  the  United  States 
from  closing  the  Panama  Canal  to  vessels  of  a 
nation  at  war  with  the  United  States  and  mak- 
ing the  United  States  responsible  to  Great 
Britain  for  its  treatment  of  other  nations  than 
Great  Britain. 

Nature  and  the  Panama  Canal  have  given  to 
America  the  inside  line  to  the  Orient;  Great 
Britain  says  that  she  shall  not  have  it.  In  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  she  denies  to  the  United 
States  the  right  to  close  the  Panama  Canal. 
Since  the  declaration  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    99 

most  pf  the  islands  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  and 
within  the  Western  Hemisphere  have  been  an- 
nexed by  European  powers  or  transferred  from 
one  suchjpower  to  ^nntVipr  Thus  Great  Brit- 
ain colonized  New  Zealand  in  1840,  the  Fiji 
Islands  in  1874-,  and  the  Solomon  Islands  in 
1885.  The  first  two  groups  are  wholly,  the  lat- 
ter partly,  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

The  Falkland  Islands 

Whether  the  British  colonization  of  the  Falk- 
land Islands  contravened  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
depends  upon  when  it  took  place.     If  before  the 
declaration_of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,itwas-san€— 
tioned  by  it;  if  after  that,  it  was  prohibjted_by  it. 

The  original  discovery  of  the  islands  is  com- 
monly ascribed  to  an  English  navigator,  John 
Davis,  who  was  driven  upon  them  by  a  storm  in 
1592,  but  there  is  conclusive  evidence  to  prove 
that  they  were  discovered  long  before  that  time, 
no  one  knows  by  whom.^ 

They  were  first  explored  in  1690  by  an  Eng- 
lishman, John  Strong. 

In  1748  Great  Britain  gave  indication  of 
coveting  the  islands  and  fitted  out  an  expedi- 

1  The  Voyages  and  Works  of  John  Davis,  by  A.  H.  Markham, 
p.  108  n. 


loo  AMERICAN  POLICY 

tion  ostensibly  for  their  exploration.  Spain 
objected  to  the  enterprise  as  unfriendly  to  her 
and  it  was  abandoned.^ 

The  first  government  to  take  possession  of  the 
islands  or  establish  a  settlement  upon  them  was 
that  of  France,  which  did  both  in  1764,  giving 
to  the  settlement  the  name  of  Port  Louis.  The 
expedition  was  commanded  by  Captain  L.  A. 
de  Bougainville.  Until  this  time  the  islands 
had  been  uninhabited.^ 

A  year  later,  in  1765,  England,  not  knowing 
or  pretending  not  to  know  of  the  French  settle- 

^  Thoughts  on  the  late  Transactions  respecting  Falkland's  Islands, 
by  Samuel  Johnson. 

2  The  French  commander  built  a  fort  and  within  it  erected  an 
obelisk,  a  face  of  which  bore  an  effigy  of  Louis  XV,  King  of  France. 
Under  this  monument  were  buried  some  coin  and  a  medallion,  on 
one  side  of  which  was  engraved  the  date  of  the  enterprise  and  on 
the  other  the  face  of  the  King  with  the  words,  Tibi  serviat  ultima 
Thule  and  the  legend:  Etablissement  des  Isles  Malouines  situees 
au  50  deg,  30  min.  de  lat.  aust.,  et  60  deg.  50  min.  de  long,  occid. 
merid.  de  Paris,  par  la  fregate  L'Aigle,  Capitaine  P.  Duclos  Guyot, 
Capitaine  de  Brulot,  et  la  corvette  le  Sphinx,  Capit.  F.  Chenard  de 
La  Giraudais,  Lieut,  de  Fregate,  armees  par  Louis-Antoine  de 
Bougainville,  Colonel  d'lnfanterie,  Capitaine  de  Vaisseau,  chef  de 
I'expeditlon,  G.  de  NervIUe,  Capitaine  d'lnfanterie,  et  P.  d'Arbou- 
lln,  Adminlstrateur  General  des  Postes  de  France;  construction 
d'un  fort  et  d'un  obelisque  decore  d'un  medallion  de  sa  Majeste 
Louis  XV,  sur  les  plans  d'A.  L'Huillier,  Ingen.  Geogr.  des  Camps 
et  Armees,  servant  dans  I'expeditlon,  sous  le  ministere  d'E.  de 
Choiseul,  Due  de  Stalnvllle,  en  Fevrier  1764.  Conamur  tenues 
Grandia.  {Voyage  autour  du  Monde  par  la  Fregate  du  Roi  la 
BOUDEUSE  et  la  FlUte  l'etoile  en  1766,  1767,  1768,  1769,  by 
[L.  A.]  de  Bougainville,  1771,  p.  51.) 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCtklNE    loi 

ment,  formally  appropriated  the  islands  in  the 
name  of  the  King  of  England,  but  without  es- 
tablishing any  settlement.  The  point  at  which 
the  ceremony  of  appropriation  took  place, 
already  named  by  the  French  Port  de  la  Croi- 
sade,  was  given  the  name  of  Port  Egmont.  The 
British  commander  was  Commodore  Byron. 

In  1766  the  first  English  settlement  in  the 
islands  was  founded  at  Port  Egmont.  In  De- 
cember of  the  same  year  the  commander  of  this 
expedition,  Captain  MacBride,  came  upon  the 
French  establishment  at  Port  Saint  Louis  and 
claimed  the  islands  as  possessions  of  Great 
Britain.  He  threatened  to  force  a  landing,  but 
made  no  attempt  to  do  so. 

In  1767  Spain,  jealous  of  France,  claimed  the 
islands  as  a  dependency  of  the  continent,  which 
acknowledged  her  sovereignty.  France  recog- 
nized, at  least  ostensibly,  the  justice  of  this 
claim  and  surrendered  the  islands  to  Spain. 
The  latter  paid  no  attention  to  England,  the 
presence  of  whose  settlement  at  Port  Egmont 
she  must  at  least  have  suspected. 

In  1769  a  Spanish  vessel  sailing  out  from 
Port  Louis  came  upon  an  English  vessel  coming 
from  Port  Egmont.     Great  was  the  surprise  on 


I02  AMERICAN  POLICY 

both  sides  to  learn  that  the  two  settlements  had 
for  a  number  of  years  been  neighbors,  as  it 
were,  without  knowing  it.  Each  party  was  in- 
censed that  an  enemy  had  established  himself 
almost  in  the  same  locality  with  it.  The  Brit- 
ish commander,  Captain  Hunt,  ordered  the 
Spaniard  to  depart.  The  Spaniard  made  an 
appearance  of  obeying,  but  two  days  later  came 
back  with  a  message  from  the  Spanish  governor 
complaining  of  the  action  of  Captain  Hunt.  In 
another  letter,  sent  at  the  same  time,  he  sup- 
posed the  British  to  be  there  only  by  accident 
and  to  be  ready  to  depart  at  the  first  warning. 
In  reply.  Captain  Hunt  warned  the  Spaniards 
from  the  island,  claiming  them  in  the  name  of 
his  King  as  belonging  to  the  English  by  right 
of  the  first  discovery  and  the  first  settlement. 
Correspondence  ensued  in  which  the  Spanish 
governor  formally  warned  the  captain  "to  leave 
Port  Egmont  and  to  forbear  the  navigation  of 
the  seas  without  permission  from  the  King  of 
Spain."  The  captain  repeated  his  former  claim, 
declared  that  his  orders  were  to  keep  possession, 
and  once  more  warned  the  Spaniards  to  depart.^ 

^  Thoughts  on  the  late  Transactions  respecting  Falkland's  Islands, 
by  Samuel  Johnson. 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     103 

In  1770  the  British  settlement  at  Port  Eg- 
mont  was  expelled  from  the  islands  by  a  Span- 
ish force  from  Buenos  Ayres. 

In  1 77 1  the  settlement  thus  expelled  was  re- 
established in  accordance  with  the  following 
declarations : 

By  Spain^ 

London,  January  22,  1771. 
His  Britannic  Majesty  having  complained  of 
the  violence  done  on  the  loth  of  June  of  the 
year  1770,  to  the  island  commonly  known  as 
the  Great  Malouine,  and  by  the  English  as  the 
Falkland  Island,  in  compelling  by  force  the 
commander  and  the  subjects  of  his  Britannic 
Majesty  to  evacuate  the  port  by  them  called 
Egmont,  a  measure  offensive  to  the  honor  of 
his  crown  .  .  .  his  Catholic  Majesty  disavows 
the  forementioned  act  of  violence  and  .  .  . 
pledges  itself  to  give  immediate  orders  that 
things  in  the  Great  Malouine,  at  the  port  called 
Egmont,  be  replaced  precisely  as  they  were  be- 
fore the  loth  of  June,  1770  .  .  .  the  pledge  of 
his  Catholic  Majesty  to  restore  to  his  Britannic 
Majesty  the  possession  of  the  Fort  and  Port 
called  Egmont  can  and  shall  in  no  way  affect 
the  question  of  previous  right  of  sovereignty  in 
the  Malouine,  otherwise  called  Falkland  Is- 
land. .  .  . 

^  Translated  from  the  French. 


I04  AMERICAN  POLICY 


By  Great  Britain^ 

London,  January  22,  1771. 
.  .  .  His  Britannic  Majesty  .  .  .  will  regard 
the  said  declaration  [of  his  Catholic  Majesty's 
plenipotentiary]  accompanied  by  the  entire  ful- 
filment of  the  said  pledge  on  the  part  of  his 
Catholic  Majesty,  as  satisfaction  for  the  injury 
done  to  the  Crown  of  Great  Britain.^ 

In  1774  the  English  settlement  at  Port  Eg-* 
mont  was  withdrawn  voluntarily.     But  British 
colors  were  left  flying  and,  on  a  fort,  a  leaden 
tablet  bearing  the  following  inscription:^ 

This  is  to  certify  to  all  nations  that  the  Falk- 
land Islands,  as  well  as  this  fort,  the  store- 
houses, wharfs,  harbors,  bays  and  creeks,  which 
pertain  to  it,  belong  of  right  only  to  his  Most 
Sacred  Majesty  George  III,  King  of  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Ireland,  defender  of  the 
Faith,  etc.     In  faith  of  which  this  tablet  has 

1  Translated  from  the  French. 

^  It  was  in  criticism  of  this  pacific  reconciliation,  instead  of  a 
declaration  of  war  for  the  vindication  of  British  honor,  that  Junius 
produced  the  gem  of  English  diction  by  which  he  lives  in  the  mem- 
ories of  students  of  rhetoric: 

"The  King's  honor  is  that  of  his  people.  Their  real  honor  and 
real  interest  are  the  same."  .  .  .  "Private  credit  is  wealth; — 
public  honor  is  security. — The  feather  that  adorns  the  royal  bird 
supports  his  flight.  Strip  him  of  his  plumage  and  you  fix  him  to 
the  earth." — (Junius,  Letter  XXXVI.) 

3  Translated  from  the  French. 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     105 

been  fixed  and  the  flags  of  his  Britannic  Maj- 
esty unfurled  and  raised,  as  a  sign  of  possession. 
Samuel  William  Clayton, 
Commanding  the  Falkland  Islands, 
May  22,  1774. 

About  1 8 10  the  Spanish  settlement  and  gar- 
rison at  Port  Louis  were  withdrawn  and  the 
islands  again  left  uninhabited. 

On  the  9th  of  July,  18 16,  the  Argentine  Re- 
public declared  itself  independent  of  Spain. 

In  1820  it  took  formal  possession  of  the  Falk- 
land Islands,  but  domestic  difficulties  prevented 
its  establishing  any  colony  or  settlement  in  them. 

In  1 82 1  the  Argentine  Government  issued  a 
decree  for  the  encouragement  of  fishery  on  the 
coast  of  Patagonia,  including  the  Falkland 
Islands,  and  regulating  the  formation  of  settle- 
ments thereon. 

When  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  declared  in 
1823  unsuccessful  attempts  were  being  made  in 
Argentina  to  establish  a  settlement  on  the  Falk- 
land Islands.  The  principal  mover  therein  was 
one  Louis  Vernet. 

In  1828  a  settlement  was  started  and  Louis 
Vernet  appointed  by  the  Argentine  Government 
as  its  director. 


io6  AMERICAN  POLICY 

In  1829,  at  the  suggestion  of  Vernet,  and  with 
a  view  principally  to  the  exclusion  of  foreign 
fishermen  from  the  waters  of  the  islands,  the 
Argentine  Republic  issued  a  decree  providing 
for  the  appointment  of  a  governor  for  the 
islands.^  Great  Britain  protested  against  such 
action.^  No  answer  was  made  to  her  com- 
munication and  Vernet  was  appointed  governor. 
The  settlement  thus  became  a  colony. 

^  Art.  I. — ^The  Islands  of  Malouines  and  those  adjacent  to  Cape 
Horn  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  shall  be  under  the  command  of  a 
political  and  military  governor  to  be  appointed  immediately  by 
the  government  of  the  Republic. 

Art.  II. — ^The  political  and  military  governor  shall  reside  in  the 
island  of  Soledad,  on  which  a  battery  shall  be  erected  under  the 
flag  of  the  Republic. 

Art.  III. — ^The  political  and  military  governor  shall  cause  the 
laws  of  the  Republic  to  be  observed  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  said 
Islands  and  provide  for  the  perforniance  of  the  regulations  respect- 
ing seal  fishery  on  the  coasts. 

Art.  IV. — Let  this  be  made  public. 

ROD.RIGUEZ, 

Salvador  Mana  de  Carril. 
2  Making  the  following  allegations : 

1.  That  the  authority  which  that  government  [Argentina]  had 
thus  assumed  was  considered  by  the  British  Government  as  in- 
compatible with  the  sovereign  rights  of  Great  Britain  over  the 
Falkland  Islands. 

2.  That  those  sovereign  rights,  which  were  founded  upon  the 
original  discovery  and  subsequent  occupation  of  those  islands, 
had  acquired  an  additional  sanction  from  the  fact  that  his  Cath- 
olic Majesty  had  restored  the  British  settlement,  which  had  been 
forcibly  taken  possession  of  by  a  Spanish  force  in  the  year  1771. 

3.  That  the  withdrawal  of  his  Majesty's  forces  from  the  Falk- 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCIRINE     107 

In  1 83 1  three  United  States  fishing  schooners 
were  seized  by  Vernet  for  violation  of  the  fish- 
ing regulations. 

In  1833,  the  United  States  and  Argentina  not 
having  settled  their  dispute,  Great  Britain  re- 
occupied  the  islands,  reasserting  her  claims  to 
sovereign  control  of  them.  She  has  been  in 
possession  of  them  ever  since.  Spain  had  taken 
them  from  France  to  prevent  France  from  hav- 
ing them.  Great  Britain  took  them  with  the 
double  object  of  preventing  the  United  States 
from  having  them  and  of  making  more  or  less 
use  of  them  as  a  depot  of  supply  and  repair  for 
vessels  rounding  Cape  Horn. 

Upon  the  British  reoccupation  in  1833  the 
sovereignty  became  a  subject  of  dispute  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Argentina.  The  right 
of  neither  was  perfect.  Great  Britain  may  be 
credited  with  the  original  exploration  of  the 

land  Islands,  in  1774,  could  not  invalidate  the  just  rights  of  Great 
Britain,  because  that  withdrawal  took  place  only  in  pursuance  of 
the  system  of  retrenchment  adopted  at  that  time  by  his  Majesty's 
government. 

4.  That  the  marks  and  signals  of  possession  and  of  property 
left  upon  the  islands,  the  British  flag  still  "flying"  and  all  other 
formalities  observed,  upon  the  occasion  of  the  departure  of  the 
governor  were  calculated  not  only  to  assert  the  rights  of  owner- 
ship, but  to  indicate  the  intention  of  resuming  the  territory  at 
some  future  period.     (Palmerston  to  Moreno,  January  8,  1834.) 


io8  AMERICAN  POLICY 

islands.  Beyond  that  she  had  no  right  in  them 
but  that  of  spoUation.  The  first  power  to  ap- 
propriate the  islands  and  the  first  to  establish  a 
settlement  on  them  was  France.  From  her 
they  passed  by  cession  to  Spain.  Argentina 
had  held  them  by  right  of  revolution,  or  for- 
cible expropriation,  from  Spain.  Neither  Great 
Britain  nor  Argentina  had,  by  treaty  or  other- 
wise, any  cession  from  Spain.  This  was  a  case 
for  arbitration.  It  was  decided  by  an  act  of 
war,  and  may,  therefore,  be  considered  as  a  con- 
travention of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Out  of 
respect  for  British  battle-ships,  or  in  considera- 
tion of  the  remoteness  of  the  Falkland  Islands 
from  the  United  States,  or  from  both  of  these 
motives,  the  United  States  has  not  seen  fit  to 
press  the  Monroe  Doctrine  with  respect  to  this 
bit  of  American  territory. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  contravened  by 
Great  Britain  when  she  assumed  dominion  over 
the  Mosauito  Coast  and  when  she  made  a 
British  dependency  of  the  Bay  Islands  also  in 
the  following  cases: 

I .  When,  in  returning  the  Bay  Islands  to  Hon- 
duras, in  1859,  she  bound  that  republic,  by  the 
treaty  of  transfer,  not  to  cede  those  islands,  "or 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    109 

any  of  them,  or  the  right  of  sovereignty,  to  any 
nation  or  state  whatsoever." 

2.  When,  in  transferring  the  Mosquito  coun- 
try to  Nicaragua,  in  i860,  she  stipulated  in  the 
treaty  of  transfer  that  the  district  assigned  to 
the  Mosquito  Indians  "may  not  be  ceded  by 
them  to  any  foreign  person  or  state,  but  shall  be 
and  remain  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Re- 
public of  Nicaragua." 

The  United  States  sought  to  free  itself  from 
the  objectionable  restrictions  imposed  upon 
them  as  partners  of  Great  Britain  in  Central 
America  by  proposing  the  abrogation  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty.  Great  Britain  replied 
by  threatening  that  if  the  treaty  were  abro- 
gated she  would  contravene  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine at  her  discretion.^ 

This  threat  was  repeated  when,  in  1882, 
Secretary  FreUnghuysen  sought  through  Lord 
Granville  to  effect  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty.^ 

^  .  .  .  From  the  abrogation  of  that  compact,  if  It  should  take  , 
place,  they  [her  Majesty's  government]  will  hold  themselves  free    C    ■ .  * 
to  act  In  regard  to  Central  America  In  the  manner  most  conducive    \     i' 
to  the  advancement  of  British  Interests.     (Malmesbury  to  Napier,  Cj ' 
April  8,  1858.) 

2  Granville  to  West,  January  14,  1882. 


no  AMERICAN  POLICY 

The  Venezuela  Boundary  Controversy 

A  series  of  encroachments  by  Great  Britain 
upon  the  territory  of  Venezuela,  by  pushing  out 
the  boundary  Hne  of  British  Guiana,  was  pro- 
nounced by  President  Cleveland  in  a  message 
to  Congress,  December  17,  1895,  ^^  be  a  vio- 
lation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  the  British  Gov- 
ernment was  informed  through  our  minister  at 
London  that  if  the  boundary  line  was  not  lo- 
cated by  arbitration  it  would  be  determined, 
so  far  as  the  United  States  was  concerned,  by  a 
commission  appointed  by  the  President.  This 
vigorous  measure  was  criticised  in  Great  Brit- 
ain as  "shirt-sleeve  diplomacy"  and  was  not 
universally  approved  in  the  United  States.  Re- 
ferring to  it  a  United  States  senator  said: 

I  cannot  for  a  moment  reconcile  to  any  Amer- 
ican precedent  or  to  any  principle  of  interna- 
tional law  the  proposition  that  in  an  honest  dis- 
pute over  a  boundary  Hne  between  a  South 
American  and  a  foreign  state  that  [sic]  we  had  a 
right  to  dictate  the  method  of  adjustment  and, 
by  the  menace  of  war,  compel  submission  to  our 
terms,  or  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  ever  con- 
templated such  an  interference  on  our  part.^ 

^  Speech  of  the  late  Senator  Rayner  of  Maryland.     The  italics 
are    mine.     For   American    disapproval,    see    also   Henderson's 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    iii 

If  the  case  had  been,  as  the  senator  says,  "an 
honest  dispute  over  a  boundary  line,"  the 
United  States  would  not  have  taken  it  up.  As 
long  as  it  could  be  considered  as  such  and  per- 
haps longer,  the  United  States  abstained  from 
every  form  of  interference  with  it.  The  true 
character  of  the  dispute  may  be  judged  from  a 
general  consideration  of  its  origin  and  final 
settlement. 

The  whole  region  in  controversy^  belonged 
originally  to  Spain  by  right  of  discovery.  It 
was  subsequently  transferred  in  part  to  Hol- 
land. Great  Britain  succeeded  to  the  rights  of 
Holland  in  1814  and  Venezuela  to  the  rights  of 
Spain  when  Venezuela  seceded  from  Colombia, 
in  1830.  The  boundary  line  between  the  Dutch 
and  Spanish,  and  consequently  between  the 
British  and  Venezuelan  territories,  had  not  been 
defined,  and  in  1 841  trouble  over  it  began.  An 
English  engineer  named  Schomburgk  planted 
posts  and  other  marks  of  dominion  on  what  the 
Venezuelans  considered  as  their  territory.     Ven- 

American  Diplomatic  Questions,  p.  443  et  seq.     This  work  gives 
the  substance  of  President  Cleveland's  message  and  of  the  corre- 
spondence between  the  governments  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States.     (P.  411  et  seq.). 
^  See  map  at  end  of  volume. 


112  AMERICAN  POLICY 

ezuela  protested  and  the  British  Government 
ordered  the  marks  removed.  In  1844  boundary- 
negotiations  were  opened  in  England.  Ven- 
ezuela proposed  the  Essequibo  River  and  Great 
Britain  a  line  through  the  Moroco  River — Lord 
Aberdeen's  line.  Venezuela  declined  the  Brit- 
ish proposition.  In  1850  it  was  agreed  between 
the  two  parties  that  neither  should  order  or 
sanction  any  occupation  of  the  territory  in  dis- 
pute. There  the  matter  rested  until  1878,  when 
Venezuela  again  opened  negotiations  and  of- 
fered to  accept  Lord  Aberdeen's  line.  Great 
Britain  declined  this  offer  and  proposed  a  new 
line  which  took  in  a  large  piece  of  additional  ter- 
ritory on  the  coast,  but  followed  the  Aberdeen 
line  in  the  interior.  This  proposition  was  de- 
clined. In  1 88 1  Great  Britain  advanced  her 
line  on  the  coast  a  distance  of  twenty-nine  miles 
toward  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco.  A  British 
man-of-war  appeared  there  with  telegraph-posts 
and  wire.  Venezuela  protested  and  invoked 
the  assistance  of  the  United  States.  In  1884  she 
again  opened  negotiations  with  Great  Britain, 
but  a  change  ensued  in  the  British  ministry, 
and  arbitration,  which  had  been  contemplated 
by  it,  was  rejected.     Again,  in  1886,  Venezuela 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    113 

opened  negotiations.  Great  Britain  proposed 
a  new  line  not  so  far  west  as  thgt  of  1878,  but 
coupled  with  it  a  demand  for  the  free  navi- 
gation of  the  Orinoco  River,  which  Venezuela 
rejected.  In  1887  Venezuela  tried  to  arrange 
again  for  arbitration,  but  in  vain,  and  mean- 
time Great  Britain  took  possession  of  a  large 
tract  of  territory  in  the  interior,  to  which  she 
had  no  valid  claim.  Unable  to  procure  arbi- 
tration, Venezuela  severed  her  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Great  Britain,  but  continued  her  en- 
deavors to  negotiate  with  her.  Great  Britain 
went  on  seizing  territory.  In  1889  she  took  pos- 
session of  the  main  mouth  of  the  Orinoco  and 
declared  Barima  a  British  port.  In  1890  she 
refused  to  accept  arbitration  as  to  anything  east 
of  an  arbitrary  line  drawn  by  herself  and  put  for- 
ward a  new  pretension  over  territory  beyond 
that  line,  to  which  no  claim  had  ever  been  made 
before.  In  1893  Lord  Rosebery  proposed  a  line 
going  far  to  the  west  of  one  which  he  had  him- 
self formerly  proposed. 

It  is  this  land-grabbing  at  the  expense  of  a 
weaker  power  that  a  United  States  senator  re- 
ferred to  as  "an  honest  dispute  over  a  boundary 
line.''     The  contention  of  the  senator,  if  sus- 


114  AMERICAN  POLICY 

tained,  would  establish  the  principle  that  a 
European  power  who  has  any  territory  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  may  acquire  any  amount 
more,  if  it  can  only  make  out  for  itself  a  case  of 
boundary  dispute;  and  it  was  on  the  occasion  of 
a  boundary  dispute  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  originally  enunciated.  But  let  us  note  how 
another  United  States  senator  expressed  him- 
self on  this  question  when  it  was  a  live  issue  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.^ 
Henry  Cabot  Lodge  said : 

England's  motives  in  her  Venezuelan  move- 
ments are,  of  course,  entirely  honorable  and 
disinterested,  because  England  herself  admits 
freely  on  all  occasions  that  these  are  her  charac- 
teristic qualities  in  dealing  with  other  nations. 
It  is  easy  also  to  appreciate  England's  natural 
and  strong  resentment  toward  a  country  she 
had  injured  as  much  as  she  has  injured  Ven- 
ezuela. But,  at  the  same  time,  let  England's 
motives  or  feelings  be  what  they  may,  we  are 
concerned  for  the  interests  of  the  United  States. 
The  practical  result  of  England's  aggressions  in 
Venezuela  is  plain  enough.  They  are  all  di- 
rected to  securing  the  control  of  the  Orinoco,  the 
great  river  system  of  northern  South  Amer- 
ica,   and    also   of  the    rich    mining  district   of 

^  North  American  Review,  June,  1 895,  on  which  I  have  drawn  for 
the  foregoing  narrative. 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     115 

the  Yuruari.  All  that  England  has  done  has 
been  a  direct  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
and  she  has  increased  and  quickened  her  ag- 
gressions in  proportion  as  the  United  States 
have  appeared  indifferent.  The  time  has  come 
for  decisive  action.  The  United  States  must 
either  maintain  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  treat 
its  infringement  as  an  act  of  hostility  or  abandon 
it.  If  Great  Britain  is  to  be  permitted  to  occupy 
the  ports  of  Nicaragua  and  still  worse  take  the 
territory  of  Venezuela,  there  is  nothing  to  pre- 
vent her  taking  the  whole  of  Venezuela  or  any 
other  South  American  state.  If  Great  Britain 
can  do  this  with  impunity,  France  and  Germany 
will  do  it  also.  These  powers  have  already 
seized  the  islands  of  the  Pacific  and  parcelled 
out  Africa.  Great  Britain  cannot  extend  her 
possessions  in  the  East.  She  has  pretty  nearly 
reached  the  limit  of  what  can  be  secured  in 
Africa.  She  is  now  turning  her  attention  to 
South  America.  If  the  United  States  are  pre- 
pared to  see  South  America  pass  gradually  into 
the  hands  of  Great  Britain  and  other  European 
powers  and  to  be  hemmed  in  by  British  naval 
posts  and  European  dependencies,  there  is,  of 
course,  nothing  more  to  be  said.  But  the  Amer- 
ican people  are  not  ready  to  abandon  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine.  .  .  .  They  are  not  now  and  never 
will  be  willing  to  have  South  America  and  the 
islands  adjacent  to  the  United  States  seized  by 
European  powers.  ...  It  is  not  too  late  to 
peacefully  but  firmly  put  an  end  to  these  terri- 
torial aggressions  of  Great  Britain  and  to  en- 


ii6  AMERICAN  POLICY 

force  the  Monroe  Doctrine  so  that  no  other 
power  will  be  disposed  to  infringe  upon  it.  .  .  . 

In  the  controversies  over  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty  and  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  have  acted  virtu- 
ally from  the  same  principle  or  motive — the  right 
or  desire  to  protect  their  possessions;  each  na- 
tion was  on  the  defensive,  Great  Britain  with 
respect  to  India  and  the  United   States  with 
respect  to  its  own  territory.     In  this  Venezuela 
controversy  the  situation  was  essentially  differ- 
ent.    Great  Britain  was  not  simply  protecting 
her  actual  interests,  but  was  endeavoring  to  en- 
large them,  to  increase  her  possessions  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere;  her  attitude,  ostensibly 
defensive,  was  fundamentally  aggressive.     Isth- 
mian canal  controversies  may  be  considered  as 
unavoidable;  this  boundary  controversy  was  of 
Great  Britain's  deliberate  seeking. 
J      To  prevent  a  settlement  of  it  by  the  United 
r     States  or  a  war  with  the  United  States,  Great 
\    Britain  agreed  with  Venezuela  upon  arbitration. 
I    Pursuant  to  a  treaty  between  these  powers  con- 
\  eluded  at  Washington  in  1907,  a  joint  commis- 
(   sion  of  arbitration  was  appointed  with  the  fol- 
\    lowing  membership: 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     117 

Baron  Russell,  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  England, 
nominated  by  members  of  the  British  Privy 
Council.  .  •  . 

Sir  Richard  Collins,  Lord  Justice  of  Appeals 
of  Great  Britain,  nominated  in  like  manner. 

Chief  Justice  Fuller  of  the  United  States  Su- 
preme Court,  nominated  by  President  Andrade, 
of  Venezuela. 

Justice  Brewer,  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court,  nominated  by  the  three  forementioned 
justices. 

Frederic  de  Martens,  Privy  Councillor  of  Saint 
Petersburg,  nominated  by  the  four  foremen- 
tioned justices. 

Mr.  de  Martens  acted  as  chairman  of  the 
commission. 

The  impressions  made  by  this  commission 
upon  the  minds  of  foreign  and  presumably  dis- 
interested observers  or  reviewers  of  its  proceed- 
ings may  be  judged  from  the  following  samples 
furnished  by  MM.  Bariset  and  de  La  Chanoine 
of  the  French  bar: 

Article  II  of  the  Treaty  of  Washington  had 
specified  that  the  arbitrators  should  be  "ju- 
rists," which,  by  implication,  excluded  diplo- 
mats.    The  intention  was  that  they  should  act, 


ii8  AMERICAN  POLICY 

not  as  a  commission  of  international  policy,  hav- 
ing for  its  object  to  reconcile  as  well  as  it  could 
the  conflicting  prejudices  of  the  opposing  govern- 
ments, by  a  solution  which  should  give  about 
equal  weight  to  the  interests  of  Great  Britain 
and  of  Venezuela,  but  as  judges  forming  a  court. 
They  were,  therefore,  to  take  a  lawyer's  point 
of  view  ...  to  seek  justice  and  not  mutual 
concession.  It  was  expected  that  their  verdict 
would  be  a  legal  decision  and  not  a  political 
compromise.  The  arbitrators  would  not  have 
been  "jurists,"  if  they  were  not  to  have  been 
judges.  Such  at  least  were  the  hopes  enter- 
tained by  the  contending  parties,  but  particu- 
larly by  the  Venezuelans.^ 

.  .  .  The  American  judges  observed  an  ex- 
treme reserve  and  neutraHty;  they  preserved 
with  scrupulous  care  their  attitude  of  judges, 
and  did  not  interrupt  the  discussion,  except 
with  requests  for  information  to  enlighten  their 
consciences.  The  English  judges,  on  the  con- 
trary, acted  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of 
the  debates,  not  as  judges  but  as  officials  com- 
mitted in  advance  to  the  British  claims.  They 
practised  neither  circumspection  nor  neutrality, 
as  clearly  appears  both  in  their  system  of  inten- 
tional obstruction,  consisting  in  tiring  the  attor- 
neys of  Venezuela  in  the  course  of  the  arguments 
with  interminable  successions  of  diff'use  and  am- 
biguous questions  and  in  their  favoring  the  at- 

*  U arbitrage  anglo'Venezuelien^  by  G.  Bariset. 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    119 

torneys  of  Great  Britain  by  means  of  leading 
questions^  not  improbably  agreed  upon  in  ad- 
vance.^ .  .  .  While  the  two  American  arbitra- 
tors were  more  judges  than  attorneys,  the  two 
English  arbitrators  were  more  attorneys  than 
judges.  Lord  Russell,  notably,  made  himself 
conspicuous  by  the  excessive  frequency  of  his 
interruptions  no  less  than  by  his  parti  pris 
against  the  arguments  presented  in  favor  of 
Venezuela.^ 

It  was  agreed  in  the  Treaty  of  Washington 
that  actual  possession  and  effective  coloniza- 
tion of  any  of  the  territory  in  dispute  during  a 
period  of  fifty  years  should  be  deemed  to  give 
title  in  such  territory.  Taking  advantage  of 
the  point  thus  conceded  to  them,  the  British 
counsel  based  their  argument  chiefly  on  the  plea 
of  uti  possidetis^  actual  possession.  The  result 
was  naturally  a  sort  of  arbitral  victory  for 
Great  Britain.  The  award  gave  back  to  Ven- 
ezuela the  rich  mining  territory  of  Yuruari,  but 
left  Great  Britain  in  possession  of  vast  tracts  of 
territory  to  which  she  had  never  had  any  but  a 
squatter's  right. 

^  Questions  insidieuses. 

2  Une  application  du  Principe  de  V Arbitrage,  by  L.  de  La  Cha- 
nolne.     {Revue  d* Europe,  March,  1900,  pp.  2,  19,  220.) 
'  G.  Bariset,  opus  cit. 


I20  AMERICAN  POLICY 

.  .  .  The  territory  in  dispute  was  divided  un- 
equally, seventy-nine  per  cent  being  awarded  to 
the  English  and  twenty-one  per  cent  to  the  Ven- 
ezuelans. British  Guiana  tripled  in  area.  It 
was  until  then  the  smallest  of  the  three  European 
Guianas;  it  became  much  the  largest  one.  .  .  . 

The  line  of  extreme  British  claims  was  not 
proposed  seriously;  the  government  designedly 
asked  for  more  than  it  wanted  in  order  to  obtain 
just  what  it  wanted. 

.  .  .  The  Venezuelan  agent,  Mr.  J.  M.  de  Ro- 
jas,  declared  that  the  sentence  was  laughable 
[derisoire]  and  constituted  "a  manifest  injus- 
tice." At  Caracas,  General  Ignacio  Andrade, 
President  of  the  republic,  stated  in  language 
less  strong,  though  equivalent  to  it  in  substance, 
that  "international  justice  had  restored  to  the 
country  some  of  the  territories  usurped"  .  .  . 
the  verdict  was  "essentially  a  compromise." 
Most  of  the  English  papers  said  so.  Speaking 
for  himself,  Mr.  de  Martens  declared  that  the 
arbitral  frontier  was  "a  line  based  upon  justice 
and  law."  "The  judges,"  he  added,  "were  ani- 
mated with  the  desire  to  establish  a  compro- 
mise." These  words  contradict  themselves;  for 
"a  frontier  of  compromise"  is  not  "a  frontier  of 
justice,"  as  was  very  truly  remarked  by  Gen- 
eral Harrison  and  Mr.  Mallet-Prevost,  the 
counsel  of  Venezuela  .  .  .  the  most  equitable 
solution,  to  be  sure,  could  not  but  be  a  com- 
promise, but  on  condition  that  the  compromise 
be  an  equitable  one.^ 

1  G.  Bariset,  opus  ciu 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     121 

My  compatriots  who  read  from  here  on  may 
wince  at  the  remarks  by  which  the  writer  of  the 
foregoing  strictures  accounts  in  his  way  for  the 
verdict  rendered.  When  all  allowance  is  made 
for  possible  misconceptions,  there  is  something 
in  his  representations  that  every  United  States 
American  may  well  take  seriously  to  heart  as  a 
warning,  if  not  as  a  reproach. 

The  arbitrators,  the  counsels,  and  even  for  a 
time  the  agents  were  all  English  or  American. 
With  the  exception  of  the  President  [Russian, 
of  German  birth]  the  international  tribunal  of 
arbitration  was  exclusively  Anglo-Saxon.  .  .  . 
Since  1897,  the  date  of  the  treaty,  the  world 
had  moved.  .  .  .  Assured  of  the  neutrality  of 
Great  Britain,  the  United  States  stripped  Spain 
of  her  last  remaining  colonies.  Assured  of  the 
neutrality  of  the  United  States,  the  English  re- 
solved to  rob  the  Boers  of  their  independence. 
When  the  proceedings  in  the  case  commenced, 
the  Americans  were  entering  in  the  Philippines 
upon  a  war  as  unjust  as  the  war  contemplated 
at  that  time  by  the  English  against  the  Dutch 
republics  of  South  Africa.  Yet  in  the  tribunal 
itself  the  Americans  represented  the  Venezue- 
lans, heirs  of  the  Spaniards,  and  the  EngHsh 
founded  their  claims  upon  the  rights  of  the 
Dutch,  whom  they  had  succeeded  in  Guiana. 
To  pretend  to  decide  a  question  in  the  name  of 
right  and  justice,  living  at  the  end  of  the  nine- 


122  AMERICAN  POLICY 

teenth  century  and  being  Anglo-Saxon,  that  is 
rather  paradoxical;  to  take  the  attitude  of  adver- 
sary while  proclaiming  oneself  brother,  issued 
from  one  and  the  same  race  as  one's  adversary, 
that  is  still  better;  but  to  defend  the  rights  of 
the  very  people  whom  one  wrongs,  that  is  simply 
perfect.  .  .  .  The  North  Americans  were  not  less 
satisfied  than  the  English.  Arbitration  once 
agreed  to  by  England,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
having  thus  triumphed,  their  lively  interest  in 
the  cause  of  Venezuela  subsided.  A  single  ques- 
tion concerned  them  still — that  of  the  control  of 
the  Orinoco,  which  they  were  bent  on  excluding 
England  from;  and  it  was  settled  in  accordance 
with  their  wishes.^ 

However  much  of  the  foregoing  arraignment 
we  may  resent  as  unwarranted,  let  us  not  in- 
dulge ourselves  in  the  conceit  that  we  are  proof 
against  every  temptation  to  practise  the  devi- 
ous, grasping  diplomacy  which  we  condemn  in 
Great  Britain.  Nations,  like  individuals,  are 
subject  to  temptations  which  prove  too  strong 
for  their  sense  of  right.  Our  geographical  posi- 
tion has  saved  us — it  can  hardly  be  said  to  do 
so  now — from  the  need  of  oversea  dominion. 
We  cannot  say  what  we  should  do  under  such 
temptation  to  freebooting  as  Great  Britain  has 

*  G.  Barlset,  opus  cit. 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    123 

been  subjected  to.  We  are  too  young  a  nation 
to  be  able  to  compare  ourselves  ethically  with 
her;  and  we  should  candidly  admit  that  our 
treatment  of  our  Indians,  if  not  "A  Century  of 
Dishonor, "  included  much  that  was  hardly  hon- 
orable; and  that  such  wrong  as  our  intervention 
in  the  Panama  Revolution  would  not  have  to 
be  repeated  very  often  to  make  a  record  that 
would  be  a  shame  to  any  peoplf . 

The  forcible  collection  of  a  debt  by  one  nation 
from  another  is  an  act  of  war,  except  where  the 
debtor  country  is  in  a  state  of  anarchy  or  in 
such  disorder  as  to  be  incapable  of  waging  war. 
In  such  case  the  collection  involves  taking  pos- 
session of  the  country,  giving  it  a  government, 
and  remaining  in  possession  and  control  of  it 
long  enough  to  collect  the  debt,  which  brings 
us  to  a  consideration  of  this  question  in  the 
light  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  1907  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  said  in  a  confidential  message  to 
the  Senate: 

An  aggrieved  nation  can,  without  interfering 
with  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  take  what  action  it 
sees  fit  in  the  adjustment  of  its  dispute  with 
American  states,  provided  that  action  does  not 
take  the  shape  of  interference  with  their  form  of 


124  AMERICAN  POLICY 

government  or  of  the  despoilment  of  their  terri- 
tory under  any  disguise.  But,  short  of  this, 
when  the  question  is  one  of  a  money  claim,  the 
only  way  which  remains,  finally,  to  collect  it  is  a 
blockade  or  bombardment  or  the  seizure  of  the 
custom-houses;  and  this  means,  as  has  been  said 
above,  what  is  in  effect  a  possession,  even  though 
only  a  temporary  possession  of  territory.  The 
United  States  then  becomes  a  party  in  interest, 
because  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine  it  cannot 
see  any  European  power  seize  and  permanently 
occupy  the  territory  of  one  of  these  republics; 
and  yet  such  a  seizure  of  territory,  disguised  or 
undisguised,  may  eventually  offer  the  only  way 
in  which  the  power  in  question  can  collect  any 
debts,  unless  there  is  interference  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States. 

While  not  quite  clear,  the  meaning  seems  to 
be  that  every  occupation  is  to  be  prevented 
or  discountenanced  by  the  United  States  be- 
cause it  may  develop  into  a  permanent  one, 
which  would  be  a  contravention  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine. 

Following  this  line  of  policy,  President  Roose- 
velt, in  1907,  ratified  a  convention  which  pro- 
vided for  the  assistance  of  the  United  States  in 
the  collection  of  custom  dues  of  the  Dominican 
Republic  and  their  application  to  the  liquida- 
tion of  a  debt  of  about  ^17,000,000.     This  may 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     125 

prove  to  be  a  precedent  for  preventing  foreign 
intervention,  by  an  arrangement  between  the 
United  States  and  the  debtor  nation  providing 
for  joint  settlement  of  the  debt.  But  there  are 
precedents  for  a  different  course — for  leaving  the 
foreign  power  to  collect  its  debt,  on  the  assump- 
tion or  its  assurance  that  it  will  not  offend 
against  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  When,  in  1862, 
the  joint  French,  British,  and  Spanish  expedition 
was  undertaken  against  Mexico,  the  purpose 
of  it,  so  far  as  our  government  knew,  was  the  col- 
lection of  debts  due  largely  as  indemnity  for  vio- 
lence committed  against  the  legations  of  France 
and  Great  Britain.  On  the  23  d  of  August,  1862, 
our  secretary  of  state  wrote  to  our  minister  in 
Paris: 

This  government,  relying  on  the  explanations 
which  have  been  made  by  France,  regards  the 
conflict  as  a  war  involving  claims  by  France 
which  Mexico  has  failed  to  adjust  to  the  satis- 
faction of  her  adversary,  and  it  avoids  interven- 
tion between  the  belligerents. 

Not  until  it  transpired  that  the  purpose  of 
the  expedition  included  the  subversion  of  the  re- 
publican form  of  government  in  Mexico  did  our 
government   commence   to   protest   against   it. 


126  AMERICAN  POLICY 

By  this  time  Great  Britain  and  Spain  had  with- 
drawn from  the  coalition,  leaving  us  France 
alone  to  deal  with. 

In  1864  a  conflict  arose  between  Spain  and 
Peru  over  an  attack  made  on  a  settlement  of 
Spanish  subjects  in  Peru  and  old  debts  claimed 
by  Spain.  To  bring  the  Peruvian  Government 
to  terms,  a  Spanish  squadron  seized  the  Chincha 
Islands  off  the  coast  of  Peru,  which  at  this  time 
were  still  rich  in  guano  deposits.  In  1865  the 
Spanish  naval  forces  proclaimed  the  coast  of 
Chili  under  blockade,  in  retaliation  for  alleged 
infraction  of  neutrality  on  the  part  of  Chili 
in  favor  of  Peru.  This  brought  Chili  into  the 
war  as  an  ally  of  Peru.  In  1866  the  Republic 
of  Ecuador,  from  a  spirit  of  Pan  American  soli- 
darity, allied  itself  with  Chili  and  Peru  against 
the  common  European  enemy.  This  led  to  the 
bombardment  of  the  unfortified  place  of  Val- 
paraiso, Chili,  a  purely  commercial  town  of 
from  80,000  to  100,000  inhabitants,  many  of 
whom  were  citizens  of  the  United  States.  The 
minister  of  the  United  States,  Mr.  Kilpatrick, 
expressed  to  the  Spanish  admiral,  "in  the  name 
of  his  government,  his  most  solemn  protest 
against  the  act  as  unusual  and  unnecessary,  and 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     127 

in  contravention  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  civ- 
ilized nations;  reserving  to  his  government  the 
right  to  take  such  action  as  it  may  deem  proper 
in  the  premises."  But,  apart  from  this  ineffec- 
tual remonstrance,  the  United  States  did  not 
attempt  to  interfere.  Secretary  Seward  con- 
tented himself  with  writing  to  Mr.  Kilpatrick 
(June  2,  1866): 

.  .  .  We  maintain  and  insist,  with  all  the  de- 
cision and  energy  which  are  compatible  with 
our  existing  neutrality,  that  the  republican  sys- 
tem which  is  accepted  by  any  of  those  [Spanish- 
American]  states  shall  not  be  wantonly  assailed, 
and  that  it  shall  not  be  subverted  as  an  end  of  a 
lawful  war  by  European  powers.  ...  In  such 
wars  as  are  waged  between  nations  which  are  in 
friendship  with  ourselves,  if  they  are  not 
pushed,  like  the  French  war  in  Mexico,  to  the 
political  point  before  mentioned,  we  do  not 
intervene.  .  .  .^ 

The  Chincha  Islands  were  retaken  from  Spain 
by  a  Peruvian  force  in  1865.  It  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  value  of  this  case  and  the  fore- 
going one,  as  precedents  for  non-intervention  by 
the  United  States,  is  somewhat  impaired  by  the 
circumstances  that  both  cases,  like  that  of  the 
British  colonization  of  Belize,  arose  during  our 

*  Seward  to  Kilpatrick,  June  2,  1866. 


128  AMERICAN  POLICY 

/civil  War,  when  the  attention  and  resources 
K  f   of  the  government  were  concentrated  upon  the 
preservation  of  the  Union. 

In  1897  the  unlawful  imprisonment  of  a  Ger- 
.#•  man  subject  in  Hayti  brought  that  republic  into 
*  conflict  with  Germany.  Ok  the  application  of 
the  German  minister  the  prisoner  was  immedi- 
ately released,  but  the  Haytian  Government 
hesitated  to  punish  the  responsible  officials  and 
to  pay  the  damage  called  for.  As  a  consequence, 
two  German  war  vessels  came  into  the  harbor 
of  Port-au-Prince^  and  their  commander  issued 
an  ultimatum,  giving  the  republic  six  hours  in 
which  to  comply  with  the  German  Remands; 
they  were  complied  with. 

In  1902  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  Italy, 
to  secure  the  payment  of  debts  due  to  their  sub- 
jects, united  in  seizing  Venezuelan  war  vessels 
and  in  the  bombardment  of  Venezuelan  ports. 
These  acts  of  war  occasioned  no  remonstrance 
from  the  United  States.  But  Doctor  Drago, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Argentine 
Republic,  expressed  himself  thereon  to  our  gov- 
ernment, through  the  Argentine  minister  at 
Washington,  advancing  for  the  first  time  the 
principle  known  as  the  Drago  Doctrine: 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    129 

The  recovery  manu  militari  of  debts  implies 
territorial  occupation,  which  supposes  the  sup- 
pression or  subordination  of  governments. 

That  situation  openly  contravenes  the  prin- 
ciples repeatedly  proclaimed  by  the  nations  of 
America  and  particularly  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
so  efficaciously  asserted  and  defended  on  all 
occasions  by  the  United  States,  to  which  doc- 
trine the  Argentine  Republic  has  already  im- 
plicitly adhered. 

The  principles  enunciated  in  the  memorable 
message  of  December  2,  1823,  contain  two  grand 
declarations  which  have  particular  application 
to  those  republics: 

"The  American  continents  are  not  hence- 
forth to  be  subject  to  future  colonization  by 
European  nations,  and  the  independence  of  the 
nations  of  America  having  been  recognized,  the 
intervention  of  a  European  power  with  the  ob- 
ject of  oppressing  or  of  controlling  their  destinies 
in  any  way  cannot  be  viewed  but  as  the  mani- 
festation of  sentiments  unfriendly  to  the  United 
States." 

All  that  the  Argentine  Republic  maintains 
and  what  it  would  like  to  see  confirmed  with 
regard  to  the  occurrences  in  Venezuela,  by  a 
nation  which  like  the  United  States  enjoys  such 
great  authority  and  power,  is  the  principle  al- 
ready accepted — that  there  can  be  no  European 
expansion  of  territory  in  America,  or  oppression 
of  the  peoples  of  that  continent,  on  account  of 
an  unfortunate  financial  situation  that  may 
have  led  one  of  them  to  postpone  meeting  its 


I30  AMERICAN  POLICY 

obligations.  In  a  word,  the  principle  that  it 
would  like  to  see  recognized  is  that  a  public  debt 
cannot  occasion  armed  intervention,  still  less 
material  occupation  of  the  soil  oF  American 
nations,  by  a  European  power.^ 

Had  the  distinguished  writer,  as  he  says, 
maintained  only  that  there  should  be  "no  Euro- 
pean expansion  of  territory  in  America  or  op- 
pression of  the  peoples  of  that  continent"  on  no 
matter  what  account,  the  United  States  would 
have  agreed  with  him,  giving,  however,  a  differ- 
ent meaning  to  the  word  oppression  from  that 
which  he  gives  it.  But  in  his  last  sentence  he 
maintains  considerably  more  than  this.  How- 
ever much  the  United  States  might  disapprove 
of  the  forcible  collection  of  debts^specially  from 
an  American  republic,  it  could_not  consider  such 
action  as  necessarily,  nor  in  the  case  of  Ven- 
ezuela, an  act  of  oppressiQn_Q£,such  country  or 
even  a  remote  danger  to  the  government  or  in- 
stitutions of  the  United  States.  It  could  not, 
therefore,  accept  the  Drago  Doctrine  as  a  corol- 
lary of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  nor  treat  this  case 
as  a  contravention  of  it. 

When,  in  1895,  Great  Britain  levied  a  fine  of 

^  Drago  to  Merou,  December  29,  1902. 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     131 

$75,000  upon  Nicaragua  for  an  offence  against 
her  dignity  and,  on  its  not  being  paid,  sent  her 
war-ships  to  Corinto  and  took  possession  of  the 
town,  our  government  resisted  the  pressure  of 
our  people  for  intervention  and  left  to  the  re- 
publics of  Costa  Rica,  San  Salvador,  and  Gua- 
temala the  subscription  of  a  sufficient  sum  to 
liquidate  the  indebtedness. 

On  this  subject  of  debts  and  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, Mr.  Bartholdt,  of  Missouri,  said  in  the 
House  of  Representatives: 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  not  nearly  as  im- 
portant to-day  as  it  was  even  ten  years  ago,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  at  The  Hague  conference 
it  was  determined — all  nations  agreeing  in  that 
determination  and  it  is  now  a  part  of  the  inter- 
national law  of  the  world — that  contractual 
debts  could  no  longer  be  collected  by  force, 
either  in  Central  or  SoutTi  America.  That  takes 
out  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  nearly  every  ele- 
ment of  friction  which  has  heretofore  caused 
trouble,  and,  therefore,  I  say  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine is  not  to-day  as  important  as  it  was,  and 
the  European  powers  are  ready  to  recognize  it. 

The  Hague  conference  has  not  determined 
*^that  contractual  debts  could  no  longer  be 
collected  by  force  in  either  Central  or  South 


132  AMERICAN  POLICY 

America."  That  body  is  not  competent  to 
take  such  definitive  action.  It  can  only  recom- 
mend to  the  nations  rules  or  principles  for  their 
approval  and  ratification.  Here  is  what  The 
Hague  conference  did  recommend  regarding  con- 
tract claims: 

The  contracting  powers  are  agreed  not  to 
resort  to  armed  force  for  the  recovery  of  con- 
tract debts  claimed  from  the  government  of  one 
country  by  the  government  of  another  country 
as  due  to  its  nationals. 

However,  this  stipulation  will  not  apply  when 
a  debtor  state  refuses  or  leaves  unanswered  an 
offer  to  arbitrate  or,  in  case  of  acceptance,  ren- 
ders the  settlement  of  the  special  agreement 
impossible  or,  upon  arbitration,  fails  to  conform 
to  the  award.  {Article  I  of  the  convention  of 
June  30,  1908,  concerning  the  limitation  of  the 
use  of  force  for  the  recovery  of  contract  dehts.y 

These  provisions,  be  it  observed,  do  not  im- 
pose on  the  debtor  nation  any  obligation  to 
accept  an  offer  of  arbitration;  they  plainly  recog- 

^  Les  puissances  contractantes  sont  convenues  de  ne  pas  avoir 
recours  a  la  force  armee  pour  le  recouvrement  de  dettes  contractu- 
elles  reclamees  au  gouvernement  d'un  pays  par  le  gouvernement 
d'un  autre  pays  comme  dues  a  ses  nationaux. 

Toutefols  cette  stipulation  ne  pourra  etre  appllquee  quand 
I'etat  debiteur  refuse  ou  laisse  sans  reponse  une  oifre  d'arbitrage 
ou,  en  cas  d'acceptation,  rend  impossible  Tetablissement  de  com- 
promis  ou,  apres  I'arbitrage,  manque  de  se  conformer  a  la  sentence 
rendue. 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     133 

nize  his  right  to  dedine  it  and  the  possibiHty  of 
his  not  even  answering  it.  In  either  of  these 
cases  the  creditor  nation  is  allowed  to  proceed 
to  collection  by  force.  If  all  the  nations  of  the 
world  had,  as  Mr.  Bartholdt  intimates,  ratified 
these  provisions,  there  would  still  be  consider- 
able room  for  armed  conflict  over  contract  debts. 
But  the  nations  have  not  all  ratified  them.  On 
the  1st  of  October,  1912,  the  nations  which  had 
and  those  which  had  not  were  the  following. 
The  letter  R  indicates  that  the  ratification  was 
qualified  by  a  reservation.^ 

Ratified 
Latin- American  Nations 

1.  Guatemala,  R.  4.  Nicaragua,  R. 

2.  Hayti.  5.  Panama. 

3.  Mexico.  6.  Salvador,  R. 

Other  Nations 

1.  Austro-Hungary.  8.  Netherlands. 

2.  China.  9.  Norway. 

3.  Denmark.  10.  Portugal. 

4.  France.  11.  Roumania. 

5.  Germany.  12.  Russia. 

6.  Great  Britain.  13.  United  States,  R. 

7.  Japan. 

^  Hague  Convention  Ratifications,  statement  Issued  by  World 
Peace  Foundation,  October  i,  19 12;  Les  Deux  Conferences  de  la 
Paix,  1899  et  1907;  Recueil  general  de  Traites,  by  Martens.  I  have 
considered  adherence  to  the  convention  as  equivalent  to  ratifica- 
tion. 


134 


AMERICAN  POLICY 


1.  Argentina. 

2.  Bolivia. 

3.  Brazil. 

4.  Chili. 

5.  Colombia. 

6.  Costa  Rica. 

7.  Cuba. 


1.  Belgium. 

2.  Bulgaria. 

3.  Greece. 

4.  Italy. 

5.  Luxemburg. 

6.  Montenegro. 

7.  Persia. 


Not  Ratified 

Latin- American  Nations 

8.  Dominican  Republic. 

9.  Ecuador. 

10.  Honduras. 

11.  Paraguay. 

12.  Peru. 

13.  Uruguay. 

14.  Venezuela. 

Other  Nations 

8.  Servia. 

9.  Siam. 

10.  Spain. 

11.  Sweden. 

12.  Switzerland. 

13.  Turkey. 


Of  the  twenty  nations  of  Latin-America, 
eighteen  were  represented  at  the  conference. 
The  two  nations  not  represented  were  Costa 
Rica  and  Honduras.  Of  the  twenty  nations, 
three  ratified  the  convention  without  reserva- 
tion, fourteen  did  not  ratify  it,  and  three  rati- 
fied it  with  a  reservation  which  amounts  almost 
to  nuUification.^ 

^This  reservation  is  expressed  substantially  as  follows: 
I.  So  far  as  debts  resulting  from  ordinary  contracts  between  the 
nationals  of  one  country  and  the  government  of  another  are  con- 
cerned, arbitration  will  not  be  resorted  to  except  in  the  case  of 


CASES  UNDER  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     135 

The  net  result  of  it  all  is  about  this:  that  in 
the  collection  of  certain  kinds  of  contract  debt 
a  nation  must  make  an  offer  of  arbitration  before 
resorting  to  force;  that  its  resorting  to  force  may 
be  prevented  by  the  acceptance  of  arbitration; 
and  that  about  one  in  severPof  the  probable 
debtor  nations  has  agreed  to  accept  arbitration 
when  it  is  not  strong  enough  to  prevent  military 
occupation.  If  it  accepts  arbitration,  it  yields 
to  threats  of  force;  if  it  submits  to  occupation, 
it  succumbs  to  acts  of  force.  The  settlement  is 
thus  a  matter  of  battalions  and  battle-ships  in 
either  case.  This  arrangement,  we  are  told, 
"takes  out  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  nearly 
every  element  of  friction  which  has  heretofore 
caused  trouble."  Far  from  it.  The  critical  and 
delicate  task  of  keeping  on  good  terms  with 
non-American  powers  which  intervene  in  the 
affairs  of  our  sister  republics  is  still  with  us. 

Whether  it  is  safe  for  the  United  States  to  let 
their  armed  forces  go  into  American  countries 
depends  upon  their  particular  intentions  and  the 

denial  of  justice  by  the  judiciary  of  the  country  of  the  contract, 
the  resources  of  which  must  first  be  exhausted. 

2.  PubHc  loans  with  emission  of  bonds,  constituting  national 
debts,  cannot  in  any  case  give  cause  for  military  aggression  or  for 
material  occupation  of  the  soil  of  American  nations. 


136  AMERICAN   POLICY 

ability  of  the  United  States  to  evict  them  should 
they  attempt  unduly  to  prolong  their  stay.  It 
is  thus  a  diplomatic  and  military  question,  to 
which  there  can  be  no  general  answer.  It  can 
only  be  properly  answered  for  each  case  as  it 
arises.  So  far  as  it  is  answerable  in  the  affirma- 
tive, the  United  States  should  let  foreign  nations 
settle  their  differences  with  American  nations 
directly. 

The  Drago  Doctrine  is  a  corollary  not  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  but  of  the  Bolivar  Idea.  As 
such  it  deserves,  and  will  doubtless  receive,  the 
serious  consideration  of  Pan  American  states- 
men. 


IV 

THE  BOLIVAR  IDEA.    CONCLUSION 

As  the  countries  of  the  Old  World  become 
more  and  more  crowded,  the  need  of  territory  in 
which  their  surplus  population  may  establish 
and  perpetuate  itself  under  the  flag  of  the 
mother  country  becomes  correspondingly  greater 
and  the  demand  for  colonies  grows  louder  and 
more  insistent.  Those  lands  should  be  looked 
for,  says  the  Bolivar  Idea,  in  the  Old  World 
and  not  in  the  New.  But  they  will  probably  be 
sought,  strenuously  and  forcibly,  along  the  lines 
of  least  resistance,  wherever  they  may  lie. 

Considering  the  annexation  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  to  Germany,  the  almost  complete  par- 
tition of  Africa  among  six  European  powers,  the 
spoliation  of  Central  America  and  Venezuela 
by  Great  Britain,  the  annexation  of  Corea  to 
Japan,  of  Madagascar  and  Morocco  to  France, 
of  parts  of  China  to  Germany,  Russia,  and  Ja- 
pan, of  Tripoli  to  Italy,  and  the  acquisition  of 
137 


L 


138  AMERICAN  POLICY 

the  Panama  Canal  Zone  by  the  United  States — 
all  since  the  Franco-German  War — one  cannot 
shut  one's  eyes  to  the  fact  that  territory  is  still, 
in  the  minds  of  statesmen,  a  prize  to  be  fought 
or  bartered  for — to  be  acquired  without  too 
scrupulous  a  regard  to  means  whenever  the  op- 
portunity offers. 

It  is  apprehended  that  Germany  and  perhaps 
Italy  and  other  nations  having  settlers  in  South 
America  are  coveting  territory  in  that  region. 
There  are  indications  that  the  policies  of  those 
countries  are  purely  commercial,  aiming  only  at 
the  creation  and  maintenance  of  markets  for 
the  mother  country;  that  there  is  no  danger  of 
any  attempt  to  acquire  territory  so  long,  at 
least,  as  the  policies  mentioned  are  not  seri- 
ously thwarted.  This  may  be  true,  but  who 
knows  how  far  it  may  be  due  to  the  lack  of 
military  and  naval  means  to  carry  out  a  policy 
of  conquest  and  annexation,  and  when  such 
means  may  become  available.?  Policies  change, 
and  true  statesmanship  regards  not  only  what 
has  been  and  what  is,  but  also  what  may  be. 
"^The  Monroe  Doctrine,  construed  as  Monroe 
meant  it  to  be,  so  as  to  cover  the  whole  Western 
Hemisphere,  goes  far  toward  answering  the  pur- 
pose of  Pan  Americanism.     But  there  is  a  con- 


THE  BOLIVAR  IDEA  139 

siderable  and  ever-increasing  difference  between 
the  protection  that  can  be  afforded  to  the 
American  world  by  the  United  States  alone^and 
that  which  might  be  afforded  it  by  the  united 
efforts  of  all  American  nations,  actuated  by  a 
spirit  not  merely  of  national  but  of  continental, 
of  Pan  American,  solidarity.  Bolivar's  active 
interest  and  efforts  did  not  go  beyond  a  union 
of  the  nations  of  Spanish  origin,  and  even  in 
this  he  was  to  be  bitterly  disappointed.  As  to  a 
concert  of  all  American  nations,  he  indulged  in 
dreams  and  speculations  which  led  him  occa- 
sionally to  express  himself  as  if  he  seriously 
contemplated  the  union  of  all  American  states 
in  some  sort  of  league  or  confederacy.  Two  in- 
stances of  his  doing  so  may  be  cited : 

Would  that  some  day  we  might  be  fortunate 
enough  to  establish  there  [at  Panama]  an  august 
congress  of  the  representatives  of  the  repubHcs, 
kingdoms,  and  empires  [of  America],  to  deal  with 
the  high  interests  of  peace  and  of  war  with  the 
nations  of  the  other  three  parts  of  the  world. ^ 

...  I  venture  to  flatter  myself  that  the  ar- 
dent desire  which  animates  all  Americans  of  ex- 
alting the  power  of  the  world  of  Columbus  will 

^Translation,  letter  to  a  Jamaican,  Sept.  6,  1815.  Docu- 
mentos  para  la  Historia  del  Libertador,  edited  under  direction  of 
Guzman  Blanco,  V,  340. 


I40  AMERICAN  POLICY 

moderate  the  difficulties  and  delays  incidental 
to  ministerial  preparations.  .  .  . 

The  day  on  which  our  plenipotentiaries  ex- 
change their  powers  an  immortal  epoch  will  be 
fixed  in  the  diplomatic  history  of  America. 
When,  after  a  hundred  centuries,  posterity  shall 
seek  the  origin  of  our  public  law,  and  record  the 
pacts  which  determined  its  history,  it  will  regis- 
ter with  respect  the  protocols  of  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama.  In  them  they  will  find  the  plan  of  the 
first  alliances,  which  will  indicate  the  course  of 
our  relationship  with  the  rest  of  the  universe. 
What  then  will  be  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth  to  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama?^ 

The  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  being  a  central  po- 
sition with  reference  to  northern  and  south- 
ern Greece,  was  often  chosen  as  the  site  of  a 
Pan  Hellenic  Congress.  Panama  appeared  to 
Bolivar  as  a  great  international  emporium.  *^Its 
canals,"  he  said,  "will  shorten  the  routes  of  the 
world;  will  strengthen  the  conventional  bonds 
between  Europe,  America,  and  Asia;  will  bring 
to  that  favored  region  the  tributes  of  the  sev- 
eral quarters  of  the  globe.  Perhaps  there  only 
will  it  be  possible  to  fix  the  capital  of  the  world, 
as  Constantine  considered  Byzantium  the  capital 
of  the  Ancient  World. "^ 

^  Translation,  circular  convening  Congress  of  Panama,  Decem- 
ber 7,  1824,  opus  cit.,  Guzman  Blanco,  IX,  448 A 

2  Translation,  letter  to  a  Jamaican,  opus  cit.,  Guzman  Blanco, 

V,  339. 


THE  BOLIVAR  IDEA  141 

But  the  context,  his  language  on  other  oc- 
casions, and  other  testimony  indicate  that  he 
never  thought  of  an  all-American  union  as 
practicable.  After  the  failure  of  the  first  Pan 
American  Congress,  he  wrote:  ^'The  Congress 
of  Panama,  which  would  have  been  admirable 
if  it  had  been  more  efficacious,  makes  me  think 
of  that  Greek  madman,  who,  from  the  summit 
of  a  rock,  pretended  to  direct  the  movements  of 
vessels  on  the  high  sea.  The  power  of  the  con- 
gress will  be  chimerical.  Its  decrees  can  be  but 
counsels,  nothing  more.  People  write  to  me 
that  many  dreamers  desire  a  code  with  a  penal 
constitution.  What  code?  What  is  the  poht- 
ical  organization  that  will  produce  harmony? 
All  that  is  ideal  and  absurd."^  It  appears  that 
he  expected  to  unite  the  Latin-American  repub-  j 
lies  in  an  association  somewhat  closer  than  the  1 
Holy  Alliance  and  yet  not  so  close  as  a  confed- 
eracy, to  found  a  sort  of  amphictyonic  council, 
or  assembly  of  plenipotentiaries,  which  should 
discuss  and  promote  the  interests  which  the 
states  had  in  common,  provide  for  their  common  / 
defence,  and  settle  their  differences  by  arbitra- 
tion backed  by  military  force. 

This  union  of  Latin-American  countries  was 

^Translation,  letter  to  Guzman,  August  8,  1826. 


142  AMERICAN  POLICY 

to  be  under  the  hegemony  of  Colombia.^  The 
circular  in  which  Bolivar  invited  the  govern- 
ments of  Colombia,  Mexico,  Central  America, 
the  United  Provinces  of  Buenos  Ayres,  Chili,  and 
Brazil  to  send  delegates  to  the  Congress  of 
Panama  gave  no  indication  that  the  United 
States  was  to  be  represented  at  that  meeting.^ 
The  invitation  received  by  the  United  States 
was  extended  to  it  at  a  late  date  by  the  govern- 
ments of  the  forementioned  countries.^  While 
not  what  is  now  understood  by  Pan  American- 
ism, Bolivar's  purpose  was  the  germ  of  that  sen- 
timent, the  origin  of  that  principle,  and  seems  to 
warrant  its  being  called  after  him — the  Bolivar 
Idea. 

^T^he  Pan  American  Association,  formed  at 
the  instance  of  the  United  States,  was  called  first 
The  Commercial  Bureau  of  the  American  Repub- 
licSy  then  The  International  Bureau  of  American 
Republics^  and  is  now  called  The  Pan  American 
Union,  These  changes  of  name  are  significant 
of  the  broadening  scope  and  purpose  of  the  insti- 
tution.    It  is   maintained   by  the   twenty-one 

,  American  republics  and  devoted  to  "the  devel- 
opment and  conservation  of  commerce,  friendly 

1  El  Ideal  internacional  de  Bolivar,  F.  J.  Urrutia,  p.  27. 

2  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  232,  Part  4,  pp.  155,  156.         ^  Jhid.^  pp.  74,  76. 


THE  BOLIVAR  IDEA  143 

intercourse,  and  good  understanding  among  all 
the  American  republics."^     Its  management  is 
determined  by  a  governing  board  consisting  of^' 
the  secretary  of  state  of  the  United  States,  who ) 
is  eX'Officio  chairman,  and  the  diplomatic  rep-j 
resentatives  of  all  the  governments  represented 
in  the  bureau  and  accredited  to  the  government/ 
of  the  United  States.     It  is  located  in  Washing- 
ton because  that  city  is  the  only  one  at  which  all 
the  American  repubjics_have  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives^    Its  executive  officers  are  a  director- 
general  and  assistant  director,  elected  by  the/ 
governing  board.     Under  the   auspices  of  the^ 
union  there  have  been  four  Pan  American  con- 
ferences: one  in  Washington  in   1889,^  one  in' 
Mexico  in  the  winter  of  1901--2,  one  in  Rio  de 
Janeiro  in  1906,  and  one  in  Buenos  Ay  res  in     - 
1910.     The  change  of  name  from  congress  to 
conference  may  be  explained  by  the  enlargement 
of  the  scope  of  the  meetings  to  include  many  sub- 
jects not  of  political  character  and  to  provide  for 
discussing  and  agreeing  without  any  view  to 
negotiation.     The  history  of  the  Pan  American 
movement  may  thus  be  divided  into  two  periods 
— one  of  congresses,  beginning  with  the  Congress  ^ 
of  Panama  in  1826  and  ending  with  that  of  Lima 

1  The  Pan  American  Union,  by  John  Barrett,  p.  60. 


144  AMERICAN  POLICY 

in  1865,  and  one  of  conferences,  beginning  with 
the  Washington  Conference  of  i_88cL^nd,  let  us 
hope,  never  to  end.  In  the  proceedings  of  the 
first  period  the  United  States  took  Httle  or  no 
part;  in  those  of  the  second  it  has  taken  a  prom- 
inent, if  not  a  leading,  one.  During  the  first 
period  ambitious  plans  for  political  union  were 
discussed  and  approved,  but  generally  failed  of 
ratification;  during  the  second  period  less  has 
been  attempted  and  perhaps  more  accomplished. 
But  the  results  cannot  be  determined  with  accu- 
racy and  are  easily  exaggerated.  A  great  show- 
ing is  made  by  stringing  out  the  resolutions, 
conventions,  treaties,  etc.,  that  are  passed;  the 
unwary  public  is  thus  led  to  believe  that  these 
more  or  less  admirable  measures  are  made  law 
or  usage.  They  are  only  recommendations  un- 
til formally  ratified  by  their  respective  gov- 
ernments. Which  of  them  are  ratified  and 
which  are  not  ?  Which  of  those  that  are  ratified 
are  observed  and  which  are  a  dead  letter.?  On 
such  vital  questions,  the  publications  of  peace 
societies  and  of  the  Pan  American  Union  leave 
us  lamentably  in  the  dark.  With  the  light  that 
I  have  been  able  to  get  from  these  organizations 
and  from  the  Department  of  State,  I  have  pre- 


THE  BOLIVAR  IDEA 


HS 


pared  the  following  statement  of  the  more  im- 
portant measures  enacted  at  the  principal  con- 
gresses and  conferences,  with  the  corresponding 
ratifications.  It  is  far  from  perfect  or  com- 
plete, but  it  is  presented  as  the  best  available 
one  and  an  important  part  of  this  discussion. 


PRINCIPAL   SESSIONS   OF   PAN   AMERICAN   CON- 
GRESSES  AND    CONFERENCES 
CONGRESSES 


No. 

Place 

Date 

States 

More  important 

Ratified  or  ad- 

represented 

enactments 

hered  to,  by 

I. 

Pana- 

22 June  to 

Colombia, 

I.  League      of 

Col^abia  (rati- 

ma. 

IS     July, 

Cent.    Amer- 

Perpetual Un- 

fied in  part  J. 

1826. 

ica,    Mexico, 

ion  and  Con- 
federation. 

2. 

II       Dec, 

Bolivia,    Chili, 

2.  Treaty  of 

N 

1847,  to  I 

Colombia, 

Confedera- 

March, 

Ecuador, 

tion, 

1848. 

Peru 

3.  Treaty  of 
Commerce, 

4    Co  n  s  u  1  a  r 
Convention, 

S.  Postal     Con- 
vention. 

Colombiaj^,.^ 

3. 

Santia- 

IS     Sept., 

Chili,  Ecuador, 

6.  League    and 

Bolivia,     Chili, 

go. 

1856. 

Peru. 

Confederation 
called ^  "The 
Continental 
Treaty." 

Costa  Rica, 
Ecuador, 
Guatemala, 
Honduras, 
Mexico,  Nica- 
ragua,    Peru, 
Salvador. 

4. 

Lima. 

14      Nov., 

Argentina,  Bo- 

7. Treaty  of 

1864,     to 

livia,     Chili, 

Union   and 

23     Jan., 

Colombia, 

Alliance, 

1865. 

Ecuador, 
Guatemala, 
Peru,   ESal- 
vador,  Vene- 
zuela. 

8    Treaty    for 
Maintenance 
of  Peace. 

PRINCIPAL  SESSIONS  OF  PAN  AMERICAN   CON- 
GRESSES  AND   CONFERENCES— (Continued) 
CONFERENCES 


No. 

Place 

Date 

States 
represented 

More  important 
enactments 

Ratified  or  ad- 
hered to,  by 

5. 

Wash- 

2 Oct.,  1889, 

All,  except 

9.  Treaty    for 

ing- 

to 19  Apr., 

Santo  Do- 

Compulsory 

ton. 

1890. 

mingo. 

Arbitration. 

6. 

Mexi- 

22   Oct., 

All. 

10.  Treaty    for 

Guatemala,Hondu- 

co. 

1901,     to 

Compulsory 

ras,  Mexico,  Peru, 

31     Jan., 

Arbitration, 

Salvador,     Santo 

1902. 

11.  Treaty    for 
Arbitration  of 
pecuniary 
claims, 

12.  Convention 
for  the  codifi- 
cation    of 
American   In- 
ternational 
Law. 

Domingo,      Uru- 
guay. 
U.  S.  and   seven 
other      states 
(1909). 

7- 

Rio  de 

23  July  to 

All,  except 

13.  Convention 

U.  S.   and  thirteen 

Jan- 

27    Aug., 

Hay  ti  and 

for  the  Codi- 

other      states 

eiro. 

1906. 

Venezu- 
ela. 

f  ica  tion  of 
American   In- 
ternational 
Law, 

14.  Convention 
as  to  status  of 
naturalized 
citizens, 

15.  Convention 
for    the    pro- 
tection   of 
Copyrights, 
Patents,    and 
Trade  Marks, 

16.  Treaty    for 
Arbitration  of 
Pecu  n  iar y 
Claims. 

(1912). 

U.  S.    and    twelve 
other      states 
(1913). 

Chili,  Costa  Rica, 
Ecuador,  Guate- 
mala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua,  Pana- 
ma, Salvador 
(1910). 

U.  S.  and  eleven 
other  states 
(1913). 

8. 

Buenos 

12  July   to 
30    Aug., 

All,  except 

17.  Convention 

Ayres. 

Bolivia. 

for  the  Pro- 

1910. 

tection    of 
Copyrights, 

18.  Convention 
for  the  Pro- 
tection   of 
Patents, 

19.  Convention 
for  the  Pro- 
tection   of 
Trade   Marks 
and  Commer- 
cial Names, 

20.  Treaty    for 
the      Arbitra- 
tion of   Pecu- 
niary Claims. 

146 


THE  BOLIVAR  IDEA  147 

These  twenty  compacts  may  be  classified  ac- 
cording to  subjects  and  to  ratification,  as  fol- 
lows : 

SUBJECTS 

Confederation,  Peace,  and  Arbitration 10 

Trade  and  Commerce 7 

International  Law 3 

RATIFICATION 

By  United  States  and  other  states 4   . 

By  other  states  only S--" 

Not  ratified  at  all ii-"^ 

While  less  visionary  or  more  practical  than 
the  congresses,  the  conferences  can  hardly  be 
said  to  have  returned  in  useful  achievement  the 
time,  money,  and  labor  that  they  have  cost. 
Their  treaties  for  compulsory  arbitration  have 
not  been  ratified  by  half  of  the  Latin-American 
states  nor  by  the  United  States  and,  should  they 
be  ratified,  are  doomed  to  violation.  The  con- 
ferences have  committed  American  countries  to 
undertaking  the  construction  of  a  grand  Pan 
American  railroad  which  may  prove  to  be  im- 
practicable and  seems  of  doubtful  utility. 

If  the  railroad  were  built,  under  present  con- 
ditions, it  would  not  pay  for  its  axle-grease. 
There  would  not  be  one  passenger  in  a  year 


X 


148  AMERICAN  POLICY 

who  would  buy  a  through  ticket.  The  journey 
by  rail  would  be  wholly  intolerable  not  alone  on 
account  of  the  distance  but  because  of  the  great 
stretches  of  high  plateaux  with  their  heat  and 
dust.  The  journey  from  New  York  to  Buenos 
Ayres  would  be  made  in  half  the  time  on  a  good 
ship  and  with  infinitely  greater  pleasure.  So 
far  as  through  freight  is  concerned,  it  is  prepos- 
terous to  discuss  the  subject.  Coal  can  be  car- 
ried from  New  York  to  Buenos  Ayres  by  ship 
for  five  dollars  or  six  dollars  a  ton;  it  could  not 
be  carried  by  rail,  if  such  railroad  were  in  exist- 
ence, for  less  than  thirty  dollars  or  forty  dollars 
a  ton.  In  such  visionary,  chimerical  dreams  as 
this  do  Pan  American  conferences  find  their 
strongest  and  most  wholesome  inspiration.^ 

With  a  view  to  the  unification  of  American 
currency,  weights,  and  measures,  of  censuses, 
and  of  statistical  nomenclature,  there^has  been 
some  discussing  and  resolving,  but  nothing,  it 
would  seem,  in  the  form  of  a  treaty  or  con- 
vention. The  conferences  have  applied  them- 
selves chiefly  to  the  assurance  of  peace.  They 
have  promoted  mutual  understanding  and  good 
will  by  the  encouragement  of  trade  and  com- 
merce and  other  forms  of  international  inter- 
course. It  is  true  that  the  ten  republics  of 
South  America  furnish  the  United  States  less 

^  American  Supremacy^  by  G.  W.  Crichfield,  II,  431. 


THE  BOLIVAR  IDEA  149 

than  one-quarter  of  their  exports  and  receive 
from  it  only  about  a  seventh  of  their  imports, 
but  the  ten  northern  repubUcs  (Mexico,  Guate- 
mala, Salvador,  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Costa 
Rica,  Panama,  Cuba,  the  Dominican  Repub- 
lic, and  Hayti)  give  nearly  three-quarters  of 
their  exports  to  the  United  States  and  receive 
from  it  more  than  half  of  their  imports.^  The 
share  of  the  United  States  in  the  trade  of  Latin- 
America,  while  not  equal  to  that  of  Europe,  is 
greater  than  that  of  any  other  country.  In  191 1 
Latin-America's  foreign  trade  (value  of  exports 
and  imports)  was  partitioned  as  follows: 

To  the  United  States 28 .98  per  cent. 

To  Great  Britain 23  •  24  per  cent. 

To  Germany 14  65  per  cent. 

To  France 8 .  63  per  cent. 

To  other  countries 24 .  50  per  cent. 

100. cxD  per  cent.2 

What  IS  more  important,  our  trade  with 
Latin-America  is  increasing;  and  our  and  Latin- 
America's  trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world  is 
increasing  even  more  rapidly  than  our  trade  with 
Latin-America.^ 

^Bulletin  of  Pan  American  Union^  February,  1913. 

2  Bulletin  of  Pan  American  Union,  February,  191 3,  p.  240. 

3  Appendix  C. 


/ 


I50  AMERICAN  POLICY 

These  conditions  are  attributable  to  the  bet- 
ter understanding  among  American  countries 
effected  by  Pan  American  conferences — not 
wholly,  but  in  sufficient  measure  to  augur  well 
for  the  future  usefulness  of  those  meetings. 
May  the  time  come  when  they  will  deal  with 
the  two  fundamental  problems  of  Latin-Amer- 
ica— immigration  and  education — and  by  the 
solution  of  them  repeople  America,  drawing  to 
it  the  surplus  brain  and  brawn  of  the  world  and 
endowing  it  with  an  art  and  literature  fraught 
with  new  joys  and  inspirations  for  mankind. 
As  the  states  of  Latin-America  rise  to  the  per- 
formance of  their  appropriate  parts  in  this 
achievement  the  United  States  will  give  them 
more  and  more  consideration  as  political  part- 
ners, the  Monroe  Doctrine  will  be  less  invoked, 
and  the  Bolivar  Idea  will  come  to  express,  not 
merely  the  vision  of  an  American  patriot,  but 
the  real,  the  successful,  policy  of  America. 

Conclusion 

Pan  American  consciousness  is  a  product  of 

common  occupancy  of  the  WesterJi  Hemisphere, 

common  European  origin,  common  repubHcan 

form,  or  ideals,  of  government.     It  corresponds 


\ 


CONCLUSION  151  X, 

essentially  to  European,  or  Old  World,  conscious- 
ness. This  American  spirit  is  about  to  be  pow- 
erfully stimulated  by  two  new  factors:  the 
opening  of  the  Panama  Canal  and  the  return  ^ 
of  the  United  States  to  ar-polixry~^f  lew  tariff 
on  imports.  The  commercial  effect  of  these 
changes  will  be  followed  by  social  and  political 
effects  of  even  greater  importance,  the  most  no- 
table of  which  will  be  a  new  Pan  American  sol- 
idarity. It  is  no  use  to  decry  such  continental 
or  hemisphere  spirit  as  provincial  or  opposed  to 
world  unity.  As  well  find  fault  with  the  division 
of  the  world  into  hemispheres.  This  geographical 
condition  is  not  more  beyond  the  power  of  man 
to  make  or  unmake  than  is  the  spirit  that  is 
born  of  it  and  nourished  by  it.  We  could  not 
abolish  it,  and  why  should  we  want  to  \  Its  two 
forms.  Eastern  and  Western,  differ,  but  need  not 
conflict;  they  are  complementary  rather  than 
antagonistic.  The  Western  spirit  craves  the 
culture  of  the  Eastern;  but  it  wants  the  privilege 
of  helping  itself  to  it;  the  New  World  wants 
much  of  the  civilization  of  the  Old,  but  does  not 
want  any  forced  upon  it. 

Wise  and  efficient  statesmanship  may  make 
America  as  populous  as  the  rest  of  the  world 


152  AMERICAN  POLICY 

and  thus  remove  one  excuse  that  nations  of  the 
Old  World  might  advance  for  its  conquest  and 
annexation.  Underpopulated  sections  of  it  may 
become  exposed  to  incorporation  in  a  non-Ameri- 
can country,  if  not  previously  merged  in  a  pop- 
ulous American  one.  The  policy  of  population 
should  be  accompanied  by  a  liberal  open-door, 
commercial  policy,  which  would  give  the  Old 
World  about  all  that  it  could  get  in  the  way 
of  trade  from  colonies,  and  at  less  cost.  Finally, 
population  and  trade,  doing  what  they  can  to 
strengthen  the  New  World  and  conciliate  the  Old, 
an  enlightened  military  and  naval  policy  might 
prove  an  effective  complement  to  the  system. 

Toward  one  another,  perhaps,  more  than  to- 
ward European  nations,  the  nations  of  America 
should  cultivate  the  most  cordial  friendly  rela- 
tions. This  appUes  especially  to  the  United 
States,  which,  as  the  strongest,  is  the  most  liable 
to  suspicion  and  distrust.  It  should  go  to  the 
extreme  of  forbearance  to  avoid  conflict  with  a 
sister  American  republic  and  lose  no  opportu- 
nity of  removing  any  unfriendly  feeling  which 
such  country  may  on  any  account  be  harboring 
against  it.  It  should  consider,  too,  that  the 
Pan  American  solidarity,  which  it  favors  and 


CONCLUSION  I  S3 

fosters  as  a  protection  against  the  rest  of  the 
world,  is  as  resentful  of  American-born  as  It  is 
of  foreign-born  injury;  that  in  dealing  with  the 
feeblest  American  republic  it  has  to  do  with  all 
America,  with  an  aggregation  of  over  70,000,000 
fellow  American  citizens. 

The  opposition  in  America  to  certain  features 
of  European  statecraft  is  diminishing  as  those 
features  themselves  disappear  from  the  Euro- 
pean system. 

What  Americans  regard  as  the  "European 
peril,''  against  which  the  United  States  directed 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  Latin  states  their 
past  attempts  at  federation  and  open  indorse- 
ment of  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  and  against 
which  they  direct  their  present  efforts  for  the 
development  and  institution  of  an  American 
international  law — this  danger  is  nowhere  so 
ardently  combated  as  in  Europe  itself.  Only  in 
Europe  it  has  a  different  name.  The  American 
people  sought  to  protect  themselves  against  that 
system  of  force,  of  intervention,  of  rank,  of 
egotistic  expansion,  of  dynastic  interest  and 
diplomatic  ambition  against  which  really  cul- 
tivated Europe  has  been  striving  since  the  days 
of  the  French  Revolution  to  protect  itself  and 
the  struggles  of  which  fill  the  history  of  the  last 
one  hundred  and  twenty  years.  What  America 
is  trying  to  protect  itself  against  is  just  what 


154  AMERICAN  POLICY 

European  democracy  is  by  bitter,  desperate 
strife  struggling  to  free  itself  from.  .  .  .  Eu- 
rope, as  here  defined,  and  modern  Pan  America 
have  a  common  opponent — feudalism,  which, 
since  the  Middle  Ages,  has  often  changed  its 
form  but  never  its  essential  spirit.^ 

Pan  Americanism  does  not  involve  a  seces- 
sion or  divorce  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  from 
the  Eastern.  In  the  domain  of  so-called  inter- 
national law  it  implies  not  independence  but 
autonomy;  it  contemplates  American  regulation 
of  affairs  peculiar  to  America  or  that  concern 
America  more  than  they  concern  any  other  part 
of  the  world — ^with  due  regard  to  those  general 
rules  that  are  necessary  to  harmony  in  the 
family  of  nations.  It  does  not,  as  already  inti- 
mated, exclude  non-American  immigration,  or 
non-American  capital,  or  even  non-American 
political  influence.  It  admits  of  occasional  co- 
operation of  European  with  American  powers, 
but  draws  the  line  at  non-American  dictation 
or  supremacy,  at  the  determination  of  the  des- 
tiny of  an  American  power  by  any  non-Ameri- 
can power  or  powers.  It  is  not  opposed  to  the 
unification  of  the  world,  but  it  is  to  its  Euro- 
peanization.     It  means  that  American  nations 

^  Pan-Amerika,  by  A.  H.  Fried,  opus  cit.,  pp.  290,  291. 


CONCLUSION  155 

shall  be  as  independent  of  the  European  concert 
as  the  European  concert  is  of  American  nations; 
that  the  American  hemisphere,  though  smaller 
in  area  and  in  population  than  the  European, 
shall  be  politically  the  equal  of  it. 

Whatever  the  efforts  and  the  talents  that 
may  be  applied  to  its  development,  America, 
comprising  less  than  one-quarter  of  the  land 
surface  of  the  globe  and  less  to-day  than  one- 
tenth  of  its  population,  will  in  all  probability 
never  be  able  to  defend  itself  as  a  sparsely  pop- 
ulated region  against  the  rest  of  the  world  as 
an  overpopulated  one.  The  twenty  armies  of 
Latin-America  aggregate  on  a  war  footing  about 
one  and  a  half  million  men.^  Taking  the  army 
of  the  United  States,  including  militia  and  vol- 
unteers, as  two  million,  we  get  three  and  a  half 
million  as  the  total  of  the  American  military 
coalition.  This  force,  hardly  capable  of  united 
action,  is  less  than  the  war  army  of  any  one  of 
the  three  leading  military  powers  of  Europe — 
France,  Germany,  Russia. 

Africa  is  already,  and  is  likely  to  remain,  un- 
der the  dominion  of  Europe,  especially  of  Great 
Britain,  who  has  been  the  most  earnest  and 

^  A.  Hartleben,  opus  cit.,  compiled. 


156  AMERICAN  POLICY 

active  opponent  of  Pan  Americanism.  Aus- 
tralia and  Canada  may  possibly  detach  them- 
selves from  her  and  furnish  some,  but  inade- 
quate, support  to  America.  Asia  is  in  part 
European,  but  is  waking  up  to  resistance  against 
its  Europeanization.  There  is  where  America 
must  look  for  its  greatest  sympathy  and  most 
effective  co-operation  in  opposing  Old  World 
domination  of  the  Nj^w.  Since  the  earliest  days 
of  the  republic  there  has  been  in  the  United 
States,  if  not  a  party,  an  element  of  population, 
which  regards  Great  Britain  as  the  natural 
friend  and  ally  of  the  United  States.  Commu- 
nity of  language  makes  a  strong  bond  of  union 
between  a  mother  country  and  its  progeny,  be 
the  latter  dependent  or  independent.  By  the 
language  of  Shakespeare,  of  Cervantes,  and  of 
Camoens,  the  people  of  North  America  and  of 
Central  and  South  America  are  forever  affili- 
ated to  those  of  Great  Britain,  of  Spain,  and  of 
Portugal,  but  that  relationship  is,  and  should 
be,  intellectual,  not  political.  It  has  nothing  to 
do  with  imperial  greatness.  There  is  no  indi- 
cation that  Latin-Americans  are  less  proud  of 
the  history  and  traditions  of  Castile  for  its  being 
no  longer  the  metropolis  of  a  colonial  world; 


CONCLUSION  IS7 

nor  would  people  of  the  United  States  take  less 
pride  in  their  heritage  from  old  England  should 
not  a  British  drum  be  heard  outside  of  the  Brit- 
ish Islands.  British  dominion  in  India  and  in 
Africa  is  not  necessary  to  American  regard  and 
afFection  for  the  mother  country.  It  is,  if  any- 
thing, a  damper  to  those  feelings. 

We  should  be  on  our  guard  against  appeals  to 
Anglo-Saxon  loyalty,  the  standard  euphemism 
for  Anglomania — such  as  the  following: 

If  British  power  prove  insufficient  to  protect 
the  empire,  the  unity  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  may 
be  broken  up  and  the  great  race,  which  united 
should  be  able  to  make  "liberty  and  freedom 
within  the  law"  the  ultimate  ruling  principle  of 
humanity,  may  be  scattered  into  a  number  of 
small  and  weak  and  consequently  uninfluential 
states.  .  .  . 

The  present  division  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race 
is  due  merely  to  an  old  family  quarrel,  followed 
by  a  few  minor  disputes  and  dissensions.  .  .  . 
We  may  well  look  forward  in  the  far  future  to  a 
gigantic  peace-compelling  Anglo-Saxon  federa- 
tion of  all  the  Anglo-speaking  peoples,  with 
home  rule  all  around  and  a  great  federal  cus- 
toms and  defence  union.  Then  will  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  race  be  truly  unassailable.^ 

^  The  Future  Peace  of  the  Anglo-Saxons^  by  S.   L.   Murray, 

pp.  122,  123. 


158  AMERICAN  POLICY 

A  specious  proposal  that  the  United  States 
renounce  the  Washington  Precept  and  the  Bol- 
ivar Idea.  What  the  United  States  would 
gain  by  it  is  hard  to  see.  United  America,  not 
Greater  Britain,  is  the  aim  of  American  states- 
manship. The  nations  of  America  have  no  such 
interest  in  their  mother  countries  as  would  jus- 
tify them  in  cultivating  their  good  will  in  gen- 
eral opposition  to  other  nations.  The  United 
States  owes  to  its  British  antecedents  the  foun- 
dations of  its  government,  the  beginnings  and 
grandest  inspirations  of  its  literature,  but  jn 
imperial  administration  it  is  shunning  rather 
than  following  the  example  of  Great  Britain. 
In  the  domains  of  art,  of  science,  of  industry,  of 
war,  of  education,  it  is  less  beholden  to  Great 
Britain  than  it  is  to  Germany.  To  those  who 
look  a  little  below  the  fortuitous  condition  of  a 
common  language  and  origin;  who  consider  the 
acts  of  nations  and  ponder  on  their  motives 
and  interests;  who,  looking  over  the  past,  note 
the  injuries  and  the  benefits  received  from  for- 
eign governments  and  peoples,  the  best  friend 
of  the  United  States  appears  to  be  Germany. 
But  those  who  look  away  from  the  past  and  be- 
yond the  present,  whose  vision  ranges  toward 


CONCLUSION  159 

the  purple  rim  of  futurity,  who  contemplate  a 
possible  worid  conflict,  between  Old  and  New, 
between  Tradition  and  Progress,  descry  a 
stocky,  military  figure  silhouetted  against  the 
rising  sun,  embodying  the  spirit  of  the  New 
East  and  representing  the  Great  Britain  of  the 
Pacific.  Japan,  however,  is  not  alone  in  the 
field  for  the  mastery  of  the  Orient.  Russia  may 
secure  it  and,  if  she  do  not,  may,  with  her  hun- 
dreds of  millions  of  subjects,  hold  the  balance  of 
power  between  America  and  Europe.  The  most 
important  friendship  for  Pan  America  to  culti- 
vate is  that  of  Japan  and  Russia.  It  should 
seek  to  attach  those  powers  to  it  and  to  recon- 
cile them  to  each  other.  Befriended  by  these 
powerful  empires  and  the  lusty  republic  of 
China,  Pan  America  may  proceed  down  the 
vista  of  the  ages,  decking  it  with  the  trophies 
of  peace,  with  prizes  of  art,  of  science,  and  of 
commerce,  justifying  the  primitive  meaning  of 
the  name  Pacific  Ocean  and  holding  out  as  fair 
a  promise  as  any  yet  given  to  men,  of  a  Pacific 
Worid. 

THE   END 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX  A 

CITIZENS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
OF  LATIN-AMERICAN  COUNTRIES,  IN 
CERTAIN  COUNTRIES  OF  CONTINENT- 
AL EUROPE,  IN  THE  COURSE  OF  THE 
WINTER  OF  1900-1901.' 


Countries 


United 
States 


Latin- 
American 


France 

Germany. . . 

Italy 

Spain 

Portugal .  . . 
Sweden .... 
Luxemburg 
Norway .... 

Totals . . . 


6,15s 

17,848 

2,907 

438 

646 

422 

18 

3,648 


32,082 


10,017 
2,812 
1,638 
1,972 

7>67S 

II 

8 

81 


24,214 


For  Germany,  on  the  ist  of  December,  1910,  the 
numbers  are: 

United  States 17,512 

Latin- Americans 4,890 

^  Except  those  in  France,  the  census  of  which  was  taken  on 
the  24th  of  March,  1901. 

163 


164  APPENDIX  A 

but  for  Berlin: 

United  States 702 

Latin-Americans 808 

and  for  Paris  (March  24,  1901):! 

United  States 3>665 

Latin- Americans 4,892 

^Resultats  Statistiques  du  Recensement  general  de  la  Popula- 
tion (1901),  Tome  IV. 


APPENDIX   B 

MARRIAGES  OF   ARGENTINIANS    IN    BUENOS 
AYRES   DURING  THE   YEAR    1907-8 


Argentinians  with  Argentinians 

4,565 
2,824 

Argentinian  women  with  Italian  men 

Argentinian  men  with  ItaHan  women .... 

2,270 
554 

Argentinian  women  with  Spanish  men . . . 
Argentinian  men  with  Spanish  women . . . 

936 
404 

i»340 

Argentinian  women  with  Uruguayan  men 
Argentinian  men  with  Uruguayan  women 

421 

240 

661 

Argentinian  women  with  French  men .... 
Argentinian  men  with  French  women. . . 

178 
99 

277 

Argentinian  women  with  English  men . . . 
Argentinian  men  with  English  women . . . 

74 
19 

93 

Argentinian  women  with  German  men. . . 
Argentinian  men  with  G  erman  women . . 

51 
21 

72 

Argentinian  women  with  other  men  .... 
Argentinian  men  with  other  women 

Total 

208 
99 

307 

10,139 

La  Espana  Moderna,  April,  191 3,  p. 
i6s 


IS3- 


i66  APPENDIX  B 

Deducting  the  undetermined  307,  we  have  9,832 
marriages,  of  which  165  were  Argentinian-EngHsh  or 
Argentinian-German,  and  9,667  that  may  be  con- 
sidered as  Argentinian-Latin,  Argentinian-mestizo, 
or  Argentinian-Indian. 


APPENDIX  C 

These  tables  are  compiled  and  computed  from 
Table  No.  245,  Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United 
States^  191 2,  p.  429,  and  other  data  furnished  by  the 
Department  of  Commerce.  Unfortunately,  no  fig- 
ures were  available  for  the  trade  in  general  of  Latin- 
America,  subsequently  to  191 1. 


TRADE  OF  UNITED  STATES—EXPORTS  AND  IMPORTS 


Year 

With  Latin-America 

With  all  countries, 
including  Latin- 
America 

Ratio  of  trade 
with  Latin- 
America  to 

trade  with  all 
countries 

1905. •• 
I9II 

^507,000,000 
681,000,000 

Increase,  34% 
Per  year,  5.7% 

^2,636,074,737 
3,577,546,304 

Increase,  36% 
Per  year,  6% 

0.19 
0.19 

TRADE  OF  LATIN-AMERICA— EXPORTS  AND  IMPORTS 


Year 

With  United  States 

With  all  countries, 

including  United 

States 

Ratio  of  trade 

with  U.  S.  to 

trade  with  all 

countries 

1905.... 
I9II 

$507,000,000 
681,000,000 

Increase,  34% 
Per  year,  5.7% 

$1,776,516,000 
2,457,676,000 

Increase,  38% 
Per  year,  6.3  % 

0.29 
0.28 

167 


i68 


APPENDIX  C 


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BIBLIOGRAPHY 

A  STAR  *  INDICATES  THAT  THE  WORK  INCLUDES  A 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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The  Foundations  of  American  Foreign  Policy"*  (1901). 

A.  B.  Hart. 
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The  Future  Peace  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  (1905).     S.  L. 

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Das  Deutschtum  in  den  Vereinigten  Staaten  in  seiner 

geschichtlichen    Entwickelung     (191 1).      A.    B. 

Faust. 
The  German  Element  in  the   United  States  (1909). 

A.  B.  Faust. 
Das    Wachstum    der    Vereinigten    Staaten    und   ihre 

auswdrtige  Politik  (1899).     Albrecht  Wirth. 
170 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  171 

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Digest  of  the  International  Law  of  the  United  States 

(1887).     Francis  Wharton. 
Census  of  the  United  State s,  1910. 
Le  Droit  international  theorique  et  pratique  (1887- 

96).     Charles  Calvo. 
Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United  States  (191 2). 
Kleines  statistisches  Taschenhuch  uher  alle  Lander  der 

Erde  (1913).     A.  Hartleben. 
La  Revolution  fr am; aise  et  V Amerique  du  Sud  (191 2). 

L.  A.  de  Herrera. 
Immigration.     A  Central  American  Problem.     E.  B. 

Filsinger,  in  The  Annalsy  May,  191 1. 
Problems  of  Power ^  a  Study  of  International  Politics 

from   Sadowa  to   Kirk-Kilisse  (191 3).      W.  M. 

Fullerton. 
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Les  EtatS'Unis   et  la   Doctrine  de   Monroe    (1900). 

Hector  Petin. 
La  Doctrine  Monroe  et  V Amerique  latine.     D.  Anto- 

kletz. 
La  Doctrina  de  Monroe  (1893).     J.  M.  Cespedes. 
La  Doctrine  de  Monroe  (1898).     M.   D.  de  Beau- 

marchais. 
Ibid,  (1896).     A.  Desjardin. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  (1898).     W.  F.  Reddaway. 
Ibid.  (1904).     T.  B.  Edgington. 


172  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Ibid.  (1885).     G.  F.  Tucker. 

Ihid.  (1863).     Joshua  Leavitt. 

Ibid.  (1853).     S.  A.  Douglas  {Cong.  Globe,  32  Cong., 

2  Sess.,  p.  941,  and  Append.,  p.  257). 
The  Monroe  Doctrine,  Its  Origin  and  Meaning  (1895). 

J.  B.  Moore. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  an  Obsolete  Shibboleth  (191 3). 

Hiram  Bingham. 
Die   neuesten   Anwendungen    der   Monroe    Doctrine 

(1908).     J.  C.  Dunning. 
Die  Monroedoktrin  in  ihren  Beziehungen  %ur  Ame- 

rikanischen   Diplomatie    und   zum    Volkerrecht 

(1913).     Herbert  Kraus. 
The   Life   of  Stephen   A.    Douglas    (i860).     J.   W. 

Sheahan. 
The  European  Concert  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  (1905). 

J.  B.  Angell. 
The  Clayton-Bulzver  Treaty  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 

(1882).     Published  by  United  States  State  De- 
partment (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  194,  47  Cong.,  i  Sess.). 
Spain,  Cuba,  and  the  United  States,  Recognition  and 

the  Monroe  Doctrine  {i^y 6).     Americus,     V.  W. 

Kingsley. 
Politique  exterieure  des  Etats-Unisy  Doctrine  Monroe. 

Ernest  Caylus. 
Monro'isme.     F.  Capella  y  Pons. 
Le   Vol  de  VAigle  de  Monroe    a  Roosevelt    (1905). 

Joseph  Ribet. 
Les  Paradis  de  VAmerique   Centrale.     Maurice   de 

WalefFe. 
Vimperialisme  americain.     Henri  Hauser. 
Ibid.     J.  Patouillet. 
Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  vol.  VI. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  173 

Ocean  to  Oceariy  an  Accounty  Personal  and  Historicaly 
of  Nicaragua  and  Its  People  (1902).  J.  W.  G. 
Walker. 

Notes  on  Central  America^  (1855).     E.  G.  Squier. 

The  Relations  of  the  United  States  and  Spain  (1909). 
F.  E.  Chadwick. 

The  Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United  States  and 
Spanish' America  (1900).     J.  H.  Latane. 

Stephen  A,  Douglas  (1909).     C.  E.  Carr. 

Las  grandes  Mentiras  de  nuestra  Historia  (1904). 
Francisco  Bulnes. 

American  Historical  Review  (Monroe  Doctrine),  vols. 
V,  VII,  VIII,  XI,  XVIII. 

The  Voyages  and  Works  of  John  Davis  (1880). 
A.  H.  Markham. 

Thoughts  on  the  late  Transactions  respecting  Falk- 
land's Islands  (1771).     Samuel  Johnson. 

Voyage  autour  du  Monde  par  la  Fregate  du  Roi  La 
Boudeuse  et  la  Flute  VEtoile  en  1766,  1767,  1768, 
1769  (1771).     L.  A.  de  Bougainville. 


The  Case  of  Venezuela,  a  Reply  to  The  British  Blue 
Book  (1896).  Commission,  Government  of  Ven- 
ezuela. 

United  States  Commission  on  Boundary  Between  Ven- 
ezuela and  British  Guiana  (1897). 

British  Aggressions  in  Venezuela  (1895).  W.  C. 
Scruggs. 

Venezuela,  Nos.  i  (1899),  2  (1899),  7  (1899),  i 
(1902),  I  (1903),  I  (1904).  British  Foreign 
Office. 

British  Guiana  Boundary,  Arbitration  with  the  United 


174  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

States  of  Venezuela    (1898).      British    Foreign 

Office. 
British  Guiana^  Venezuela  Boundary^  Arbitration^  etc. 

(1899).     British  Foreign  Office. 
line  Application  du  Principe  de  V Arbitrage,     L.  de  la 

Chanoine. 
V Arbitrage  anglo-venezuelien,     G.  Bariset. 
The  Venezuela  Dispute  (1896).     J.  B.  McMaster. 
The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy  (191 3).     Gro- 

ver  Cleveland. 


Pan-Amerika*  (1910).     A.  H.  Fried. 

Relaciones  del  Libertador  Simon  Bolivar,  ...  0  Dia- 

rio  de  Bucaramanga  (1869).     Lacroix. 
Documentos  para  la  Historia  de  la   Vida  publica  del 

Libertador  de  Colombiay  Peru  y  Bolivia  (1875- 

77),  published  by  direction  of  General  Guzman 

Blanco. 
Life  of  Simon  Bolivar  (1866).     Felipe  Larrazabal. 
Simon  Bolivar,     E.  L.  Petre. 
Esquisse  de  la  Vie  de  Bolivar,     S.  de  Schryner. 
Union  latino-americano ;  Pensamiento  de  Bolivar ^  etc. 

(1865).     J.  M.  Torres-Caicedo. 
The  Pan-American  Union  (191 1).     John  Barrett. 
International  American  Conference  (1890). 
Minutes  of  the  International  American   Conference 

(1890). 
Congress  of  Panama^  House  Resolutions^  38,  40,  41, 

I  Sess.,  19  Cong.  (1826);  Rep.  of  Sen.  Comm., 

Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  232,  51   Cong.,  i   Sess.,  Part  3 

(1890).  _ 
La  Conferencia  internacional  de  Mexico  (1902). 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  175 

Congres  de  Panama  (1825).     Abbe  de  Pradt. 
Autour  de  Vlsthme  de  Panama.     Joseph  Justin. 
Bulletin   of    the    Pan  American    Union,    February, 

1913- 

El  Porvenir  de  la  America  latina  (1910).     Manuel 

Ugarte. 
Les  Democraties  latines  de  VAmerique   (191 2).     F. 

Garcia-Calderon.      Published     in     English    as 

Latin- America,  Its  Rise  and  Progress  (1913). 
La  Politique  exterieure  d' Haiti  (1886).     J.  N.  Leger. 
The  Republics  of  Central  and  South  America  (191 3). 

C.  R.  Knock. 
South  America,  Observations  and  Impressions  (191 2). 

James  Bryce. 
Pueblo  enfermo,  Contribucion  a  la  Psicologia  de  los 

Pueblos  hispano-americanos.     Alcides  Arguedas. 
South  American  Problems*  (191 2).     R.  E.  Speer. 
Cuestiones  americanas  (1907).     J.  S.  Carranza. 
Sild-Amerika   und  die   deutschen   Interessen    (1903). 

Wilhelm  Sievers. 
Welche  Aussichten  bieten  sich  den  Deutschen  in  Sud- 

Amerika,     Doctor  Backhaus. 
The  Two  Americas  (1914).     Rafael  Reyes. 
V Amerique  et  le  Droit  international  (1907).     Etienne 

Vernet. 
Le  Droit  international  americain  (1910).     Alejandro 

Alvarez. 
Race  Distinctions  in  American  Law  (19 10).     G.  T. 

Stephenson. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


A  B  C  of  La  tin- America,  13. 

Aberdeen,  Earl  of,  112. 

Africa,  partition  of,  115,  137,  155. 

African  race,  6. 

Alaska  boundary,  47,  52,  53. 

Alexander  VI,  Pope,  70  n. 

Alliances,  on  part  of  U.  S.,  32-39. 

Alsace,  137. 

Alvarez,  Alejandro,  on  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  56,  69. 

America,  in  relation  to  Europe,  42, 
153-156;  transfer  of  territory  of, 
70-72;  population  of,  9,  10, 
150-152,  15s,  156;  currency, 
weights  and  measures,  etc.,  of, 
148;  armies  of,  155. 

Andrade,  Ignacio,  on  Venezuela 
boundary  decision,  120. 

Anglo-Saxon  population,  4,  5; 
union,  157. 

Angouleme,  Duke  of,  in  Spain,  49. 

Arbitration,  Anglo  -  Venezuelan 
boundary,  116  et  seq.;  of  con- 
tractual debts,  132-134;  in  the 
Bolivar  Idea,  141;  treaties  for 
compulsory,  147. 

Argentina,  13;  res  nidlius,  68;  de- 
clared independence,  105;  col- 
onizes Falkland  Islands,  105, 
106;  Drago  Doctrine,  129,  130; 
134;  invited  to  Congress  of 
Panama,  142;  at  Congress  of 
Lima  (i  864-1 865),  145. 

Asia,  140,  156. 

Australia,  156. 

Austro-Hungary,  ratifies  Hague 
Convention,  133. 

Aves,  Island  of,  70  n. 


Bariset,  G.,  on  Venezuela  bound- 
ary arbitration,  117,  118,  121, 
122. 


Bartholdt,  Richard,  on  collection 
of  contractual  debts,  131,  133. 

Bay  Islands,  The,  a  British  de- 
pendency, 108,  109. 

Belgium,  134. 

Belize.    See  British  Honduras, 

Big  Stick,  The,  30. 

Bolivar  Idea,  The,  29,  30,  56, 136- 
150,  158,  159. 

Bolivar,  Simon,  his  ill  treatment, 
20;  the  BoUvar  Idea,  29,  30, 
137-150;  letters  from,  139-141. 

Bolivia,  population  of,  6;  res 
nullius  in,  6S;  134;  at  Congress 
of  Lima,  145;  absent  from  con- 
ference at  Buenos  Ayres,  146. 

Bougainville,  L.  A.  de,  takes  pos- 
session of  Falkland  Islands,  100. 

Brazil,  population  of,  4,  9;  Ger- 
man ideas  in,  6;  government  of, 
13 »  134;  invited  to  Panama 
Congress,  142. 

Brewer,  D.  J.,  Justice  Supreme 
Court  of  U.  S.,  117. 

British  element  in  America,  5,  27. 

British  Honduras,  made  a  crown 
colony,  99,  100,  127,  128. 

Buchanan,  James,  on  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty,  87. 

Buenos  Ayres,  United  Provinces 
of.    See  Argentina. 

Buenos  Ayres,  Conference  in,  143, 
145;  marriages  in,  148,  165. 

Bulgaria,  134. 

Bulwer,  Sir  Henry,  87,  88,  91. 

Byzantium,  140. 

Camoens,  156. 

Canada,  territory  of,  61  n.;  U.  S. 

people  in,  76,  156. 
Canning,  George,  British  secretary, 

42-46;  credited  with  suggesting 


179 


i8o 


INDEX 


Monroe  Doctrine,  51;   his  doc- 
trine, 51-54- 

Central  America,  population  of, 
19;  as  part  of  U.  S.,  60;  under 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  91-94; 
spoliation  of,  137;  invited  to 
Panama  Congress,  142;  at  same 
145.    See  Latin-America. 

Cervantes,  156. 

Chanoine,  L.  de  La,  on  Vene- 
zuela boundary  arbitration,  118, 
119. 

Chili,  population  of,  7;  govern- 
ment of,  13,  134;  invited  to 
Congress  of  Panama,  142;  at 
Congresses  of  Lima,  145;  at 
Congress  of  Santiago,  id. 

China,  ratifies  Hague  Convention, 
133,  137,  159. 

Chincha  Islands,  The,  126,  127. 

Civil  War  in  U.  S.,  foreign  ele- 
ment in,  78. 

Clarendon,  Lord,  as  to  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty,  93. 

Clay,  Henry,  against  transfer  of 
Cuba,  70. 

Clayton,  J.  M.,  in  Senate,  35; 
secretary  of  state,  88  n. 

Clayton,  S.  M.,  commanding  Falk- 
land Islands,  105. 

Clayton-Bulwer    Treaty,    86393;^ 
proposed  abrogation  of,  109. 

Cleveland,  President,  on  Anglo- 
Venezuelan  dispute,  no. 

Clipperton  Island,  62  n. 

Coaling  stations  for  U.  S.,  93,  94. 

ColHns,  Sir  Richard,  117. 

Colombia,  population  of,  7 ;  course 
of  U.  S.  toward,  74,  95,  134; 
hegemony  of,  142;  invited  to 
Panama  Congress,  id.;  at  same, 
145;  at  Congress  of  Lima,  id. 
See  Panama,  Secession  of. 

Colonization  by  non-American 
powers,  47,  53-55,  60-69. 

Colored  people  in  U.  S.,  5,  26,  27; 
in  Latin- America,  6,  8,  9. 

Commercial  Bureau  of  the  Ameri- 
can Republics,  The,  142. 

Concessions,  Latin- American,  67, 
68. 

Congress  of  Panama.  See  Panama. 


Contractual  Debts.     See  Debts. 

Conventions,  Hague  Conference, 
13 1- 1 34.  See  Treaties  and  Pro- 
tocol. 

Corea,  137. 

Corinth,  Isthmus  of,  140. 

Corinto,  British  occupation  of,  131. 

Costa  Rica,  subscribes  to  debt  of 
Nicaragua,  131,  134;  not  at 
Hague  Conference,  id. 

Creoles,  6,  8. 

Cuba,  transfer  of,  70,  71,  134. 

Davis,  John,  said  to  have  discov- 
ered Falkland  Islands,  99. 

Debts,  collection  of  contractual, 
129-134.     See  Public  loans. 

Denmark,  despoiled  by  Austria 
and  Prussia,  82,  83;  ratifies 
Hague  Convention,  133. 

Diaz,  Porfirio,  7. 

Dollar  Diplomacy,  30. 

Dominican  Republic,  under  finan- 
cial tutelage,  124,  134;  absent 
from  Washington  Conference, 
146. 

Douglas,  S.  A.,  on  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  89-91. 

Drago  Doctrine,  The,  128-130, 
136. 

Drago,  L.  M.    See  Drago  Doctrine, 

Eastern    Hemisphere,    American 

territory  in,    61,  62.    See   Old 

World. 
Ecuador,  population  of,  6,  7;   res 

nullius  in,  68, 134;  at  Congresses 

of  Lima,  145;    at  Congress  of 

Santiago,  id. 
Europe,  in  relation  to  America,  24, 

25,  41,  42,  63-72,  81-84,  140, 

153-156. 
Exclusion  of  Mongolians,  31. 
Expansion,  by  U.  S.,  40,  44. 

Falkland  Islands,   appropriation, 

of,  99-108. 
Fiji  Islands,  colonized  by  Great 

Britain,  99. 
France,  in  relation  to  U.  S.,  33-36; 

to   Great  Britain,  43,   44,   52; 

intervention  of,  in  Mexico,  94- 


INDEX 


i8i 


97,  125,  127;  first  settles  Falk- 
land Islands,  100;  ratifies  Hague 
Convention,  133;  annexes  Mad- 
agascar and  Morocco,  137,  155, 
163. 

Frelinghuysen,  F.  T.,  secretary  of 
state,   109. 

French  element  in  America,  6,  8, 
27. 

French  Revolution,  influence  of, 
17. 

Fuller,  M.  W.,  Chief  Justice,  117. 

Garcia-Calderon,  F.,  opposed  to 
immigration  from  U.  S.,  24. 

German  element  in  Latin-America, 
6,  8,  27. 

Germany,  intervenes  in  Hayti, 
128;  in  Venezuela,  id.;  ratifies 
Hague  Convention,  133;  her  an- 
nexation of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, 137;  her  interests  in 
South  America,  138,  155,  163. 

Grant,  President,  on  transfer  of 
territory,  71;  disappearance  of 
European  power  from  America, 

Great  Britain,  present  troubles  of, 
3;  opposes  emigration  to  U.  S., 
3,  4;  in  relation  to  U.  S.,  34-36, 
42-45,  8s  et  seq.,  156-158;  in 
relation  to  Nicaragua,  35,  130, 
131;  to  Holy  Alliance,  42,  50, 
51;  to  Latin- America,  42-44; 
to  France,  43,  44,  52;  her  pos- 
sessions in  Western  Hemisphere, 
62, 99-108;  in  Pacific  Ocean,  99, 
115;  refuses  to  abrogate  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  Treaty,  109;  con- 
troversy with  Venezuela,  iio- 
120,  137;  grasping  diplomacy 
of,  122, 123;  ratifies  Hague  Con- 
vention, 133;  her  spoliation  of 
Central  America,  137;  opposed 
to  Pan  Americanism,  156. 

Greece,  134. 

Guam,  Island  of,  62. 

Guatemala,  subscribes  to  debt  of 
Nicaragua,  131;  ratifies  Hague 
Convention,  133. 

Guiana,  British,  boundary  contro- 
versy, no  et  seq. 


Hague  Conference,  as  to  contrac- 
tual debts,  131-134. 

Haiti.     See  Hayti. 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  on  Venezue- 
lan boundary  decision,  120. 

Hayti,  intervention  in,  128;  rati- 
fies Hague  Convention,  133 ;  ab- 
sent from  conference  at  Rio  de 
Janeiro,  146. 

Holland,  her  litigation  with  Ven- 
ezuela, 70  n.;  acquires  part  of 
Guiana,  in. 

Holy  Alliance,  The,  41,  42  n. 

Honduras,  134;  not  at  Hague 
Conference,  id. 

Iberian-American,  distinguished 
from  Latin- American,  4;  mu- 
latto, 6. 

Immigration,  to  U.  S.,  3-5;  to 
Latin- America,  16,  18,  19,  21- 
23,  76,  77. 

India,  British,  86,  157. 

Indian  race,  American,  6-9. 

International  Bureau  of  American 
Republics,  The,  142. 

International  philanthropy,  31, 
124. 

Intervention,  by  U.  S.,  39,  40; 
by  Holy  Alliance,  47-50;  by 
France  in  Mexico,  94-97,  125; 
by  Spain  in  Peru,  126,  127;  by 
Germany  in  Hayti,  128;  by 
Great  Britain,  Germany,  and 
Italy  in  Venezuela,  1 28. 

Italian  element  in  America,  27. 

Italy,  intervenes  in  Venezuela, 
128,  134,  137,  163. 

Japan,  ratifies  Hague  Convention, 

133;   137.  159. 
Juarez,  B.  P.,  President  of  Mexico, 

7. 
Junius,  104. 

Kilpatrick,  H.  J.,  minister  to 
Chili,  126,  127. 

Latin-America,  population  of,  3- 
28;  76,  156;  republicanism  of, 
10-13,  66-68;  union  of  coun- 
tries of,  17 ;  influenced  by  French 


l82 


INDEX 


Revolution,  17;  two  great  wants 
of,  28;  congresses  of  republics 
of,  36,  143-145;  opposed  to  po- 
litical system  of  Europe,  50; 
liberation  of,  52;  in  relation  to 
Monroe  Doctrine,  56,  57;  revo- 
lutions in,  77;  as  a  market,  83, 
84;  absorption  of,  84;  collec- 
tion of  contractual  debts  in, 
131-136;  represented  at  Hague 
Conference,  134;  German  inter- 
ests in,  138;  trade  of,  167-169. 

Latin-Americans,  distinguished 
from  Iberian- Americans,  4;  in 
U.  S.,  14-16;  in  Europe,  id., 
163;   characteristics  of,  18-20. 

Latin  race,  24. 

Lima,  Congresses  of,  36,  145. 

Lodge,  H.  C.,  on  his  resolution,  79; 
on  the  Anglo- Venezuelan  con- 
troversy, 1 14- 1 16. 

Lodge  Resolution,  The.  See 
Lodge f  H.  C. 

Lorraine,  139. 

Luxemburg,  134,  163. 

Madagascar,  137. 
Mallet-Prevost,    counsel   of  Ven- 
ezuela, on  Venezuelan  boundary 

decision,  120. 
Martens,     Frederic     de.     Privy 

Councillor,  117,  120. 
Mestizo,  7,  8. 
Mettemich,  Prince,  42  n. 
Mexico,  as  part  of  U.  S.,  60,  75,  76; 

partly  absorbed  by  U.  S.,  74,  77; 

French  intervention  in,  94-97; 

ratifies  Hague  Convention,  133; 

invited   to   Panama   Congress, 

142;  at  same,  145. 
Mexico  City,  Conference  in,  143, 

145. 
Mongolians,  excluded  from  U.  S., 

131. 
Monroe,  President,  his  message, 

December      2,     1823,     47-50- 

See  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Monroe  Doctrine,  The,  29,  46-84; 
"^  for   benefit    of    U.    S.,    55-57; 

sphere  of,  57-59;    enforcement 

of,  59,  60;    as  to  expansion  by 

U.  S.,  60;    cases  under,  85  el 


seq.;  136;  as  protection  of  West- 
ern Hemisphere,  138. 

Montenegro,  134. 

Morocco,  137. 

Mosquito  Coast,  British  Domin- 
ion, 108,  109. 

Mulatto,  6. 

Napoleon  III,  his  intervention  in 
Mexico,  94,  95. 

Netherlands,  ratifies  Hague  Con- 
vention, 133. 

New  Granada.     See  Colombia. 

New  World.  See  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. 

New  York,  148. 

New  Zealand,  colonized  by  Great 
Britain,  99. 

Nicaragua,  in  relation  to  U.  S.,  35, 
131;  fined  by  Great  Britain, 
131;  financially  assisted  by 
Costa  Rica,  San  Salvador,  and 
Guatemala,  131;  ratifies  Hague 
Convention,  133. 

Non-recognition  of  governments 
based  on  violence,  31. 

Norway,  ratifies  Hague  Conven- 
tion, 133,  163. 

Old  World,  overpopulation  of,  137; 
consciousness,  150-152,  156, 
159.  See  Ancient  World,  East- 
ern Hemisphere. 

Open  Door  in  China,  The,  31. 

Orient,  The  mastery  of  the,  159. 

Pacific  Ocean,  The,  159. 

Palmyra  Island,  62  n. 

Pan  America,  Pan  Americanism. 
See  Bolivar  Idea. 

Pan  American  Association,  142; 
Union,  142-145;  conferences, 
143-150;  congresses,  143,  145; 
league,  treaties,  conventions, 
145-147;  consciousness,  150; 
soHdarity,  151,  153;  railroad, 
147,  148. 

Panama,  Congress  of,  36-38,  81, 
141,  142,  145;  as  site  for  con- 
gresses, 139,  140. 

Panama,  Secession  of,  18;  ratifies 
Hague  Convention,  133. 


INDEX 


183 


Panama  Canal,  The,  60,  138,  151. 

Paraguay,  res  nullius,  68;    134. 

Peace  conferences,  39,  40. 

Pekin,  allied  expedition  to,  40. 

Persia,  134, 

Peru,  population  of,  6,  7,  134;  at 
Congress  of  Panama,  145;  at 
Congresses  of  Lima,  id.;  at  Con- 
gresses of  Santiago,  id. 

Philippine  Islands,  The,  independ- 
ence for,  31,  40,  41;  acquisition 
of,  40;  in  Eastern  Hemisphere, 
61,  62. 

Political  system  of  Europe,  48,  50, 
63-66. 

Polk,  President,  his  understand- 
ing of  Monroe  Doctrine,  59;  on 
transfer  of  territory,  71. 

Population  and  government,  3-28. 

Port  de  la  Croisade,  10 1. 

Port  Egmont,  101-104. 

Port  Louis,  first  settlement  in 
Falkland  Islands,  100;  evacu- 
ated, 105. 

Porto  Rico,  transfer  of,  70. 

Portugal,  4,  6;  ratifies  Hague  Con- 
vention, 133;    156,  163. 

Protective  tariff.     See  Tarijff. 

Protocol  (1840),  Russia,  England, 
France,  82. 

Public  loans,  under  Drago  Doc- 
trine, 130,  135  n.     See  Debts. 

Rayner,  Isidor,  on  Venezuela 
boundary  controversy,  no. 

Res  nullius  in  America,  53,  54,  68, 
69. 

Rio  de  Janeiro,  Conference  in, 
143. 

Rojas,  J.  M.  de,  on  Venezuelan 
boundary  decision,  120. 

Roosevelt,  President,  on  hege- 
mony of  U.  S.,  30  n.,  123,  124. 

Rosebery,  Earl  of,  113. 

Roumania,  ratifies  Hague  Con- 
vention, 133. 

Rush,  Richard,  U.  S.  minister,  42, 
53  n. 

Russel,  Lord  Chief  Justice,  117. 

Russia,  boundary  of,  Alaskan,  47, 
52,  53;  ratifies  Hague  Conven- 
tion, 133;   137,  iss,  159. 


Salvador.    See  San  Salvador. 

Sambo,  6. 

San  Salvador,  subscribes  to  debt 
of  Nicaragua,  131;  ratifies 
Hague  Convention,  133;  at 
Congress  of  Lima  (i  864-1 865), 

145- 

Santiago,  Congress  of,  36,  145. 

Santo  Domingo.  See  Dominican 
Republic. 

Schleswig-Holstein.   See  Denmark. 

Schomburgk,  Sir  R.  H.,  in. 

Self-preservation,  right  of,  79,  80. 

Servia,  134. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  secretary  of  state, 
36,  95,  97,  127- 

Shakespeare,  156. 

Shirt-sleeve  diplomacy,  no. 

Siam,  134. 

Solomon  Islands,  colonized  by 
Great  Britain,  99. 

South  America.  See  Latin-Amer- 
ica. 

Spain,  invasion  of,  49  n.,  52;  in 
relation  to  Cuba,  70;  to  Portu- 
gal, 70  n.;  claims  Falkland  Is- 
lands, loi;  expels  British  from, 
103;  restores  islands  to  British, 
103,  104;  right  by  discovery,  to 
Guiana,  in,  134,  156,  163. 

Spanish- America,  4,  6;  union  of 
countries  of,  17. 

Spanish  element  in  America,  4,  6, 
27. 

St.  Barthelemy,  Island  of,  trans- 
ferred, 72. 

Strong,  John,  first  explored  Falk- 
land Islands,  99. 

Suffrage  in  Latin- America,  12. 

Sweden,  returned  Island  of  St. 
Barthelemy  to  France,  72,  134, 
163. 

Switzerland,  134. 

Taft,  President,  80. 

Tariff,  for  revenue,  30;  a  factor  in 

diplomacy,  60,  151. 
Territory,  value  of,  137,  138. 
Texas,  revolt  of,  against  Mexico, 

77- 
Trade  of  U.  S.  with  Latin- America, 

167-169. 


1 84 


INDEX 


Transfer  of  American  territory, 
70-72. 

Treaties,  U.  S-  with  France,  33; 
with  Great  Britain,  34,  86-91; 
with  Nicaragua,  35;  with  Co- 
lombia, 95;  Great  Britain  with 
Venezuela,  116.  See  Protocol, 
Conventions y  Pan  American. 

Tripoli,  137. 

Turkey,  134. 

Ugarte,  Manuel,  on  Latin-Ameri- 
can republicanism,  10-12;  op- 
posed to  U.  S.  immigration,  16; 
favors  Latin-American  Union, 
17;  on  hegemony  of  U.  S.,  73; 
favors  European  protection,  81, 
82. 

United  States,  population  of,  4,  5, 
26,  27;  immigration  from,  16; 
in  secession  of  Panama,  18; 
oflBcials  of,  in  Antilles,  22  n.; 
foreign  policy  of,  cardinal  prin- 
ciples, 29  et  seq.;  minor  prin- 
ciples, 30,  31;  hegemony  of,  30, 
72-75,  123,  124;  responsibility 
of,  for  Latin- America,  3 1 ;  com- 
mand of  the  Pacific,  31;  in  rela- 
tion to  France,  33-36,  125;  to 
Great  Britain,  34-36,  156-158; 
to  Nicaragua,  35;  to  Con- 
gresses of  Latin- American  re- 
publics, 36-38;  to  Pan  American 
Conferences,  39,  144;  to  Peace 
Conferences,  39,  40;  to  Russia, 
47;  to  Dominican  Republic,  124; 
to  Germany,  158;  not  seeking 
territory,  74-76;   not  protector 


of  Latin- America,  76,  80,  81, 
127;  ratifies  Hague  Convention, 
133;  invited^  to  Panama  Con- 
gress, 142;  its  pohcy  toward 
Latin- America,  152,  153;  citi- 
zens of,  in  Europe,  163;  trade 
of,  167-169. 
Uruguay,  population  of,  7,  9;  gov- 
ernment of,  13;   134. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  his  declara- 
tion respecting  Cuba,  70,  71. 

Venezuela,  her  litigation  with  Hol- 
land, 70  n.;  her  controversy 
with  Great  Britain,  1 10-120, 
137;  intervention  in,  128,  134; 
at  Congress  of  Lima  (1864- 
1865),  145;  absent  from  con- 
ference at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  146. 

Vernet,  Louis,  105,  106. 

Waleffe,  Maurice  de,  on  expan- 
sion of  U.  S.,  75. 

Washington,  Conference  in,  143- 
145- 

Washington  Precept,  The,  29-41, 
47,  158. 

Washington's  Farewell  Address. 
See  Washington  Precept. 

Webster,  Daniel,  on  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  58;  on  transfer  of 
Cuba,  71. 

Western  Hemisphere,  The,  42; 
expansion  in,  51;  sphere  of 
Monroe  Doctrine,  57,  58,  61,  62, 
138;  contractual  debts  in.  135, 
136,  156,  159. 


14  DAY  USE 

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